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1  An Overview of 
Macroeconomic 
Performance 
In  the  first  half of  the  l980s,  Bolivia experienced an economic crisis of 
extraordinary proportions. As seen in table I  I, Bolivia's  economic debacle in 
this  period was  striking  even  in  comparison with the poor performance of 
Bolivia's neighbors. Like its neighbors,  Bolivia suffered  from major external 
shocks,  including the rise in world interest  rates in the early 1980s, the cutoff in 
lending from the international capital markets, and the decline in world prices of 
Bolivia's  commodity exports. But the extent of  economic collapse in the face of 
these shocks suggests that internal factors as well have been critical  to Bolivia's 
economic performance. The Bolivian hyperinflation of 1984—85, for example, 
was  one  of the most dramatic inflations in world history and one of the only 
hyperinflations that did not result from the dislocations of  war or revolution.' 
In some ways, Bolivia's economic recovery since 1985 is as remarkable 
as the economic crisis during the first half of the decade.  In the fall of l985, 
the  new  government  of President  Victor  Paz  Estenssoro  succeeded  in 
eliminating Bolivia's  hyperinliation. The inflation  was  cut from  25,000 
percent per year during  the hyperinflation  to a remarkable 10.7 percent per 
year  in  1987.2 As  shown  in  figure  1.1.  the  disinflation was  almost 
instantaneous:  by early  1986 virtual price  stability  had been restored. 
The stabilization  is all the more amazing in view of the extremely large 
and  adverse shocks which  hit the Bolivian economy  after the start of the 
stabilization program.  As we  discuss below,  the prices of all of Bolivia's 
major exports (even the illicit exports such as coca leaf) plummeted in late 
1985  and  after.  The  terms-of-trade  deterioration  further  squeezed  real 
incomes, worsening  the  decline of over  25 percent in per capita income 
levels that had occurred in the first half of the  1980s. The terms-of-trade 
decline  further embittered  the political conflicts in  Bolivia, which  have 
always  been acute,  and  also directly reduced government  revenues, thus 
threatening the macroeconomic stabilization  program. 160  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey 1). Sachs  161  Bolivia/Chapter  1 
Tabk 1.!  Eeom,mk ftrfor  mane  in  thr 1980s,  Sal  aelad Cwtnlries 
GOP Growth  Inflation  Terms  of 
(annoal  rate),  (annnal  rate).  Debt-GDP  Trade, 1985 
Cotmlry  1980—85  1980—85  Ratio,'  1985  (1980= 100) 
Bolivia  -4.5  569.!  136.8  86 
Latin America 
Argentina  -1.4  342.8  56,4  88 
Brazil  1.3  147.7  43.8  87 
Mesico  .8  62.2  52.8  98 
East Asia 
Malaysia  5.5  3.1  62.0  85 
Indonesia  3.5  10.7  36.6  97 
Korea  7.9  6.0  43.0  105 
r  World  Bank  (1988). 
Medium- and long-term  debt. public and private. 
in  1987  Bolivia experienced its  first  positive GNP growth  after seven 
years  of  decline,  with  an  increase  in  GNP  of  2.3  percent.  Growth 
increased to about 3.0  percent in 1988.  These positive growth rates during 
1987—88  averaged  about the  same  as population growth (2.7 percent per 
year),  so  that  per  capita  income  remained  stagnant after eight  years  f 
sharp decline.  The  greatest disappointment of the  stabilization  experience 
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positive per  capita  GNP  growth.  In our view,  the  continuing  economic 
stagnation is not  a result of the stabilization  effort per se,  but  is  rather  a 
result  of the  recent  external  shocks  together  with  internal  disarray  that 
preceded the stabilization  program. 
This monograph focuses  on Bolivia's economic crisis and recovery in the 
1980s, with a special emphasis on the role of external debt in the economic 
dynamics. The bulk of our attention is on the period from 1952 to 1985, from 
the Bolivian Revolution  to the end of  the hyperinflation.  We do consider more 
briefly the period of  economic recovery, 1986—88,  but in view of  the lack of 
perspective on recent events, we are not as comprehensive in our coverage of 
the years after 1985. 
We view  the  hyperinfiation  as  the culmination of deep  trends in  the 
Bolivian economy and society, rather than the result of short-run  forces in 
the  early  l980s.  One  pervasive  theme  of our work  is  that the  recent 
economic crisis is a reflection of political and social conflicts in Bolivian 
society that have  undermined the development process for decades.  We thus 
lay  great stress  on the failures of politics in accounting for the failures of 
economic performance. 
1.1  Some Basic Characteristics  of the Bolivian Economy 
Bolivia is a landlocked country with the second  lowest  per capita income 
in  Latin America (U.S.$470 in  1985).  All  indicators  of economic  and 
social development in Bolivia lie well below the Latin American averages. 
The  economy has been  heavily  dependent on two exports,  tin and  natural 
gas, for the past thirty-five years.  Not surprisingly,  the cycles of expansion 
and contraction  of the Bolivian economy  have  followed quite  closely  the 
movements in the world market prices of tin and  petroleum.  Moreover,  as 
we  shall  see,  the  accumulation  of foreign  debt  up  until  1980 took place 
in  a  procyclical pattern,  in  that  Bolivia  became  able  to  attract  foreign 
loans precisely during  the phase of high international prices for its exports. 
At  the  same time,  in  the  mid-l970s,  a  thriving  underground  economy 
developed  based  on  coca-related exports, a  development  that has deep 
implications  for the functioning  of the economy and the country's political 
institutions. 
Bolivia's long-term growth problems begin with the inherent difficulties of 
growth  in  a  landlocked  mining economy  centered  in  breathtaking,  yet 
forbidding, terrain more than 14,000 feet above sea level. Bolivia is a very 
large and  sparsely populated country. Its area  is greater than the combined 
areas of the United Kingdom,  West Germany, and France, with a population 
of only  six  million.  The  country  is  divided geographically  between the 
Andean highlands, where the mining industry is located, and the lowlands to 
the east,  where petroleum products and commercial agriculture  are situated. 
From the beginning of  colonial  development, bolivia's political and economic 
1987 
FIg. 1.1  Monthly  InOation rates,  1984—88 
Source:  Institute of  National  Statistics, Bolivia. 
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center of gravity has been in the highlands. The secular decline of the mining 
sector has led in recent decades to a shift in economic and political activity to 
the east. This shift, which is the cause of significant political conflict, was 
accelerated by the sharp crash of tin prices in October 1985. 
Bolivia's economy since the colonial period has been based on mining, first 
silver from the colonial period until the late nineteenth century, and then tin 
in the twentieth century. With the population centered in the highlands and 
neighboring valleys, transport costs are extremely high. Therefore, while it 
has been profitable for Bolivia to export minerals such as silver and tin that 
have a high value added per unit weight, and therefore a low share of transport 
costs per unit value. Bolivia has been unable to overcome the transport costs 
for almost any kind of manufactured product. The problem of transport costs 
was greatly exacerbated by Bolivia's  loss of its littoral on the Pacific Coast in 
the traumatic War of the Sea against Chile and Peru in 1879. 
The requirement of high value added per unit weight in Bolivian exports 
helps to explain Bolivia's only real diversification of exports in recent years: 
coca  leaf derivatives (the precursors of cocaine) and  petroleum products. 
Petroleum products, particularly  natural gas exported to Argentina, can be 
carried out of the country by pipeline,  while coca  leaf can  be profitably 
transported even if carried on a peasant's back.  Table 1.2 shows Bolivia's 
concentration  of  non-coca  exports  in  recent  years.  Among  Bolivia's 
measured exports (i.e., excluding coca),  tin and petroleum products usually 
accounted for much more than half of total exports during the l960s, 1970s, 
and 1980s. Coca exports in the  1980s  are generally estimated to equal the 
sum of tin and natural gas exports. 
ThbIe 1.2  Share of Tin and NaIwal G  as in ToW E  sports of IlolivIa, 1952-84 
As%of  As%of 
Year  Merchandise  Exports  Year  Merchandise Exports 
1952  59.9  1969  57.3 
1953  64.2  1970  52.0 
1954  55.2  1971  58.4 
1955  56.0  1972  61.3 
1956  55.!  1973  57.2 
1957  58.9  1974  44,6 
1958  56.1  1975  48.! 
1959  68.2  1976  47.9 
1960  71.0  1977  62.4 
196!  87.3  1978  72.0 
1962  89.7  1979  65.9 
1963  80,6  1980  63.6 
1964  80.8  198!  68.3 
1965  80.5  1982  73.5 
1966  70.2  1983  77.6 
1967  58.5  1984  86.1 
1968  58.9 
Ssercr.'  Central  Bank of Bolivia. Bokgin Euad,uic'o  tLa Paz), various  issues. 
Many of Bolivia's problems can be seen as the tragic playing out of the 
secular decline in the mining sector, a process that has been underway for at 
least half a  century.3 Actually,  Bolivia's  first  deep  crisis  came  with the 
depletion of silver deposits and the fall of world silver prices at the end of 
the last century. Good fortune, however, pulled Bolivia out of crisis when a 
boom in  world demand for tin followed the  development of the modern 
canning process.  The  apogee of modern Bolivian economic development 
relative to the neighboring countries was reached in the first two decades of 
the twentieth century, when tin was intensively developed and when export 
earnings  provided  the  basis  for  a  major  extension  of  the  country's 
infrastructure, including roads and the railway system. 
Tin lodes were increasingly exhausted in the 1920s, and Bolivia began to 
lose export competitiveness with other producers. When tin prices collapsed 
at the start of the Great Depression, Bolivia became the first country in that 
crisis to default on its sovereign foreign debt, in January 1931. Bolivia was 
also the last country  in Latin America  to settle these defaulted debts after 
World  War H. The collapse of tin undermined both the economy and the 
political system, and eventually ushered in the Revolution of 1952. 
1 .1 .1  Aggregate Growth 
Table 1.3  shows some indicators of long-term growth.4 Real GDP grew 
between 1952 and 1985 at the average annual rate of 2.4 percent. If the crisis 
years of 1982—85 are left Out,  the average annual rate is 3.2 percent (or 0.4 
percent in per capita terms). The growth, of course, was not smooth and was 
characterized by well-defined cycles.  The years  1952—57,  in the aftermath 
of  the Revolution,  showed negative  rates  of growth as important  social 
changes prompted major dislocations of production. In particular, agricul- 
tural output in cash crops suffered a substantial reduction after the first year 
of an ambitious agrarian reform. The high inflation of those years, coupled 
with misguided policy measures that attempted to suppress the symptoms of 
inflation, also had important negative real effects. 
After the inflation stabilization of late 1957 until the early  1960s, growth 
resumed at a moderate pace. In 1959 the negative rate of growth is explained 
by a sharp drop in tin prices brought about by the mild world recession of 
1958—59 and the sales of tin in international markets by the Soviet Union. 
From 1962 to  1972,  very healthy rates of growth are observed, higher on 
average than the growth rates of the "export boom years" between 1972 and 
1977. The growth in the l960s is due importantly to a favorable international 
environment, internal political stability under President Barrientos, and the 
payoffs on earlier investments in petroleum and commercial  agriculture in 
eastern  Bolivia.  Appropriate  use of  foreign  aid  funds,  entrepreneurship 
provided by the educated Bolivians who had fled from the Revolution and had 
returned in the mid- l960s,  and the substantial investment expenditures made 
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Thble 1.3  Real GDP, Levela and Itatea of Growth,  1952-88 
Year  Real GDP  Growth Rate (%) 
Five-year 
Average (%) 
Table 1.4  Sectoral  Comp4asition  of GOP Ipercentagea) 
Sector  1952  1957  1962  1967  1972  1977  1982  l985 
Primasy  46.5!  44.84  39.94  38.40  29.08  25.75  34,2!  32,23 
Manufacturing  14.15  12.34  14.05  15.28  14.60  15.86  11.96  9.83 
Noritradables  I  4.6!  4.60  5.42  6.30  5.35  5,93  4.04  4.15 
Nontradables Ii  34.73  38.23  40,60  40,02  50.97  52.46  46,15  50.69 
Indiict taxes  '  2.64  3,10 








Sources: Ministry of Planmrsg. Reris5u  vie PthniJicorirrn  y Desnrrol!o  (La Paz:  1970); Central  Bank of Bolivia, 
Do/ala  Esw4islico (La Paz), various issues. 
Notes:  Percentages are computed  from basic data in real terms.  Nontradables I  energy and  construction. 
Nootradabks  II =  commerce,  transportation,  and  other services. 
Psttmated figures. 
taxes are included  in each sector. 
the corresponding percentage was 32 in 1985. The share of manufacturing in 
GDP  in  1952 was  14 percent,  compared  with a  low  9  percent  in  1985. 
Construction and energy accounted for almost 5 percent of GDP in 1952 and 
for  4  percent  in  1985.  Commerce,  transportation,  and  othei  services 
(denoted "nontradables II" in the table) constituted 35 percent of GDP in 
1952,  with that share  rising to  51  percent  in  1985.  This  latter group of 
industries,  which  experienced  such  a  dramatic  increase  in  share,  are 
generally nontradables. Between 1967 and 1977, services increased its share 
in  the  economy from 40 percent  to  more than 50 percent of GDP.  This 
change  in  the  composition of GDP,  with  a higher  share of  nontradables 
(services  plus  a  significant  but  unknown  percentage of  agricultural  and 
manufacturing output),  became in the 1980s an important explanatory factor 
of the difficulties of servicing the accumulated foreign debt. 
1.1.2  Foreign Trade 
Bolivia's growth and development have been very strongly tied to foreign 
trade.  With the exception of a few years in the period  1952—82, generally 
associated with strong political disruptions, exports amounted to more than 
20 percent of GDP in current prices (table 1.5). The dependency on imports 
is obviously very high with import-GDP ratios rarely below 20 percent (in 
some years, the ratio is over 25 percent). 
As we noted in table  1.2,  Bolivia's  legal exports during  1952—85 were 
highly concentrated in two major exports,  tin and natural gas, with natural 
gas exports  beginning in  1972.  In  some years,  more than 70 percent of 
measured exports  are in these two commodities. Export diversification was 
one of the  principal economic policy goals of the revolutionary period of 
1952—56.  However, after the stabilization program of December 1956,  the 
policy was largely abandoned and the export concentration on tin increased 
substantially. After 1966 the share of tin in total exports declined because of 
the growing importance of petroleum and agricultural exports. The cycle of 
Source: Central  Bank  of  Bolivia. Cuenlas  Nacionaies  no.  4,  Oepcirtamento  Cuenlas  Nacionales  (La  Paz: 
1983). and for 1984—88, IMP, Iaternaiionva! Finrutca! Statistics. 
Notes:  1988, estimated.  Five-year  averages are calculated  as geometric  averages over the penod. 
Growth remained  relatively strong during the Banzer  regime, 1971—78, 
but the  bases of the  observed prosperity became more tenuous.  Bolivian 
growth  was based  importantly on  heavy foreign  borrowing from  private 
banks,  as  well as a temporary commodity price boom which  favored the 
country. The pace of growth started to sharply decline from  1978 on.  The 
high  inflation of  1982—85,  to  which  we  devote  substantial attention  in 
chapter 5, was accompanied by negative rates of growth. 
In  regard to  the composition of  output,  shown  in  table  1 .4,  primary 
production, including agriculture, accounted for 47 percent ot GDP in 1952; Table 1.5  Trade as a Frrentage  of Boll  via's GDP, 8956-85' 
Period  Exports  Imports  Total 
1956—60  17.7  24.6  42.3 
1961—65  18.5  25.0  43.4 
1966—70  20.7  24.0  44.7 
1971—75  26.8  22.5  49.3 
1976—80  20.7  23.4  44.1 
1981—85  15.5  13.7  29.2 
.rte For  1956—80. Central  Bank of Bolivia. Boktin Eswdistico (La Paz). vanoos  issues; for 1961—85. 
unpublished  data from the World Bank. 
Annual  averages. Percentages ale derived  from National Accounts  data in current  prices. 
decreasing dependency on tin and natural  gas  ended around 1977. During 
the crisis  years of 1982—85, natural gas became the most important export. 
In 1985 natural gas and tin constituted almost 90 percent of all exports. 
The performance  of exports was rather dismal from 1952 to 1985, as can be 
observed in table 1.6, but again very definite  cycles of  expansion  and contraction 
can be distinguished.  Between 1952 and 1961, the average annual rate of export 
growth was negative.  in  the  quinquennium 1962—67 there was a  healthy 
recovery that then slowed down between 1967 and 1971. The big boost in the 
dollar value of exports occurred  between 1972 and 1977 because of higher prices, 
but in volume terms the growth of exports was negative  during 1970—75  and very 
low during 1976—80. It is notable that despite the uniformly good real prices for 
exports during most of the 1970s, the output response was weak. 
The year 1974 has been called by some observers  a "miraculous"  one for 
Bolivian exports. The index of export prices almost  doubled from its level of the 
previous year.  In the export basket, the price of tin increased 70 percent in 
nominal terms and 40 percent in real terms.  Tin prices would remain high with 
a slight downward trend until the collapse of the market in 1985 (figure 1 .2). 
imports  generally  followed the growth path of exports,  though  in  the 
1980s, imports fell sharply as export earnings were devoted increasingly to 
debt servicing. Transportation and insurance costs loom large in the CIF value 
of imports, given the geography of Bolivia and its rudimentary transportation 
network. Transportation costs are also a very important determinant of the 
structure of Bolivian exports. As mentioned earlier, because of the high costs 
of transportation, exports  have to be of high value added per unit of weight. 
1.1.3  Capital Formation and the Sources of Funds 
The share of fixed  investment in GDP varied widely during  1952—85, as 
is shown in table 1.7. The long-run value of this rate seems to be, however, 
above  15  percent. In the two years following the Revolution of 1952, the 
investment rates fell below this long-run value, but there was a substantial 
recovery in 1955 and  1956 despite extremely high inflation. In  fact, contrary 
to what  occurred during the  1980s, forced savings (i.e., the  inflation tax) 
helped to sustain a high investment rate. 
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In  the  1960s,  investment  rates  were  very  high,  comparable to those 
of the high-growth period of Brazil. However,  these rates were  sustained 
to a very significant extent by the contribution of foreign savings. Between 
1975  and  1978,  there  was  another  upsurge in  the  investment  rate,  sus- 
tained  similarly  by  foreign  savings,  leading  to  increased  indebtedness. 
The  investment  rate  fell  in  1981  in  line  with  the  increasing  diffi- 
culties in obtaining foreign financing. From  1982 onward,  the  investment 
rate  fell  precipitously  as  disbursements  of  foreign  credits  almost 
disappeared. 
As  shown  in  table  1.8. 
capital formation has  been 
the  contribution  of domestic  savings to  gross 
substantial  and should not  be  underestimated. 
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Table 1.6  Atmual Rates  of Growth of Main Export (volumes), 1950—85 
Pertod  Tot  Natural Gas'  Total  Exports 
1950—55  —2.3  —  —  3 
1955—60  —7.0  —  —6.! 
1960—65  4.2  —  30 
1965—70  2.8  —..  9 4 
1970—75  —2.2  —55 
1975—80  —2.0  5.6  1.5 
1980—85  —6.4  1.7  —2.9 
Source.  Data are export volumes  reported  in  the IMP.  International  Financial Statistics  (Washington,  DC),  vanous issues. 
Note: Growth  rates calculated  as geometric  averages of period  shown. 
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Fig.  1.2  RelatIve price of tin in world markets (1980=1.0) 'lable 1.7  mv  eatmenl  Rades tpercentag  e of GDP), l952—85 
Year  Investment Rate  Year  In  vestment  Rate 
1952  16.0  1969  20.0 
1953  IOU  1970  14.0 
1954  13.0  1971  15.0 
1955  20.0  1972  16.0 
1956  20.0  1973  15.0 
1957  I9.0  1974  15.0 
1958  15.0  1975  17.0 
1959  15.0  1976  17.0 
1960  17.0  1977  17.0 
1961  14.0  1978  18.0 
1962  21.0  1979  17.0 
1963  20.0  1980  14.5 
1964  20.0  1981  12.4 
1965  20.0  1982  9.8 
1966  17.0  1983  6.6 
1967  18.0  1984  8.8 
1968  25.0  1985  6.5 
Sos,rr.'  Ministry of Planning. Rerizw sir  PIontJl us'irs,, v Drsnrrollo (La  Paz 1970); Central Bank of Bolivia. 
Bofrti,t Esw.dLruco (La Paz),  variotis issnes; and tinpttblisbed  World Bank  data. 
Note; Investment  rates ate compated as real investinettt  divided by teal GDP. 
A high share of foreign savings in total investment was concentrated in a few 
subperiods: the 1960s. with foreign  aid provided  by the Alliance for Progress 
and with important foreign direct investment in the petroleum sector; and the 
late  1970s,  with  credits  from  commercial  banks  and  suppliers.  Gross 
national savings  (i.e., domestic savings less net factor income plus current 
transfers) as a percentage of GNP experienced  large fluctuations over the 
years  1958—85.  During  most of the  1970s, the  saving rate  was over  15 
percent,  and  in  1974,  it  rose to more than  20  percent.  From  1978 on, 
however, the rate began to fall, eventually to very low levels in the years of 
the economic crisis. A picture emerges in which two features stand out: first, 
the  Bolivian economy  can  generate respectable national saving rates  and, 
second,  these high rates are generally  the product of high growth  in the 
economy supported by a favorable terms of trade or by access to foreign 
loans.  The  public  enterprises  played  an  important  role  in  generating 
domestic savings during these high-growth years. 
The domestic financial system, constituted mainly by commercial banks, 
has played an important role in the formation of private savings. The data in 
table  1.9  indicate that  financial deepening  reached  its maximum in  the 
mid-1960s. It is interesting to note that the real  value of' monetary balances 
(measured as M2) in 1965 was the highest in the entire 1952—85 period and 
that this peak was obtained without the dollar-indexed savings deposits that 
were the most common form of deposit after  1975. The evidence seems to 
indicate that the most important factor that induced savings in the banking 
system in the 1960s was the low and stable inflation rates of those years. 
Year  Domestic  Savings  Itreign  Savings 
1952  94.4  5.6 
1953  79.4  20.6 
1954  98.9  1.1 
1955  99.1  .9 
1956  98.9  LI 
1957  93.2  6.8 
1958  78.2  21.8 
1959  83,4  16.6 
1960  76.0  24.0 
1961  81.9  18.1 
1962  75.3  24.7 
1963  73.4  26.6 
1964  105.3  —5.3 
1965  78,7  21.3 
1966  80.7  19.3 
1967  77.5  22.5 
1964  66.4  33.6 
1969  64.2  35.8 
1970  87.8  12.2 
1971  79.7  20.3 
1972  82.5  17.5 
1973  92.3  7,7 
1974  132.1  —32.1 
1975  72.1  27.9 
1976  84.3  15.7 
1977  76.8  23.2 
1978  56.3  43.7 
1979  50.7  49,3 
1980  67.4  32.6 
1981  94,7  5.3 
1982  128.5  —28.5 
1983  84.7  15.3 
1984  100.3  — .3 
1985  63.0  37.0 
.1.4  Inflation 
The annual inflation rates during 1952—88 are shown in table 1.10. It will 
be observed in that table  that  Bolivia had a bout with high inflation in the 
wake of the Revolution of 1952, that lasted until the stabilization of 1957.  At 
that time,  Bolivian  inflation rates were the highest ever known  in  Latin 
America. Inflation ended with an IMF-sponsored stabilization plan and with 
loans and subsidies from the U.S. government to support the budget. Details 
on that inflationary episode and how it was ended are given by Eder (1968). 
The  1960s and  l970s were characterized by tow inflation, except after the 
devaluations of late 1972 (and the protracted relative price adjustments that 
lasted until the first  months of 1974) and of late  1979. From 1980 onward 
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Table  1.8  Soorees of Finatteing for Grta Capital Formation (as a proporlaon of total), 
1952—85 
Soarces;  For  I952—79, Central  Bank of Bolivia. Ct,entras Nc'ionn1ra  tin. 4; for 1980—82, Drportametuo  sic 
Caernas Nacionadas; for 1983—85, cIaborted with data from the World  Banks. Year  Money  Base  MI  M2 
1961  81)  8.6  13.7 
1965  10.0  11.8  17.6 
1969  (0.6  11.2  14.0 
(973  6.7  9.4  12.5 
1977  10.4  10.4  14.5 
1961  8.6  8.9  15.5 
(985  2.3  2.3  3.5 
Source.' Elaborated  with data from Central Bank of Bolivia, Me,,mrüar  Amusks  (La Paz),  various  issues. 
Note: Monetary  indicators are annual avenges. 
18b(e 1.10  Annual  Inflation  Ratta,  1954-88 
(972  6.5 
1973  31.4 
1974  62.8 
1975  8.0 
1976  4.4 
1977  8.1 
(978  10.4 
1979  19.7 
1980  47.2 
1981  32.1 
(982  (23.5 
3983  275.6 
1984  (.282.4 
1985  11,857.1 
1986  276,3 
1987  14.6 
until the fall of 1985, inflation rates were very high, crossing  the 100 percent 
barrier  in  1982.  Inflation reached  hyperinflationary  levels  in  1984 (i.e., 
monthly price  changes  in  excess  of 50  percent),  with the hyperinflation 
lasting from May 1984 to September 1985.  The inflation ended dramatically 
with the New Economic Policy of the Paz stenssoro government, which 
was launched on 29 August  1985. 
The Bolivian inflations of 1953—57 and  1982—85 had their rOots in weak 
fiscal budgets. Importantly, Bolivia (unlike Brazil, for example) did not have 
the institutional mechanisms that produced inertial inflation. Wage indexation 
was implemented only in 1983, when  high inflation was well on its way, and 
171  Bolivi&Chapter  1 
lasted  until  August  1985.  The  labor unions have  had  little experience in 
collective bargaining, and there have been very few formal labor contracts with 
escalator clauses or  even with well-delined  periods of  validity. The practice in the 
labor unions has frequently been to ask for wage increases whenever there has 
been a significant erosion in real wages and to go to the Ministry of Labor for 
arbitration if  the unions do not reach a settlement  with the  employers. During the 
last months of the hyperinflation, wages in many private sector firms, especially 
for qualified  labor and in the service sector, were Linked to the dollar in informal 
arrangements  that were not legally binding. 
In the high-inflation episode of 1953—57, the fiscal troubles were the result 
of deliberate  policies to enhance production diversification projects in the 
eastern region of Santa Cruz with deficit financing, that is, by printing money. 
Inflation was used to generate forced savings to finance capital expenditures 
in a growing public sector. In the more recent experience of the early eighties, 
the replacement of foreign financing by internal financing to cover prolonged 
fiscal deficits was the most important explanatory factor of high inflation. 
1.5  The Expansion of the Coca Economy 
An important question that arises when studying the Bolivian economy of 
the late  1970s and early 1980s concerns the role played by coca production 
and exports of processed coca leaves in the form of cocaine paste or refined 
cocaine. After 1978, illegal cocaine exports became a very important source 
of foreign exchange.  A booming underground economy developed around 
the coca trade,  with far-reaching consequences for the legal sectors of the 
Bolivian economy and for the international relations of Bolivia. 
Until  around  1975,  coca  leaves  were  marketed  essentially  for  legal 
domestic uses.5 The sharp increase in demand for cocaine (and other drugs) 
in  the United States that started in the 1970s and emerged later in other 
industrial countries strongly increased the demand for coca leaves. Production 
responded rapidly  to  the demand shift.  Coca paste was transported  from 
Bolivia to Colombia,  refined there,  and marketed  in  the United States by 
Colombians. By 1980 some Bolivians started to refine the paste and market 
it without intermediaries in the U.S. market.  Bolivia's involvement in the 
cocaine business increased rapidly and took several forms: production of coca 
leaves, coca paste, and refined cocaine. 
It  is very  hard  to  come  up  with  precise  figures  concerning  Bolivia's 
production and exports of coca-based  products given  the illegality of the 
activity, but preliminary estimates of the FOB value of cocaine chlorohydrate 
have been computed by Doria Medina (1986) using data on acreage prepared 
by  the  Earth  Satellite Corporation  and  information  on  the  technology of 
deriving cocaine from coca leaves. The figures,  in  1980 dollars,  are 412.2 
million  for  1980,  563.9  for  1981,  and  758.5  for  1982.  In  1980  this 
represented 40 percent of recorded exports of goods and services; in 1981, 
56 percent; and in 1982, 83 percent. These estimates art fairly conservative. 
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Table (.9  Monetary Variables  as a ftreeatage of GDP. 1961-85 Iseketad  years) 
Year  Inflation  Kale  Year  tuflation Rate 
1954  124.8 
3955  77.9 
1956  181.2 
(957  115.5 
(958  3.0 
(959  20.3 
(960  11.5 
(96!  7.5 
(962  5.8 
(963  — .7 
1964  10.1 
1965  2.9 
1966  6.9 
1967  II.! 
(968  5.4 
1969  2.2 
1970  3.8 
1971  3.8 
Sourcm.'  For  1953—70,  Central  Bank of Bolivia, Menu,,ias Amsuks  (La Paz). various  issues;  [or 1971—81, 
lnstitutO Nacional tie Estadisuca, Rmumen Ez(adsgico (La Paz:  (982); for 1982—85,  Unidad tie Analtais tie 
Politsca Econonuca (UDAPE), Anezo (La Paz);  for 1986—88,  IMF, Th,e,nojionuj  Finuaciai  Siwrsncs. 
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If export values are difficult to estimate, gross value added in the cocaine 
industry (and related activities) are even harder to come by. Under the rather 
arbitrary  assumption  that  material inputs  other  than  coca  leaves  are  20 
percent of gross output in cocaine chiorohydrates,  the gross  value added 
estimates would represent 5.7 percent of GDP in 1980; 7.5 percent of GDP 
in  1981;  and  10.8  percent  in  1982.  If one  considers  cocaine and  coca 
production as vertically integrated industries, these percentages increase to 
7.3, 8.8, and  12.7, respectively. Undoubtedly, these figures are very high, 
but significantly less than the wild estimates sometimes given in the press. 
1.2  Summary of the Monograph 
With this basic introduction to the Bolivian economy, we now turn to a 
summary of the remainder of the monograph. The outline of the work is as 
follows.  Chapter  2  provides  an  overview of  the  political  economy  of 
macroeconomic policymaking in Bolivia since the  1952 Revolution. Great 
stress is put on the weakness of fiscal institutions in the face of heavy social 
and  sectoral  demands.  The  chronic  fiscal  weakness led to  a  remarkably 
overextended public sector, one that reached effective bankruptcy by  1985. 
During the period of hyperinflation, 1984—85,  the government paid its w 
almost entirely through money printing. 
Chapter 3 highlights some of the main directions of development policy 
during 1952—85, especially involving public investment spending and trade 
policy. We show that most of the period is characterized by a development 
strategy of "state capitalism,"  in which the public sector is called upon to be 
the leading engine of growth through public sector  investment spending and 
overall guidance of the private sector. The paradoxical result, however, is 
that as the government tried to control too much, it ended up controlling very 
little indeed. The model of state capitalism was particularly undermined by 
the chronic instability in policymaking that resulted from the rapid turnover 
of governments. 
In chapter 4 we consider important characteristics of Bolivia's interna- 
tional trade, focusing both on structural features (e.g., the heavy dependence 
on a small number of primary commodities), as well as policy choices. Our 
analysis of trade policies since 1952 makes clear that Bolivian governments 
continued to focus on primary commodity exports as the key  to Bolivian 
growth, despite the secular decline in tin and the mixed fortunes regarding 
petroleum exports.6  Bolivian governments typically  spent more time and 
energy on attempting to improve the terms of trade for tin (mainly through 
the  International  Tin  Agreement,  which  collapsed  in  1985)  than  on  a 
diversification of the export base into manufacturing. 
Import policies have generally been ill-focused,  leading to an enormous 
range of effective protection across sectors, with little discernible long-term 
strategy in the distribution of incentives  and with little attention to the indirect 
effects of import policies on the profitability  of exports. Similarly, exchange  rate 
policies were often pursued for fiscal purposes (e.g., overvalued exchange  rates 
allowed the central government to appropriate some of the rents from export- 
oriented state enterprises that were otherwise hard to tax), rather than  for the 
purpose of stimulating  nontraditional  exports. 
Chapter 5 describes the process of foreign debt accumulation, which was 
the counterpart of the large budget deficits of the public sector in the 1970s 
and early  1980s. Bolivia's external  debt,  particularly  from  the  private 
financial markets, rose dramatically in the 1970s, mostly during the Banzer 
era.  Bolivia's rapid  accumulation of external  debt in  the  1970s reflected 
three forces at work. First, part of the foreign borrowing financed a plausible 
attempt to generate a more diversified export base through various invest- 
ment projects. Some of these projects were successful, but more often the 
investments proved to be expensive failures. Second, the foreign borrowing 
also reflected an attempt to finesse internal distributional conflicts by using 
borrowed money to pay for social demands for spending. Third, some of the 
foreign borrowing had the purpose and effect of enriching a narrow set of 
private interests through the public sector's  access to foreign loans. Similarly, 
an overvalued exchange rate, maintained through foreign borrowing, became 
a channel for capital flight for wealthier individuals. 
By the late  l970s,  the precariousness of Bolivia's financial situation was 
clear. Banks pulled back from new lending,  and in  1980 Bolivia  began to 
miss payments due to the banks. Note that this occurred almost two years 
ahead of the  global debt  crisis,  usually dated to  Mexico's  suspension of 
principal payments in August 1982. Bolivia signed a rescheduling agreement 
with  the  banks  in  April  1981,  which  fell  apart  when  Bolivia  missed 
payments due in September 1982.  Payments were restarted in 1983, but then 
suspended again  in  mid-1984.  Since  then,  Bolivia  has  made  no  interest 
payments to the commercial banks. 
Chapter 6 lays out the dynamics of the hyperinflation during  1982—85, 
focusing on the complex causal links among the budget deficit, the money 
supply, the exchange rate, and the price level. President Hernán Siles Suazo 
therefore inherited an extraordinarily difficult financial position  in October 
1982.  In  the  event,  the  Siles  government  was too  weak  and  often too 
confused in its policies to restore  fiscal  order. Sues tried several  times to 
implement a comprehensive stabilization program (during November 1982, 
November 1983,  April 1984, August 1984, November 1984, and  February 
1985), but in each  of these  cases,  some combination  of Sues' political 
opponents  in  Congress  and  his  ostensible  "allies"  in  organized  labor 
torpedoed the adjustment efforts. As the inflation accelerated, tax collections 
fell sharply in real terms, thereby exacerbating the fiscal crisis. The inflation 
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1983  to  several  thousand  percent  in  1984  and  1985.  The  hyperinflation 
began in May  1984 and ended in September 1985, upon the accession to 
power of the Paz Estenssoro government. 
In chapter 7 we detail the process of stabilization since 1985 and discuss 
some of the general lessons about ending high inflation that might be applied 
to other economies in the region. The successful stabilization program was 
carried out by the newly elected centrist government of Paz Estenssoro. The 
economic program, which  was unveiled just  three weeks after the govern- 
ment  came  to  office,  was remarkably  wide  ranging and  indeed  radical, 
encompassing not only plans  for macroeconomic stabilization but  also for 
trade  liberalization,  administrative  and tax reform,  and  deregulation  and 
privatization in the domestic market. The so-called New Economic Policy 
constituted nothing less  than a  program to dismantle the  system of state 
capitalism that had prevailed over the previous thirty years. 
Chapter 8 describes the novel arrangements that Bolivia has negotiated in 
order  to  escape the  severe  overhang  of external  debt.  Bolivia took one 
"heterodox"  step  in  its  stabilization  program:  it  maintained  a  iota! 
suspension of interest  payments on  its  commercial bank  debt,  pending  a 
longer-term settlement on the debt. For this reason, the Bolivian program 
might be characterized as  "internal  orthodoxy, external heterodoxy." The 
debt suspension was an integral piece of the political and economic strategy 
of the government. 
The  Bolivian  debt  strategy  paid  off.  After  years  of  negotiations, 
Bolivia's  creditor  banks  ultimately  accepted the argument  that  the debt 
should be reduced. Bolivia won the right to buy  back part of its debt at the 
secondary market price,  under the condition that it use money donated by 
donor  governments  to  pay  for  the  buyback.  In  May  1988,  Bolivia 
repurchased $308  million  in  principal (approximately 47  percent of the 
outstanding debt) from the commercial bank  creditors,  at a price of about 
II  cents on the dollar.  Bolivia continued to repurchase debt at II  percent 
of par and  by mid-1989 had  repurchased in total about  70 percent of the 
outstanding debt. 
In  the concluding  chapter  9,  we  discuss briefly the  challenges  facing 
Bolivia in the future, once stabilization has been accomplished. The key fact 
that we focus on is the weakness of Bolivia's traditional export base and the 
consequent need for the development of new sources of export earnings. 
Bolivia will have to diversify beyond mineral exports  to new agricultural 
exports and light manufacturing. The latter could be spurred importantly by 
an opening of the Brazilian market to Bolivian light manufacturing exports. 
We stress that accomplishing this transition will require careful and sensitive 
attention to regional and  social  conflicts  which  remain  powerful  in  the 
country.  The  government  will  probably  have  to  contemplate  specific 
measures to address these conflicts so that the structural transformation can 
proceed with internal political stability. 
2  Political Economy and 
Macroeconomic Policymaking, 
1952—87 
In  this  chapter  we  review  the  major  trends  in  Bolivian  growth  and 
development between 1952 and  1987.  We have chosen 1952, the year of the 
Bolivian Revolution, as the relevant starting year for the analysis because 
the  changes  wrought  by  the  Revolution  shaped  Bolivian  economic  and 
political  development  for  the  next  thirty-five  years.  The  review  in  this 
chapter will help to establish the links between foreign borrowing and the 
main macroeconomic developments. 
The developments  in  the export markets (and the attendant changes in 
foreign  indebtedness) could  have been used  to  define the main temporal 
phases of the  economy. We  have chosen  instead  to divide  the  1952—87 
period using the criteria of political economy, according to the degree and 
character  of  state  intervention  in  the  economy.  Given  that  this  period 
encompasses several  subpenods of intense political turmoil that seriously 
affected  economic  policymaking,  the issues  of  State  intervention  in  the 
economy and political instability receive more attention in our analysis than 
is perhaps typical of a country study. 
In view of this emphasis on the political economy of Bolivian economic 
development, we  begin this  chapter with a detailed account of the  major 
political developments since the Revolution of 1952. with a stress on their 
effects on  the  macroeconomy. Then,  we turn to a summary  of the  main 
dimensions of economic performance, including growth, inflation, trade, and 
debt management, in the context of the political-economic history. 
2.1  Bolivian Political  Economy, 1952—87 
This  period  witnessed a  variety  of policy  phases  that  clearly  deserve 
separate treatment. While the fundamental strategy of development set after 
the Revolution of 1952 did not change substantially until the end of 1985, 
the degree  and the nature of state  intervention in  the  economy  differed 
significantly among  the phases.  Economic policy was shaped as much by 
political  considerations  as  by  macroeconomic  objectives.  Noneconomic 
objectives were  very much present,  and  political turmoil  itself left a deep 
mark on the period. 
Table  2.1  gives  a  brief  political  chronology  of  Bolivia  since  the 
Revolution of  1952.  The  most  striking aspect  of the  chronology  is  the 
instability of constitutional rule in the country. The Revolution was led by 
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Table  2.1  Political Chronology  of Bolivia,  1952—89 
Year  Politii.al Event 
1952  Bolivian Revolution. cazeied out by Nationalist  Revolutionary  Movement  (MNR>.  under the 
leadership of Dr. Victor Paz Pasenssoro. 
1952—56  Presidency of Paz Estenssoro, important  reforms,  bid sharp rise in inflation, reaching  178.8% in 
1956. 
1956—60  Presidency of Hemdn Sues Suazo (MNR); economic  stabilization under U.S. and  15SF supervtstoti 
sod finance. 
1960-64  Second presidency of Paz Estenssoro. 
1964  Third presidency of Paz Estenssoro; Paz deposed in military coup led by  General  René Bamentos 
Ortimo. 
1964—66  Co-presidency  of Alfredo Ovando  Candla and Barrientos  Ortuno. 
1966—69 Civilian presidency of Banientos  (dies  in helicopter  crash.  Apnl 1969). 
1969  Vice President Luis Sues Salinas becomes president; Sues Salinas deposed in  coup by Ovando 
Cendla. 
1970  Ovando  Candla  deposed by General  Miranda;  Miranda  deposed by General Juan José Tories. 
1971  Tories  rules left-wing radical  government;  Tories deposed in  coop, jointly sponsored by the 
military party Bolivian Socialist  Phsslsnge  (FSB) and the MNR. 
1971—73  General Hugo  Banzer  Sua,ez rules with MNR and FSB support. 
1974—78  Banzer  presidency  tinder military rule; MNR and FSB  withdrawal  from governmenl  in  1974. 
1979  General Juan Pereda becomes president  iii election  masked by accusations of fraud;  l'vreda deposed 
by General David Padilla.  who  calls for 1979 election. 
1979  Election  results  in stalemate (no majority); Senate President Walter Guevara  Arze serves as mtenm 
president; Guevars  deposed by Colonel  Natusch  Bosch; Nsstosch  Busch resigns in IS days; 
president  of Chamber of Deputies,  Lidia Goeiler,  becomes interim president. 
1980  Blectoral  stalemate; Gueiler  deposed in coup by General Luis Garcia  Mean. 
1981  Garcia  Mesa forced to resign in favor of General  Bernal; Bernal resigns in favor of General  Celso 
Totrelin. 
1982  Torrelio deposed in coup by General Guido Vildoso;  Congress  reconvenes and names Sties Suazo 
as president. 
1985  Sues Soiree announces early elections;  Paz Estenssoro becomes president; new economic  policy 
declared on 29 August  1985. 
1989  Paz Zumora of the Movimiento  tzquierds Revolucionario  (MIR) elected president;  governs In 
coalition  with the Acción Democratica  Nacionalista  (ADN) party led by General Banzer. 
for twelve years, winning elections in  1956 and  1960. The military toppled 
the civilian  regime  in  1964 and  ruled without interruption  until  1978.  A 
period of political chaos followed during  1978—82,  with a rapid alternation 
of military and  civilian rule. Civilian rule was restored in  1982,  with the 
accession to  power  of  SUes  Suazo,  and  then  was  continued  with  the 
presidency of Dr.  Victor Paz Estenssoro, which began in August  1985. 
As  in  other  Latin  American  nations,  intense  conflicts  over  income 
distribution  contributed to a  chronic alternation of power between populist 
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and  anti-populist  politics.  In Bolivia,  however, this alternation  has  been 
particularly  sharp.  Generally,  the  military  rule  was  anti-populist  and 
especially anti-labor. There was, however, a brief populist  phase of military 
rule under General Ovando  and  then  General Torres in  1969—71,  which 
coincided with the leftist military government in Peru under Juan  Velasco. 
The civilian governments have all drawn their leaders  from the MNR, though 
these governments have varied widely in their policies, with populist phases 
during 1952—56 and 1982—85,  and conservative phases during  1956—64 and 
1985—89. 
The leaders of the Revolution of 1952 drew inspiration  from the Mexican 
Revolution and from Mexico's Institutional  Revolutionary Party (the PRI) in 
the formation and policies of  the MNR.  The experience under the Rosca  (the 
disparaging  name  given  to  the  pie-Revolution  oligarchy) had  thoroughly 
discredited  private  wealthholders  as  a  class  capable of leading  national 
development. The leaders of  the Revolution  looked to the public sector as an 
engine of growth that would be more broadly based and equitable. They put 
in place an economic  system which can broadly  be  called state  capitalism, 
which assigned  the bulk of capital  formation  to the public sector, both for 
infrastructure and  for industrial  production in state enterprises. The  leading 
state enterprises were COMIBOL, the national mining  company, and YPFB, 
the state petroleum company. 
The whole concept of more equitable growth through  a large state sector 
collapsed in  a  mass  of inconsistencies over  the thirty  years between the 
Revolution  and  the  onset  of  the  Bolivian  hypennflation.  During  the 
post-Revolution  period,  leftist leaders were always  too  weak politically to 
satisfy their distributional  aims. To the extent, for instance, that they aimed 
to raise public  sector salaries or to increase public sector investment  and 
employment, they lacked the capacity to tax income and wealth,  which was 
essential to finance the larger state  sector. If necessary,  the Bolivian army 
was prepared to intervene to forestall  populist or redistributionist  actions, as 
it  did  in  1971.  For  these reasons, leftist  or  populist leaders have  been 
constantly forced to rely  on inflationary  finance or foreign aid and foreign 
borrowing to carry out their distributional  and developmental goals. The first 
high inflation in Bolivia came in the wake of the Revolution,  and the second 
came with the left-wing government of SUes Suazo  in 1982. 
Leaders on the right, such as Barnentos and Banzer, were not interested to 
limit the power of the state, but  rather to use  the state to satisfy their own 
agenda. While governments on the left sought redistribution  through higher 
wages  and  a larger role for public sector workers, governments on the right 
often sought  to  bolster  favored  segments of the  private  sector  through 
generous  government subsidies. Governments of the left have generally paid 
for higher public  salaries through printing money (i.e., the inflation tax) or 
through foreign borrowing, since  they  have been forestalled  from raising 
taxes. Governments of the right,  on the  other  hand,  have  rejected higher 178  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
taxes outright and have  instead sought to finance the government through a 
reduction of public  sector wages (often with overt repression of labor) and 
also through foreign borrowing. Note one  common theme of both types of 
governments: let the foreigners pay! 
We now turn to a more detailed look at several key subperiods in Bolivia's 
political  history  since the Revolution.  In doing so,  we use a taxonomy that 
borrows  heavily  upon  Malloy  and  Borzutsky  (1982)  and  Malloy  and 
Gamarra (1988). 
2.2  The Revolutionary Friod, 1952—56 
The  Revolution of 9 April 1952 that swept the Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario  (MNR) into  power,  with Dr.  Victor  Paz  Estenssoro at the 
head,  brought  profound  changes to  the  Bolivian economy  and  political 
structure.' Four important  economic changes  should be highlighted:  (1) the 
three  largest mining concerns  were  nationalized;  (2)  a  very  broad  land 
reform program was initiated; (3) import substitution and export diversifica- 
tion  became official  policies;  (4) a march to the hitherto underdeveloped 
eastern  lowlands  was  begun through  various government-sponsored coloni- 
zation projects 
2 
The nationalization of mines was a natural outcome of a process of greater 
taxation  and  control  of  the  private  mining  enterprises  that  had  been 
underway for decades.  Before nationalization, taxation  occurred directly but 
also indirectly, through  manipulations of the export exchange rate.  With 
increased taxation  and  controls,  the mining enterprises sought ways,  legal 
and illegal, to evade  them. As the govermnent exhausted its taxing power, it 
was  natural for the issue of nationalization to arise. 
An occupation of the  mines by their workers in  1952 pushed the MNR 
leadership to undertake the nationalization. The MNR leaders, who were by 
and  large moderate reformers with middle-class  roots rather than  extreme 
revolutionaries, thought that government control  of the mines,  as urged by 
the miners,  was  better than  workers'  controversy. Land reform  also  went 
beyond the intentions of most MNR leaders and again was a policy imposed 
on them by the squatting by landless  peasants. 
Export  diversification, import substitution,  and  the  march to  the  East 
were,  however,  deliberate development  policies.  Two  instruments  had  an 
important  role  in those policies.  First, through overtaxation  of the mining 
sector with differential  rates of exchange, resources were transferred to  the 
new activities, especially in the East. Second, many public  sector investment 
projects were financed with forced savings, that is, the inflation tax. 
A point of some importance  about  the Revolution  should be noted.  In 
spite  of the official  rhetoric  of "anti-imperialism,"  the  government  was 
generally  supportive of foreign  capital,  as long as it was not from the Tin 
Barons.  After  1955,  following changes  in  the legislation governing  the 
petroleum  sector,  Bolivia received  significant  amounts of foreign direct 
investment in petroleum. Substantial American mining interests belonging to 
W.  Grace Co. were never threatened with nationalization.  It should also be 
mentioned  that,  to  the  surprise  of  the  neighboring  countries,  a  close 
cooperation with the United States developed during the revolutionary  period. 
At the same time that the MNR was undertaking development projects, it 
tried to satisfy the demand of its support groups for increased consumption. 
There was  a clear inconsistency between these two claims that exacerbated 
the distributive  problems. Malloy and Borzutsky  (1982, 46) correctly point 
out: 
The Bolivian revolution  quickly demonstrated some inescapable facts of 
the  reality  of the  situation  of economic  backwardness and  structural 
dependency,  namely that (a) a relatively  backward country cannot follow a 
simultaneous policy  of economic development and popular consumption 
and (b) any process of restructuring for development demands that some 
social groups pay the "cost of the new course." 
2.3  Stabilization and the Beginnings  of State  Capitalism, 1957—64 
The revolutionary  process  entered into economic chaos by mid-1956.  The 
period  was marked by high inflation rates,  foreign exchange rationing, a 
rapidly rising black-market premium for foreign  exchange, shortages of food 
and  other  essentials,  stagnant  output  in  the  mines  and  in  traditional 
agriculture,  and a decline in tin prices following the end of the Korean War 
boom. 
The deteriorating situation clearly required a drastic stabilization program. 
Such  a program was announced on 15  December 1956. The program shares 
many elements with the one enacted  almost thirty years later in August 1985: 
exchange rate unification, a sharp reduction  in public expenditures (around 
40 percent in real terms), complete price liberalization  and elimination  of all 
subsidies, and a wage freeze after an initial limited rise in compensation. All 
policies directed toward diversitIcation  in production and exports came to a 
halt with the anti-inflationary  package of 1956.  A shortage of funds in the 
public sector and  the strictures of an IMF agreement forced a sharp cut in 
government  investment. A planning  board for state  sector investment  was 
created, but its role was very modest. 
The  stabilization  effort  was  largely  sustained with donations  from the 
United States, using food  aid (Public  Law 480 funds) and direct budgetary 
support.  The world recession of 1957 and a substantial fall in tin prices in 
that year made things even more complicated and increased dependency on 
foreign  aid.  In  exchange for  U.S.  support, the  government  of Bolivia 
committed to resume  payments on foreign  bonds  that had been  defaulted on 
in  1931  (see  Ugarteche 1986;  Baptista  1985).  Notwithstanding  the commit- 
ment, Bolivia defaulted again on this debt in  1960, 
r 
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in  regard to development  policies,  the government  tried  to rehabilitate 
COMIBOL,  the  state  mining enterprise.  The  other  two  principal  state 
enterprises, YPFI3 (oil) and the Development Corporation of Bolivia (CBF), 
were at  that time relatively  well-run enterprises that could  stand on  their 
own. COMIBOL, on the other hand, had  been left completely decapitalized 
by the government management during 1952—56 and suffered from many 
ailments ranging from inadequate machinery to labor indiscipline.  In  1961 
the Triangular  Plan  was  established with funds from the U.S.  government, 
the  newly  created  Inter-American  Development  Bank  (1DB),  and  a 
consortium  of West German  mining  firms. The plan called for extensive 
mechanization of the mines, the dismissal of several thousand workers, and 
the  elimination of worker  control  of the  activities  of COM1BOL.  Not 
surprisingly,  the plan met strong labor  opposition. 
It is interesting  to  note a significant  change in declared export  policy  in 
this  second  phase,  compared  with  the  policies  immediately  after  the 
Revolution.  Mining  again  received  high priority,  and  hopes  for  export 
diversification  were  reduced  to  the  undertakings  of  the  foreign  oil 
companies.  Active  policies  of  import  substitution  were  also  largely 
forsaken. 
The  second  phase  coincided  with  the  beginning  of the  Alliance  for 
Progress,  a  development program for Latin America  created by President 
John  Kennedy. The Bolivian government grasped right away the opportuni- 
ties offered by this new program and became one of the main beneficiaries. 
The  government  under took extensive  infrastructure  investment,  financed 
mostly with Alliance for Progress funds. 
By 1964 the remnants of the  Revolution,  including heightened political 
mobilization,  worker participation  in the management of public enterprises, 
and  redistributive policies,  had been all but abandoned. By the early  1960s, 
a form of state  capitalism developed, controlled and  exploited  by various 
competing  groups of the  middle  classes.  As  we  shall  note,  the  state 
enterprises became  a source of enrichment for these private  factions,  some 
civilian and  some military. 
2.4  The Resurgence of the Private Sector,  1964—65 
in  1964  President Paz Estenssoro, who was at  the beginning of his third 
term,  was deposed in a coup  d'etat staged by his  vice president, General 
René Barrientos Ortuno. The coup itself reflects the collapse of unity of the 
governing MNR, which  had  ruled since the Revolution.  The party had by 
1964 splintered  into  a  myriad  of factions  and  personalistic  cliques,  all 
organized to extract patronage and other spoils from the Treasury and from 
the  state  enterprises. When  Paz  attempted to  maintain power for a  third 
administration,  many of the splinter groups of the MNR, which felt deprived 
of their share of the spoils, coalesced in support of the coup. 
General Ban-ientos continued the big push to modernize the public sector 
which  had  begun in  Paz's second  term  (1960—64). Significant  effort and 
money were spent on the public sector, much of it financed by the Alliance 
for Progress.  The domestic private sector, which had played a limited role in 
the economic developments of the previous twelve years, resurged as a result 
of two strong impulses. First, fresh investment funds were made available, at 
subsidized interest rates and with a high grant element, to private producers.  A new group of producers formed a nascent entrepreneurial class that began 
to play  an important  political role in the late l970s and  early  1980s.  The 
investment  funds came mostly  from  international  aid,  with 1DB  and the 
World  Bank being  the  principal  sources.  Second,  many  managers and 
middle-class professionals who  had  left the country during the MNR reign 
returned and  engaged  themselves in industrial  and mining activities.  As  a 
result of this surge in public and private activity, economic growth was very 
high,  reaching 6.6 percent during 1965—69. 
Foreign direct investment flowed into the mining and  petroleum sectors. 
The expansion of petroleum production  and  exports was largely due to the 
investments of the Bolivian Gulf Oil Corporation.  Very important  natural gas 
deposits were discovered, and the construction of a gas pipeline to Argentina 
was started.  At the  same  time, investments made in  Santa  Cruz, in  the 
eastern  portion of the country, during the MNR period (1952—64) started to 
pay off during  the  Barrientos  era.  Commercial  agriculture  increased in 
output very significantly.  More importantly,  economic development meant a 
larger political influence for an emerging class of Santa  Cruz businessmen. 
It should be underlined that while foreign borrowing  was high during the 
sixties, investment  rates were  also very  high.  Unlike during  the  1970s, 
foreign  borrowing  indeed translated  into  higher  domestic investment,  and 
without  a  subsequent debt  crisis.  The  nature of the credit sources in  the 
1960s might help to explain this fact. Official creditors then were both more 
careful in screening their  loans and  more generous in their terms than  the 
banks proved to be in the 1970s. 
Bolivia  joined the Latin American  Free Trade Association (LATFA) in 1966 
and in  1969 signed the Cartagena Agreement,  which created the economic 
integration scheme of the Andean Pact (to be discussed in detail in chap. 4). 
The Bolivian government at  that time held considerable expectations of the 
benefits of this association, expectations that failed to materialize. 
2.5  The Populist Interlude of 1969—71 
Barrientos was killed in a helicopter  crash in April 1969, and the civilian 
vice  president,  Luis  Adolfo  Siles  Salinas,  assumed  the  presidency.  In 
September 1969 he  was  overthrown in  a  coup led by General  Aifredo 
Ovando CandIa, who in turn was overthrown  by General Juan José Torres in 
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populist military regime, which mirrored the political developments in Peru 
at the same time (with the ascension to power of General Juan Velasco). 
During  the  presidency of  Ovando  CandIa,  three  important  economic 
policy  decisions  were  made:  (I)  the  Bolivian  Gulf Oil  holdings  were 
nationalized; (2) very costly, and ultimately uneconomical, tin smelters were 
built;  and  (3)  the  very  influential  Socioeconomic Strategy  for  National 
Development  (SSND)  was  prepared.  Even  today,  the  reasons  for  the 
nationalization of Bolivian Gulf Oil are not very clear, except as a populist 
measure to garner political support.  On the other hand, the construction of 
the  tin smelters  was a  response  to  a  long-held  Bolivian  aspiration:  the 
exportation  of metallic tin instead of ores.  This could  indeed have been 
profitable to the country by saving heavy costs of transportation and charges 
for processing in foreign smelters, but  unfortunately the tin smelters were 
built very inefficiently.3  The SSND will be discussed in chapter 3. 
2.6  The Bauzer Era, 1971—78 
A  coup d'etat in  August  1971  installed General  Hugo  Banzer  in  the 
presidency. He was supported in the coup by civilians and members of the 
military discontent  with the left-wing course  of the Ovando and Tones 
regimes  and  afraid  of  emerging  guerrilla  threats.4  Banzer's  supporting 
civilian force reunited the MNR of former president Paz Estenssoro with the 
far-right  party  Bolivian  Socialist  Phalange  (FSB).  In  a  turnaround,  not 
uncommon in Bolivia, some party members of the Marxist-Leninist Party of 
the Revolutionary Left (PIR) entered government. In the military, command- 
ers of the anti-guerrilla Units had acquired the upper hand. 
Banzer's government lasted seven years. From the end of 1971 until the 
first half of 1974, he governed with the political parties mentioned above; 
thereafter  he  relied essentially on  the  military and  some  technocrats and 
businessmen.5 During  his administration,  Banzer  faced strong  opposition 
from organized labor, the leftist parties,  and  the intellectual elites; but he 
enjoyed, owing in part to great improvements in the economy, a high degree 
of popularity among the  middle classes,  small businessmen, and even in 
some favored "unions," such as that of the railroad workers. Some peasant 
organizations also gave support to the regime,  though on the  whole,  the 
peasant community was not favored by the Banzer regime.  The emergent 
Confederation of Private Enterprises (CEPB) generally supported  Banzer's 
economic policies. Prominent businessmen held the key position of Minister 
of Finance during most of his term. 
It is important to realize  that  support and  opposition  to  Banzer  were 
established also along regional lines.  Santa Cruz and, more generally, the 
eastern  part of the country, constituted his strongest political base.  Santa 
Cruz  was  not  only  Banzer's  home  province,  but the region  also greatly 
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benefited  from  his  economic  policies,  including  various  rent-grabbing 
opportunities made available by the government. 
Economic growth had the highest priority in Banzer's economic policies. 
Real GDP grew at an average 5.4 percent during his term. But the apparent 
prosperity had  several profound economic weaknesses, a point that was to 
become painfully evident in the l980s.  First, much of the prosperity in the 
l970s  was  based  on  a  temporary  commodity  boom  and  heavy  capital 
inflows. Once the inflows slowed, as was inevitable,  the economy faced a 
sustained period of austerity. Moreover, a persistently overvalued exchange 
rate during the l970s prompted investment in the nontradable sectors of the 
economy and  in capital flight, so that there was little basis laid for a more 
dynamic export sector in the  1980s that would be necessary to service the 
debts accumulated during the Banzer years. 
Second, Banzer pushed growth  in part by granting large subsidies  to the vested 
intemst groups that supported the regime. Friends of the government, particularly 
in the militaiy and among the private  business community, were frequently 
favored with property  rights over hitherto public lands, with mining  concessions, 
and, most importantly, with highly subsidized credits. The rationale of these 
policies  was that above-normal profits, if saved and reinvested in the country, 
could be conducive to the desired high rates of growth. 
2.7  The Years of Political Instability, 1978—82 
There was another profound weakness of the Banzer years: the absence of 
a legitimate succession. In 1977 and  1978, General Banzer  faced growing 
pressure  from  the  Carter administration  for  a  return  to  democracy.  An 
election  was  called,  and  Banzer's  handpicked  successor,  General  Juan 
Pereda, was named president in an election marked by massive fraud. When 
the  results of the  election were  challenged,  Banzer decided  to remain in 
office, but was quickly ousted by Pereda himself. There ensued a period of 
intense political instability that brought to power no less than eleven heads of 
State  between  1978  and  1982.  There  were  several  stalemated elections, 
which produced interim civilian presidents, and several coups. Just a listing  of the heads of state captures the political instability of the period: 
1979:  Pereda  (military),  Padilla  (military),  Guevara  (civilian),  Natusch 
(military), Gueller (civilian); 
1980:  Guciler (civilian), Garcia Meza (military); 
1981:  Garcia Meza (military), Bernal (military), Torrelio (military); 
1982:  Torrelio (military), Vildoso (military), Siles Suazo (civilian). 
The  events  of  1979  deserve  some  notice.  After  two  brief military 
governments,  new  elections  were  held in  the  summer of  1979.  These 
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popular  vote  and  no  candidate being able  to  command  a  majority in 
Congress. Walter  Guevara,  then  president of the  Senate,  was chosen as 
interim president. He was quickly overthrown  in a violent coup by Colonel 
Natusch  Busch,  who  in  turn  was  forced  to resign  shortly after.  Another 
interim president came to power, Lidia Gueiler,  who was then president of 
the Chamber of Deputies. She  in turn  was overthrown  the following year, 
but  not  before she had  launched a  tough,  coherent stabilization  plan that, 
alas, did not have time to take effect. 
An attempt to elect a president failed  in  1980 when  the elections again 
ended in stalemate. At that point, the country reached  its political nadir, with 
General LUiS  Garcia  Meza deposing  President Gueiler.  The  Garcia  Meza 
regime  was deeply  implicated  in  the  burgeoning  cocaine industry in the 
country  and,  therefore,  never  received U.S. diplomatic recognition.  The 
regime  was  nearly  universally  condemned  for  massive  corruption and 
violence  and  was  internationally isolated,  except  from  the  Argentinian 
military  government which had  helped  in the  coup  and  provided  some 
financing,  leaving behind debts that haunted Bolivia until the late 1980s. 
Capital flight reached  new heights in the period, with errors and omissions 
in the balance of payments of 1980 and 1981 totalling $590 million, or about 
10  percent  of  1980  GNP,  a  remarkably  high  amount  that  probabl" 
understates  the full extent of capital  flight.  The  international  commercial 
banks  stopped  all  lending  and  negotiated  an  emergency  rescheduling 
agreement in  1980,  upon which the regime soon defaulted.  The diplomatic 
isolation also had  important financial consequences:  the multilateral  creditor 
organizations, including the IMF, the World Bank,  and the Inter-American 
Development  Bank,  withdrew  their  support  and  new lending, leaving  the 
country without any effective  access to world capital markets. 
Bolivia started in  1980 to build up arrears with the commercial  banks, 
skipping amortization payments. At the same time, the economy was feeling 
the stress of higher interest rates on the foreign  debt. The need to normalize 
relations with the international commercial banks led to the debt reschedul- 
ing agreement  of April 1981, but even with debt rescheduling, Bolivia again 
fell  into arrears in 1982. 
Short-term Argentinian loans and some swaps provided by Latin American 
central banks allowed the Garcia Meza government  to  overcome the  most 
pressing  liquidity problems and  provided  some  transitory alleviation of the 
financial squeeze.  The government was also helped by a short-lived  export 
boom in 1980 with important price increases  for many nontraditional exports. 
In addition, Bolivia was able to negotiate better prices on its sales of  natural 
gas to Argentina. 
Garcia Meza met enormous difficulties in his exercise of government and 
faced strong  opposition  even  among  members of the  military  who  had 
conspired  with  him.  His  brutal  ways  alienated  him  from  the  business 
organizations and  middle-class constituencies that had  originally supported 
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his coup. By mid-1981, it became clear that he had to step down. In August 
1981,  he  resigned to a junta of commanders of the Anned Forces and, after 
a short interval, was replaced by General Celso Torrelio. 
Torrelio's presidency coincided with the onset of the world recession  and 
of the Bolivian economic  crisis.  Unable to control the economy, he was 
deposed in  favor of General Guido  Vildoso in  the  second half of  1982. 
Vildoso lasted  only  a  few  weeks,  but  in  the  meanwhile  he  prepared  a 
stabilization  plan,  trying to make it palatable both to the IMF and  to the 
public.  Political fatigue  owing to the  deterioration  of the  economy  and, 
especially,  the  instability of  the  military  governments  forced  him  to 
reconvene the  Congress elected  in  1980,  which, in  turn,  acting  as  an 
electoral college, named the civilian Hemán Sues Suazo as president. 
The political chaos between 1978 and the end of 1982  had a paralyzing 
effect  on  the  economy.  The  uncertainties  that  arose  from this Situation 
delayed recognition  of the external disturbances that the national economy 
faced  and  obstructed  the  process  of  decisionmaking  needed  to  take 
appropriate  action.  Political antagonists attributed  the  effects of external 
shocks to their political foes,  instead  of looking to the  true causes.  Quite 
unfortunately  for Bolivia. the  internal political chaos overlapped with the 
onset  of high world interest  rates and  world recession during  1980—82. 
Had opportune  action  been  taken to redress  the external  imbalances, it is 
likely that the toll exacted on Bolivia by the world crisis  would have  been 
lighter. 
Bolivia  remained  largely  isolated  from  the  ongoing  discussion  in 
international academic and  official circles  about  the way to cope with the 
crisis.  Some  of  the  macroeconomic  mistakes that  were  made  can  be 
attributed  to  this  isolation.  The  courageous attempt  at  stabilization  of 
President Lidia Gueiler in November 1979 stands  out as an exception.  Her 
stabilization  plan  contained  the  following  elements:  (1)  a  20  percent 
devaluation of the peso; (2) increases  in prices of publicly provided  goods 
and  services (e.g., a 36 percent rise in gasoline prices,  and  a 30 percent 
increase  in electricity  rates and railroad fares); (3) a reduction in subsidies on 
imported  staples;  (4) a reduction of export taxes  that had been  created in 
1972;  and (5)  strong regulations on dollar-denominated  time  and  savings 
deposits in the domestic banking system. The package was completed with a 
small wage increase. 
In January 1980 an Extended Fund Facility loan was agreed  upon with the 
IMF for U.S. $66.4 million, and in June of that year a Structural Adjustment 
Loan was obtained from the World  Bank for U.S. $50 million. Both of these 
programs subsequently fell  into  abeyance, after the  coup  which  brought 
Garcia Meza to  power. It is worth noting that the agreement with the IMF 
was reached very rapidly after Gueiler's stabilization  plan was announced. 
This  contrasts  sharply  with  what  happened in  the  ensuing  years,  when 
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It is difficult to assess the effects of  the stabilization plan and the IMF and 
World Bank loans of those years. The Garcia Meza coup clouded the picture. 
Had the democratic process continued and the new government followed the 
economic  policies  set  forth  by  President Gueiler,  results  probably  would 
have been better than those observed. 
2.8  The Return to Democracy  and the Outbreak of Hyperinftation, 
1982—85 
As  in  other  Latin American countries in  the  early  1980s,  economic 
deterioration  prompted  the  military to  retreat to  the  barracks.  In  1982, 
Hernán Sues  Suazo, who  had  been the president to preside over the IMF 
stabilization program of 1957 and who had received the plurality of votes in 
the  stalemated  1980  elections,  was  called  on  by  a  newly  reconvened 
Congress to accept  a four-year term of  office. 
It is important to appreciate the political implications of Siles' accession  to 
power. The new administration  represented the first elected government  in 
eighteen years, so that pent-up social and economic aspirations were sure to 
boil over early in the term.  Moreover,  Siles represented  the left wing of the 
MNR and governed in a coalition  that included  the Communist  party,  the 
left-wing MIR (Movimiento de Izquierda  Revolucionario),  and  for part of 
the  time,  the  centrist  Christian  Democrats.  In the  early  phase  of the 
administration,  the  union  movement  gave  strong  support  to  the  new 
government,  but  demanded large  real  wage  increases  and  other political 
concessions in return.  Ultimately, when successive wage increases  did not 
keep  ahead  of  the  accelerating  inflation  and  when  various  political 
concessions  were  not  granted,  the  unions  turned  sharply  against  the 
government.  Indeed,  labor unrest in  1984 and  1985 killed the final two 
stabilization attempts of the Siles administration. 
It is  not unusual for inflation to accelerate sharply upon the accession of 
leftist governments, particularly if  the left has been denied power for many 
years.  The same phenomenon occurred, to a lesser extent, in Bolivia in the 
1950s, in Chile under Aliende (1970—73), and in Portugal in 1974 after the 
collapse  of the  right-wing regime  in  that  year.  The  price  explosion  is 
typically  due  to  a  rise  in  government  spending  in  favor of the  new 
government's key constituencies (e.g., real wage increases  for trade union 
members or  increases  in  social  spending)  and  to  the  inability  of  the 
government to achieve a national consensus on raising taxes to cover such 
spending (with the right wing blocking tax increases). In the case of Bolivia, 
though,  it was  not  only  that  the  new  government  forced  through large 
increases  of public  spending, but also that it was  unable to reduce the huge 
deficit that  it  had  inherited  from earlier  governments and  was  unable to 
attract noninflationary  forms of finance. The coalition members of the Sues 
government were never able  to agree  on policies  to restrain spending (tile 
Communists, for  example, rejected any kind of policy that implied a drop in 
public sector employment or real wages), while the government's opponents 
in the Bolivian Congress opposed all tax reform proposals to stabilize or 
enlarge the shrinking tax base. 
Siles was  unable to stop  the economic decline,  and indeed many of his 
policies (and  sometimes his  lack  of action)  aggravated the  situation.  The 
inflation rate jumped in  the  second quarter of 1984 to  hyperinflationary 
levels.  The  detailed  economic  analysis of these events is  postponed to 
chapter 4. 
A complete  understanding of what precluded  the  necessary  policy  ad- 
justments  would  take  us  deeply  into  the Bolivian  political  system  and, 
therefore, is beyond the scope of this study. An excellent political analysis of 
the period is available, in any event, in Malloy and Gamarra (1988). A few 
general points can be raised. First, a key condition for the eventual outbreak 
of  hyperinflation  was the cutoff in access to foreign  borrowing in 1982: only 
a credit-constrained  government  would  choose to finance current expendi- 
tures with a hypennflation  rather than with more foreign borrowing. 
Second,  interest  group  politics  were  crucial  in  the  process.  At  a 
fundamental level, an inflation tax is  a highly regressive tax that affects a 
general  and  poorly  organized  part  of  the  population,  while  cuts  in 
government expenditures or increases  in other  kinds of taxes often affect 
better  organized or more  influential interest  groups.  Third,  many well- 
connected, rent-seeking individuals  made considerable fortunes in the course 
of the hyperinflation.  Anybody with access to official foreign  exchange from 
the Central Bank could  become wealthy  almost instantly  during  the period 
by purchasing cheap dollars at the Central Bank and selling  them at a several 
hundred percent profit in the black market.  Similarly,  commercial  bankers, 
who took deposits at zero interest rates and lent at high nominal  rates, shared 
in the government's seignorage gains during the hyperintlation.  Moreover, 
the government  extended a large number of low interest  loans during  the 
period, which effectively became grants as a result of the inflation. Price 
controls  on  public  sector  goods,  such as  on  petroleum  and  even flour, 
generated  opportunities  for  lucrative smuggling  operations.  All of these 
opportunities  for  gain  from  the  price  distortions  provided  a  natural 
constituency of powerful individuals  who wanted to see  the hyperinflation 
process continue. 
Fourth, there was a continuing  and sometimes profound misunderstanding 
of the costs  of stabilization. One  of the  most important checks on the 
stabilization process was  the government's political inability to impose real 
wage  "decreases,"  however  transitory,  on  the union sector. The  unions 
resisted any cuts in measured real wages as part of a stabilization  program, 
despite  the fact that the gains in reducing  the inflation tax for the workers 
could have exceeded any direct real income losses from a reduction in public 
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W,  deflated by  a  consumer price index,  P,  that does  not  include the  price 
(i.e., opportunity  cost) of holding money. Thus, while a rise in oil prices that 
allows the government to eliminate inflationary  finance could well  leave  real 
wages net of  the inflation tax higher than under the hypennilation,  the policy 
will almost  surely reduce measured WIP,  and therefore would typically be 
resisted by the unions. 
It should also be noted that much of  the union movement's opposition to the 
Siles  government's  policies  was  not limited to narrow  calculations  about 
short-run movements in real wages, but rather to a broader agenda to push the 
country to the extreme left. The main union organization,  the COB (Central 
Obrero Boliviana), pursued a strategy of insisting on co-government, with a 
goal of pushing the left-wing  coalition  toward a model of state socialism (see 
Malloy and Gamarra 1988 for an extensive discussion of  this point). This  was 
much farther than most of the other coalition  partners, and the president, were 
willing to go.  Therefore,  after failing to convince  the government from the 
inside, the COB  took to active and  vocal external opposition. 
2.9  Stabilization  and the End of the State-Capitalism  Model, 
1985—88 
By November  1984, President Siles admitted defeat in his government's 
attempts to control  inflation,  and  he called for new elections to be held in 
July 1985, one year before his term was due to expire.  During the last year 
of the  Siles  government,  inflation reached 24,000  percent (August  1985 
compared with August  1984).  Former presidents Hugo Banzer  and  Victor 
Paz Estenssoro were the front-runners in the national elections of 1985,  but 
neither of them received a majority of votes. While Banzer had a plurality of 
votes,  Paz  Estenssoro was  voted  in  by  the  newly  elected Congress  on 
4 August 1985, with the support of left-wing representatives who  opposed 
Banzer's attempt to return to power. 
Three weeks after Paz's inauguration, on 29 August  1985, the center-right 
government of Paz Estenssoro unveiled a wide-ranging  program, known by 
its  decree  number,  21060,  which  encompassed  not  only  plans  for 
macroeconomic stabilization but also for trade liberalization,  administrative 
and  tax reform, and  deregulation of domestic  markets. The  scope  of the 
program  is  remarkable in that it attempted to address  deep and politically 
sensitive structural issues  in the economy  at  the  same  time that it battled 
against  the  hyperinflation.  Hyperinflation  was  ended  shortly  after  the 
program  was  announced. Details  of how  this  was  accomplished will be 
considered in chapter 5. 
In the set of structural reforms,  announced in the program of 29 August 
1985  and  implemented during the following year, the most important  were: 
(I) a tax reform that simplified  a complicated structure, replacing it with one 
where valued added  and  wealth taxes loom large;  (2) reform, decentraliza- 
tion, and expenditure cutting in the state enterprises, especially in the mining 
company  COMIBOL;  (3)  reform  in  the  trade  regime,  aiming at  the 
elimination  of most barriers to international trade and the implementation of 
a flat tariff schedule; and  (4)  normalization  of Bolivia's  access  to  inter- 
national financial  flows from the official creditor community  (i.e., the IMF, 
the World Bank, the 1DB, and bilateral creditors). 
The political base for implementing this enormous program was established 
in a crucial  Pact for Democracy signed by Paz's MNR and Banzer's party, 
AcciOn  Democratica  Nacionalista  (ADN).  This agreement established  a 
congressional  majority sufficient to put through the Congress the key features 
of Supreme Decree 21060. The pact allowed the decree to take effect in the 
context of democracy, a  remarkable accomplishment  in view of Bolivia's 
volatile political institutions  and its vulnerable position  amongst politically 
unstable neighbors in the region. With the pact, the Paz government reserved 
important  positions in state enterprises for members of Banzer's ADN party. 
In addition to the political base of the MNR and ADN, Paz also had strong 
support in the  business  community.  Several prominent  businessmen, some 
who had been head of the CEPB, were given top Cabinet posts. 
The structural reforms did away with the state-capitalism model, with its 
several variants, that had been followed since the Revolution of 1952. The 
reforms  were carried  out with a remarkable smoothness. Of course,  there 
was some bitter  opposition, particularly  in the labor  unions and in the parties 
of the left, as well as lively Criticism  in  the press, but  the  changes  were 
peaceful and in the framework of  democratic institutions.  At no point during 
Paz's administration  was the process of reform imperiled. 
3  State Capitalism and the 
Operation of the Public Sector 
This chapter  focuses  on the  strategy of state  capitalism  as the  model of 
development in  Bolivia during  1952—85  and  particularly on  the role of 
public finances, public investment spending, and trade policy in that period. 
We have already stressed  that the Bolivian debt crisis in the  1980s, and  the 
economic crisis more generally, can be traced largely to insufficient  domestic 
savings and to a very weak public sector, despite the central role assigned  to 
the public sector in the development strategy. 
The  main point that  we emphasize is  that  while the  government faced 
large and politically urgent demands for spending—on,  for example,  the 
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cation),  the  military,  and  foreign  debt  servicing—the  tax  base  for  fi- 
nancing these expenditures had  always been extremely  fragile.  Domestic 
revenues were generally adequate only during periods of high foreign prices 
of raw materials.  When export  prices fell, governments generally tried  to 
maintain spending with funds borrowed from abroad. The real crises arose 
when neither high export prices nor foreign loans could sustain the level of 
government spending. Thus, after  1980 and before the stabilization program 
of 1985,  the government was forced to rely heavily on the inflation tax. 
As a general point regarding the  structure of government revenues,  the 
important thing to notice is that revenues were collected primarily through 
production taxes and foreign trade taxes, collected from a small number of 
activities undertaken by a handful of enterprises. Many, but not all, of those 
enterprises were publicly owned. The tax structure can be seen in table 3.1, 
from Breuer (1988). In 1976, for example, taxes from trade, state enterprises, 
and private mining (which is a production tax on an export good) accounted 
for 49.7 percent of the overall tax revenues. These three sources proved to be 
highly unstable during the 1980s as real tax revenues fell sharply. Trade taxes 
fell as a rising share of trade went through the black market; state enterprise 
taxes fell as profitability of the state sector declined. partly  as the result of 
unrealistic pricing; and private mining profits fell, partly due to terms-of-trade 
decline and partly due to a failure of collections. 
With a tax structure as in Bolivia,  the search for tax revenue was easily 
confounded with the search for investment opportunities for the public sector 
that  could  yield  those  revenues.'  Nobody  was  better  equipped,  it  was 
asserted, than the public sector to seize large investment opportunities, and 
the public sector needed the revenues in order to finance the balance of its 
expenditures. 
In this setting, the heavy emphasis on public investment projects combined 
with the allocation of public  sector revenues,  necessitated a development 
until 1985, the governments emphasized economic devel- 
public sector planning. The design and implementation of 
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development plans were considered essential for rapid economic growth in the 
productive and distributive spheres.  The common view on the topic over a 
long period was that centralized planning should be compulsory for the public 
sector and indicative for the private sector. 
In this chapter substantial space is devoted to the public sector investment 
projects as they were framed in development plans, the main conceptions of 
which  shed some light  on  the  projects themselves.  Indeed,  the policy of 
investing public income and publicly guaranteed loans in huge projects of 
resource-based industrialization cannot be fully understood without appeal- 
ing to the main conceptions on development as reflected in the development 
plans. Unfortunately, failed public investments, together with the narrowness 
and  vulnerability of the  tax  base,  are  the  main  sources  of  the  eventual 
collapse of the public sector. 
3.1  The Mature State-Capitalism Model, 1969—84 
The most important feature of the state-capitalism model is the degree of 
intervention of the government in the economy. In  1975, for example, the 
GDP generated in the public sector accounted for 22 percent of total GDP, 
while in 1982 this ratio reached a high of 28 percent. The data in table 3.2 
are even more telling,  as they  show the  very high share of public  sector 
investment  in  total  investment  spending.  During  1965—69,  the  public 
investment share in  total investment was  51  percent; by  1975, the share 
decreased  slightly  to  48  percent;  during  1976—80,  it  increased  again, 
reaching  an  average of  60.4  percent.  From  1981  to  1985,  the  ratio fell 
sharply because of the deep cuts in public investment spending during the 
financial crisis. It may be noted that from 1970 on, the years of high private 
investment rates  are  also  associated  with  strong  investment rates  of the 
public sector.  This  is  in  part  a  manifestation of state capitalism,  in that 
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private investment spending was often closely tied  to specific public sector 
projects. 
It  is  worth looking  at  some explicit statements of the  state-capitalism 
model contained in several  development  plans formulated  by various govern- 
ments. Though  the  model has  roots  that  go back  to the Revolution  and 
even before, we will focus our analysis on the 1969—84  period. In 1969 the 
left-wing populist government of General Ovando presented to the nation a 
Socioeconomic Strategy for National Development (SSND). The SSND was 
more "statist" and nationalistic than the ten-year plan prepared by the MNR 
regime in  1962.2  The SSND clearly defined a long-run vision of state-led 
growth, with many "strategic sectors" of production that were reserved to 
the public enterprises. The SSND targeted an increase in domestic saving 
based on the retained surpluses of the enterprises in the public sector; as a 
counterpart,  and  consistent  with a  nationalistic  ideology,  it  called  for a 
reduction of foreign savings through  cuts in foreign direct investment  and 
public external  borrowing. 
A  very  important feature of  the  SSND  was  the  emphasis given  to 
resource-based industrialization. A key theme  was that big  operating sur- 
pluses  can  be  generated in  the  state  enterprises  in  the resource sectors, 
which in turn can be reinvested in other sectors. in addition, the SSND, in a 
clear  case of misjudgment,  relied  quite  heavily for  the  industrialization 
program on the market prospects offered by the economic integration scheme 
of the Andean Group Pact of 1969, formed by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Peru, and Venezuela (Chile belonged originally, but quit in  1976).  With re- 
gard to agriculture, the SSND advocated a more communitanan organiza- 
tion of production, with strong emphasis on cooperatives and technological 
improvements.3 
The  SSND  was  short-lived, abandoned by President  Banzer in  1972. 
However, the SSND exerted a powerful influence on the formation of ideas 
in Bolivia that went well beyond  1972. The strongly nationalistic nature of 
the  SSND appealed to  the  left  in  the  Bolivian  political  spectrum  and, 
ironically, to many high-ranking officers in the military. In fact,  the state- 
capitalism  model  reached  its  peak  during  the  government  of  General 
Banzer and,  although we can  trace  the  origins of Banzer's  model to the 
Revolution of 1952, many of the most important concepts came from the 
SSND. 
The expansion of the public sector, especially as a producer of goods and 
services  that could,  under  appropriate  policies,  be  provided by  private 
enterprises, indeed constitutes the landmark of the Banzer years. But this did 
not mean a confrontation with the private sector; instead, the policies of the 
Banzer  regime aimed at a symbiotic relationship  between the public and 
private sectors.  Moreover, and  this  needs  to  be  underscored,  the  public 
enterprises served  frequently as  a  mechanism  to  transfer state-owned (or 
state-guaranteed) resources to privileged groups in the private sector. Access 
to government officials and government contracts were considered the most 
important asset from the viewpoint of many private sector businessmen. 
On the basis of research in progress,  Ugarteche (1986) and Rivas (1986) 
claim  that  the  main  beneficiaries  of  the  public  sector  external  debt 
accumulated in  the  Banzer  period were  private  sector supporters  of  the 
Banzer regime.  Also,  public employment was  increased substantially be- 
tween 1971 and  1978:  many new public enterprises  were created,  and  the 
government asserted its monopoly over the developments in the new mining 
sectors  (especially  iron),  as  well  as  in  the  commercialization of tin and 
metals. 
in 1975 Banzer announced a five-year development plan. In the summary 
of the plan given by Malloy and  Borzutszky (1982),  the following points 
stand  out:  (1)  the  plan's  aim  was  export-led  growth  accompanied  by 
selective import substitution; (2) it gave the preponderant role to the public 
sector,  targeting  the  public  sector  for  71  percent  of  total  investment 
spending; (3)  it allocated public investment primarily to the production of 
hydrocarbons;  (4)  it  divided  the nation  into  three  investment  zones:  a 
primary zone of La Paz—Cochabamba—Santa  Cruz,  a  secondary zone of 
Oruro-Potosi-Chuquisaca, and a tertiary zone of Beni and Pando, with the 
share in total investment of the primary zone to be 63 percent; and (5) it paid 
relatively scant attention to the peasantry. 
Most  of Banzer's  five-year plan  was never  put  in  place.  Two  factors 
accounted for the failure to implement the plan. First, the financing of the 
plan  was heavily dependent on Bolivian petroleum exports  which failed to 
materialize. Second, the public administration did not adhere to the guide- 
lines for  the allocation  of  investment,  so  that many  public  investment 
projects were  undertaken  without  due  consideration  for  the  investment 
allocations outlined in the plan. As this practice became common,  the plan 
became wholly unenforceable. 
In the SSND and the five-year plan (as well as in the MNR's  1962 ten-year 
plan), traditional exports occupy the center stage. In all of these plans, the 
expansion  of traditional exports  was deemed  to  be  the  "locomotive" of 
development, with the rest of the sectors of the economy following along. It 
has to be emphasized that nowhere was the conception of Bolivia as an export 
economy abandoned in favor of, for instance, import-substituting activities on 
a large scale. Planners and government bureaucrats did look on an expansion 
of a protected light manufacturing sector with some sympathy, but they did 
not think, given the smallness of the domestic market, that this sector could 
be the engine of rapid economic growth in the near future. Hopes were always 
placed on growth led by exports of primary commodities. 
The model of export-led growth embodied in the development plans that 
we  have  discussed  differed  significantly  from  the  traditional  pattern  of 
growth, as  well  as from the export-led models in the newly industrialized 
countries (NICs). In contrast to the traditional pattern, based on the export of 
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a few primary products, the development plans aimed at a more diversified 
export basket,  with the production of commodity-based goods having more 
domestic value added (e.g., the export of metals instead of mineral ores, and 
refined sugars and oils instead of the crude varieties). Unlike in the strategy 
of the NICs, there was little emphasis on the export of manufactures, except 
for some belated attempts in the context of the Andean Pact market. With the 
emphasis  on  petroleum  and  mineral  exports,  policymakers  placed  little 
importance on exchange rate management to promote new exports or on the 
deepening of domestic financial markets, though exchange rate and financial 
policies had played a crucial role in the successful takeoff of the NICs (cf. 
Tsiang 1986). 
The military successors of Banzer, by and large, tried to continue with the 
state-capitalism model.  The civilian governments of Walter Guevara Arze 
and Lidia Gueiler attempted to follow a somewhat less "statist" course, but 
their efforts were curtailed by strong political adversities. In 1984 one more 
attempt  was made  to  develop  a  plan,  with  the  "National  Development 
Strategy and  Four-Year Plan." Three  different  versions of the  plan  were 
offered  to the  public.  Because of the  internal squabbles of the  coalition 
partners in the Union Democratica Popular (UDP) governments in 1984—85 
and the high priority given to the inflation problem, no real importance was 
attached to any of the versions by the government or the public. 
3. 1 .1  Public Investment Spending in the State-Capitalism Model 
The deficiencies of planning  were  nowhere  more revealed than  in  the 
execution of public investment projects. A full evaluation of investments in 
the very capital-intensive projects has yet to be made. ideally, information 
should be gathered  for an ex ante  and cx post evaluation of each  major 
project undertaken in the  l970s and up until  1985.  Short of that, we may 
note  the  following points.  First,  many  large projects responded  more to 
noneconomic factors (prestige,  national security, etc.) than to profitability, 
measured either  in private or social  terms.  Second,  grave  mistakes were 
made  in  evaluating the endowments  of  natural resources.  For  example, 
overoptimistic assessments of oil and mineral reserves led to overinvestment 
in  these  industries.  Third,  the  cost-benefit  analyses  performed  before 
undertaking the  projects were  either  incomplete or  were  ignored in  the 
implementation phase.  Fourth,  the  large  projects were  typically  financed 
with expensive suppliers' credits and foreign bank loans. The conditions of 
repayment were, from the start, likely to create problems in the cash-flow 
Stream.  Fifth, when the projects were financed with official loans, delays in 
disbursements often disrupted the investment schedules. Sixth, the execution 
of the projects was extremely poor, with frequent but avoidable long delays 
in deliveries and construction. 
Contrary to what occurred in other debtor countries, public investment was 
largely directed to sectors producing tradables or to physical infrastructure, 
and even in the last case, infrastructure served primarily for the production of 
tradables.  The  problem  in  Bolivia  was  not  an excessive  allocation  of 
investment to  nontradables,  but  rather  the  highly  inefficient choice  and 
execution of investment projects within the tradables  sector. Political  and 
regional pressures, as well as specific vested interests, held great sway over 
the selection of investment projects and the procurement of construction and 
supply contracts. Graft, of course, was a very important factor—kickbacks 
and unwarranted cost overruns were the order of the day. 
Several examples illustrate the assertion of investment mismanagement: 
the uneconomical expansion of the tin smelters of the ENAF company in 
Vinto; the huge  Karachipampa polymetallurgic smelter  in Oruro for which 
there were no minerals; the expansions in oil-refining capacity in Santa Cruz 
and  Cochabamba when oil production was declining  at  a rapid  rate; the 
refinery for soya oil built close to the Paraguayan border, so far away from 
producing and marketing areas that  transportation Costs made it completely 
unprofitable; the  very modern international airport  of Vim-Vim  in  Santa 
Cruz, with a traffic load of no more than fifteen planes  a day  in 1987; the 
high-cost military-run truck assembly plant of Cochabamba; and so on. 
Even when some projects could have been reasonably profitable under the 
right  circumstances,  cost overruns  and  technical  misjudgments  impaired 
profitability.  For  instance,  the  COMIBOL  plant  for  the  treatment  of 
low-grade ores in La Palca was planned to be built in two years, yet after ten 
years it was still  unfinished. Similarly, there is the sugar refining mill of 
Guabira, the abnormally high costs of which were essentially due  to poor 
financial management that systematically delayed the sugar harvest by its 
suppliers, therefore causing a strong fall in the saccharose content of the 
inputs. 
It  is  interesting  to  note  that private investment projects  financed with 
foreign resources and public guarantees also showed poor performance, and 
substantial arrears were quickly built up after the loans were made. Loans to 
private firms that were guaranteed by the public sector institution, Banco del 
Estado, were used in white elephant projects and had a very low probability 
of  being  repaid.  Similarly,  the  foreign  loans  channelled  through  the 
state-owned agricultural bank, Banco Agricola Boliviano, to large farmers in 
the eastern lowlands suffered extensive defaults. 
3.1.2  State Enterprises in the State-Capitalism Model 
The  public  enterprises  were,  during  1952—85,  the  main  hope  for 
economic development but also the Achilles'  heel of the public sector. As 
was shown before, the size of the Bolivian public sector  relative to GDP has 
been considerable, far above the average in Latin America. Up to 1983, most 
of  the  larger  public  enterprises  were  able  to  generate  savings  in  spite 
of  adverse  macroeconomic policies  (mainly  overvalued  exchange  rates), 
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which already showed current account losses in 1980 (and chronic overall 
deficits, when account is  taken of investment spending) and  the smelting 
company, ENAF, which had troubles since its inception. For the other firms, 
however, the savings were usually insufficient to finance capital investment 
and debt servicing. As a result, the public enterprises were among the main 
borrowers internationally, as an increasing share of their capital outlays in 
the  l970s were financed by foreign savings. 
For  several reasons,  however, it is very  difficult to evaluate  with any 
accuracy the performance of individual enterprises. There  are  simply too 
many  distortions  in  financing  and  pricing  to make  such a retrospective 
analysis  feasible.  Complex cross-subsidies among  the  state-owned enter- 
prises distort the measured profitability of individual firms. A case in point is 
that  of  ENAF, which  was heavily  subsidized  by  COMIBOL.  Also,  the 
National Enterprise of Electricity (ENDE)  subsidized all  the other  public 
companies through low electricity tariffs. 
A further complexity in evaluating the State enterprises is the need to place 
the  enterprises  in  a  macroeconomic context,  while  also  taking  careful 
account of trends in the international economy. The net incomes of the state 
enterprises are much more sensitive to macroeconomic policies than are the 
profits  of  private  sector  enterprises.  The  temptation  to  suppress  the 
symptoms of inflation by manipulating the prices of the public enterprises or 
by delaying a devaluation of the official exchange rate,  for example, is a 
constant  danger.  Lags  during  1982—85  in  raising  public  sector  prices 
(especially petroleum products) and in devaluing the official exchange rate 
brought heavy losses to the public enterprises. As we shall note in chapter 5, 
the complete mismanagement of prices of publicly provided goods was an 
essential feature of Bolivian policymaking in 1982—85. 
To  help  understand  the  behavioral  choices  of  the  state  enterprises  in 
Bolivia,  it is relevant  to  introduce here the concept  of the soft  budget 
constraint,  as introduced by Kornai (1986) to explain the behavior of public 
sector firms in socialist economies. The essential idea  is that normal bud- 
getary constraints on  a firm's behavior do not hold in socialist economies 
since the  firm's  managers know  that  in case of trouble,  the  firm  will be 
bailed out by subsidies or credits from the central government.  As Kornai 
points out, this leads to a nearly insatiable demand for public sector credit, 
since "sooner  or later it can expect to be able to cover its costs on input, and 
if its proceeds on sales of output are insufficient, it will be able to cover 
costs from an external financial source" (44). Also, state enterprises facing a 
soft  budget  constraint  lack  incentives  and  sanctions  to  stick  to  their 
production goals and to limits on use of resources. 
This situation characterized most  state enterprises in Bolivia during the 
period  up  to  1985  (and  to  some  extent  afterward).  During  the  l970s, 
individual firms could borrow internationally on the full faith  and credit of 
the  central government.  There  were  few  bureaucratic constraints  that re- 
strained them from doing  so, with the result, as  we saw in the previous 
section, of a series of disastrously inefficient and uneconomical investment 
projects. The problem of soft budget constraints was especially severe during 
the high-inflation years of 1982—85. It was relatively easy to find ways to 
escape the budget constraints, for instance by delaying tax payments of the 
enterprises  to  the  central  government,  accumulating  liabilities  and  then 
shifting them to the Treasury, gaining access to heavily subsidized Central 
Bank loans, or contracting.  foreign debt beyond their needs when they could. 
Many state enterprises also suffered from a confusion of objectives: they 
were asked to generate profits to be reinvested, as well as to be shifted to 
other sectors; to generate employment,  frequently as a disguised scheme of 
unemployment compensation;  to provide education and  health  services to 
workers plus their families; and to act as a retirement fund and as a means to 
channel subsidies to the general consumer. This multiplicity of objectives 
impaired their normal functioning, as might be suspected. 
Most perniciously,  state  enterprises  were  used  as a  form  of political 
patronage and spoils to bolster the political power base of the government. 
For  this  reason,  employment  in  state  enterprises  increased  remarkably 
rapidly  in  the  1970s,  far  outstripping  the  growth of population and  the 
economy in general. Between 1970 and  1982,  state enterprise employment 
rose at an annual rate of 4.6 percent. Political pressures played an important 
role in the expansion of jobs during these years. In fact, a nonnegligible part 
of  the  support  for  the  Banzer  government  and  the  succeeding  military 
regimes was the willingness to create employment in the public sector. The 
return to democracy in  1982 was also accompanied by  a big spurt in the 
expansion of jobs in the most important public enterprises, particularly in 
COMIBOL. The distribution  of sectoral ministries  and  public  enterprises 
among  the  parties in  the  UDP  coalition  led  to  an unrestrained  race  of 
political patronage.  The  patronage of  the  Communist Party, through  the 
Ministry of Mines that it controlled, was especially notorious. 
In  the  same vein,  Rivas  (1986),  Ugarteche  (1986),  and  many  other 
Bolivian  analysts  also  claim  that  it  was  through  the  mismanagement of 
public  investment projects  that  the  public  foreign debt was  diverted  to 
private  beneficiaries,  often  with  political  goals  in  mind.  In  this  direct 
way,  the  public  debt  financed  consumption  and  capital  flight.  While 
the  government of Bolivia  retained  the  commitments,  the  benefits were 
privatized. 
3.1.3  The Public Sector as "Shock Absorber" for External Shocks 
The  public sector  was frequently used to absorb,  at  least temporarily, 
external shocks hitting the economy. For instance, while YPFB reaped some 
important  benefits and  the  Treasury substantial  taxes  from  the  oil  price 
increases of  the  l970s.  each of  these could  have been  greater  had the 
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consumption.  The protection of some consumers from the oil shocks was 
made  at  the  expense  of  taxes  and  profits  for  the oil  enterprises.  The 
opportunity costs of this policy were high. Moreover, as some oil products 
were  smuggled  out,  the  subsidies  gave  much  to  the  contrabandistas 
(smugglers) in addition to the general consumer. 
In some cases, not only opportunity costs were incurred but also heavy 
Treasury disbursements were spent in subsidies.4 For instance, when world 
prices of  wheat and  other grains  climbed during  1974—75  and  in  1979, 
domestic prices of wheat were kept constant, with the Treasury making up 
the difference between import prices and  domestic prices.  Moreover, the 
government established de facto price support schemes for some agricultural 
staples, like sugar and rice. These price support schemes were very costly in 
years of low international prices and good harvests. 
The essential point is that the fiscal sector was used to isolate the economy 
from external fluctuations. When the shocks were transitory, this policy did 
not have important consequences.  However, as adverse shocks frequently 
lasted  longer  than  expected,  significant debt  accumulation  ensued.  The 
domestic price repercussions of those deficits went unnoticed as long as it 
was possible to finance them by borrowing from abroad. The government 
deficits that resulted from subsidies was one of the channels that led to the 
financing of consumption with foreign debt. 
In some cases, the "shock absorber"  function was used for the protection 
of a very narrow part of the elite. A good illustration is the case of Cotton 
growers in the Santa Cruz region during the Banzer period. Tens of millions 
of dollars were loaned by the government's agricultural bank (Banco Agricola 
Boliviano) to a small number of large landowners during an incipient cotton 
boom. The Bolivian producers sold their crops forward on world markets, but 
then tried to renegotiate when the spot-market prices rose above the forward 
contract price. They failed in the renegotiations and, in the end, much of the 
Cotton remained undelivered. The growers quietly defaulted on the agricul- 
tural bank loans and the government absorbed the losses with no attempt to 
collect or to foreclose on any property. To this day, the bad cotton loans have 
undermined the solvency of Banco Agricola. 
3.2  The Chronic Weakness of Public Sector Revenues 
In Bolivia, the sources of income for the public sector have suffered from 
extreme fragmentation since the beginning of the Republic. Before the tax 
reform measures of 1986,  there were many central government taxes with as 
many  collecting  agencies;  local  taxes;  and  taxes earmarked  for  regional 
development corporations, the state universities, and for the social security 
system. In part because of this extreme fragmentation and in part because of 
notoriously bad  record keeping for tax  collections,  it is hard to  make a 
precise quantitative assessment of the public revenue system. 
The combined accounts of the central administration, the social security 
system,  and the so-called decentralized agencies  form the central govern- 
ment accounts. If one  adds to  the account of the central government the 
accounts  of  the  local  governments,  this  gives  the  general  government 
accounts. The general government accounts together with the accounts of the 
nonfinancial state  enterprises  form the consolidated  nonfinancial public 
sector. Note that transfers between parts of the system are very important for 
the consolidated nonfinancial public sector. Public enterprises pay taxes to 
(and on occasion receive subsidies from) the central administration and some 
local  governments.  Central  administration  transfers  to  the decentralized 
agencies and local governments are very substantial. 
Finally, the quasi-fiscal activities of the  financial public sector (i.e., the 
Central Bank of Bolivia, together with the state banking system) should be 
consolidated with  the  nonfinancial public  sector accounts  to  get a  com- 
prehensive view of the  fiscal activities of the overall  public  sector.  Be- 
cause of data limitations,  this  complete consolidation would  be virtually 
impossible for historical data. 
The best recorded data for the public sector are found for the account of 
the General Treasury of the Nation, TGN (Tesoro General Nacional), which 
handles  the  accounts  for  the  central  administration  and  which  has 
traditionally been under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance. We now 
turn to a look at revenues of the TGN. 
3.2. 1  The Revenues of the General Administration 
From  1961  to  1970,  central  administration revenues amounted to 8.0 
percent of GDP on the average; in the next decade this ratio  increased to 
10.2  percent, with a slight rise in the second half of the decade compared 
with the  first  half.  The maximum ratio of revenues to GDP of the TGN 
occurred in  1976 (12 percent of GDP). Data on revenues, expenditures, and 
the deficit, from Breuer (1988), are shown in table 3.3 for the years 1970 to 
1984. 
The rise in revenues as a percentage of GNP from the 1960s to the 1970s 
was  due  to  a  determined effort  to  improve tax administration and to an 
increase in the tax base because of the expansion in the  value of exports 
during the l970s. However, after 1979, inflation started to take its toll on the 
real value of lax collections, in line with the so-called Olivera-Tanzi effect 
(see Tanzi 1977), which predicts a negative relation between inflation rates 
and real tax collections. During the high inflation years, the TGN revenues 
were as low as 2.8 percent of GDP in 1984 (and fell to only about I percent 
of GDP in the first  quarter of 1985!). We  shall describe in chapter 5  more 
precisely how the high inflation made a shambles of the Bolivian tax system. 
Changes in the structure of the TGN revenues should also be noted.5 In 
the l970s, taxes collected by the internal revenue service amounted to 34 
percent of the TGN  revenues,  while taxes on the foreign  sector,  mainly 200  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey 1). Sacks  I 
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Ilt.dget Revenues, Eapenditures,  and the Delirst,  l97O—4  (as  erceotage 
of GNP) 
Year  Revenues  Fxpendttures 
1970  8.4  9.8  1.4 
1971  7.9  10.0  2.! 
1972  7.6  10.0  2.4 
1973  9.1  10.6  1.5 
1974  11.5  11.9  .4 
1975  1L3  12.6  1,3 
1976  12.0  140  2.1 
1977  11.5  13.8  2.2 
1978  11.4  14.0  2.7 
1979  9.4  14.3  4.9 
1980  9.6  16.0  6.4 
1981  9.4  15.1  5.6 
1982  4.6  26.9  22.3 
1983  2.6  20.1  17.5 
Srerrer  Bretter (1988),  table  5.5. which is based on  estimates  supplied  by UDAPE as the  Mtnisuy ot 
Planning,  Bolivia, 
import tariffs, represented  31 percent  on the average.  The  remaining  source" 
were  production  taxes  on the mining and petroleum sectors, which averaged 
31  percent.  Property  income  and  services  provided  by  the  central 
government yielded 4 percent of the TGN revenue.  By the end of the by- 
perinflation,  however,  tax collections on  internal income  and  on  inter- 
national  trade  had  been  sharply  eroded.  Only  the  taxes  on  petroleum 
production could  be easily  collected  in  the  short  term,  even  after  the 
hyperinflation  stopped. Therefore, in 1985, the year that stabilization began, 
taxes on petroleum represented no less than 64 percent of  TGN  revenue. We 
return to this point in chapter 5. 
In  regard  to  the  composition of  internal  taxes (more  precisely, taxes 
collected by  the  internal revenue service  and  excise  taxes on  petroleum 
products), the most important component during the normal years 1975—78 
was taxes on consumption and sales. The share of personal income taxes in 
total internal taxes has  never been above 25  percent. The contribution of 
corporate income taxes was likewise modest, never going beyond 23 percent 
of internal taxes. 
Until the tax  reform of  1986,  property and road taxes were  local taxes 
collected and earmarked for the municipalities and did not enter the TGN 
coffers. It is very hard to locate data of good quality for local governments, 
so only gross trends can be suggested. As happened with the TGN revenues, 
there was a slight improvement in tax effort during the  1970s, but in the 
1980s,  property  taxes  and  vehicle  taxes  suffered  very  much  with  high 
inflation. Not only did lags in payments affect the real value of collections, but 
property  assessments (which were undervalued  to begin  with) lagged far 
behind  inflation, so that real property values for tax purposes fell sharply 
during the high-inflation period. Some municipalities in dire financial straits 
asked  for,  and  obtained,  frequent  direct  transfers  from  the  TGN.  The 
financing problems of the regional development corporations, the universities, 
and the social security system were also acute during the high inflation period. 
3.3  Management of Public Expenditures 
The chronic weakness of public sector revenues and the low profitability 
of public  investment  spending explain  a  large  part  of the overall  fiscal 
disaster in Bolivia in the 1980s. Also important were the dynamics of public 
sector spending on the  current account of the budget (i.e.,  other than for 
capital expenditures). The key  point here  is that debt-servicing costs rose 
sharply in the 1980s just  as the availability of new financing dried up.  The 
government was squeezed by,  falling tax revenues (due to rising inflation), 
higher expenditure charges (due to rising interest payments), and an inability 
to finance the resulting gap (as well as the deficit levels inherited from the 
1970s) through foreign borrowing. The result was a turn to the inflation tax. 
Unfortunately, there is a profound difficulty in tracing interest payments 
carefully through the budget  since the interest obligations were at various 
points charged to the  state enterprises, the central  administration, and  the 
Central Bank. We  will be able  to review in chapter 5 some data on overall 
interest payments made to foreign creditors, but without precisely specifying 
how the spending was allocated among various parts of the public sector. 
As in the preceding section, a detailed analysis of expenditures must focus 
mainly on the TGN because of a lack of information regarding other parts of 
the state sector. Precisely because of the shifting of various financial burdens 
among different parts of the state sector, a focus on the TGN  is not only 
incomplete, but may sometimes even be misleading. TGN expenditures as a 
percentage of GOP were 9.6 percent on average in the decade of the sixties, 
12.2  percent in the  seventies,  and  16.7  percent from  1981  to  1985.  The 
evolution of overall expenditures  was shown  in table  3.3.  The large  in- 
crease  in  overall  spending  after  1981  is  mostly  accounted for  by  a rise 
in debt-service expenditures  and  in  transfers  to  financially strapped  state 
enterprises. 
The composition of the TGN expenditures for selected years is shown in 
table 3.4.  Note  that in the  l970s,  personnel expenses were generally about 
half of the total. In 1982, however, interest costs on the foreign and internal 
debt rose sharply, and payments to the Central Bank, also apparently related 
to foreign debt, accounted for about two-thirds of overall expenditures. In 
1984,  interest costs fell sharply as  Bolivia  suspended  payments  on  the 
commercial bank debt. 
Was the central government profligate between  1970 and  1985? A key 
indicator of profligacy is the increase in employment.6 Employment in the 
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Table 3.4  Structore of E  endilurra  in the Central Govermnent, 8970—84 
tar percentage  of toti  expenditure) 
1970  1976  1980  1982  1984 
Personnel  54.1  42,4  46.4  20.8  59.7 
Materials  1.4  6.3  7.3  3.0 
Tranaters  16.3  16.6  I  10.0  19.8 
Debt  service  13.6  2.1  16.3  26.8  7.6 
Payments to Central Bank  .0  .0  .0  40.7  .0 
Other  14.6  22.7  18.4  4.1  7.6 
Total  100.0  100.0  100.0  1000  100.0 
Data refer to central government (TON) and  arc  based  on  the data g,vcfl m iablc 5.4  of  Brcoer 
(1988), whiCh in  turn  were provided  by UDAPE in the  Ministry of Planning,  Bolivia. 
central  administration  increased by 92.4 percent between  1970 amid 1982, 
yielding an average annual rate of growth of 5.6 percent. This rate of growth 
was  well above that of the urban population and of GDP, with the main 
increases occurring  between  1970 and  1976.  We  know  from  the political 
analysis that succeeding administrations used patronage as a way to cement 
patron-client relations, and thereby build a political base of support.  It does 
indeed seem that the result was a profligate and inefficient overextension of 
public sector employment. 
Expenditures on investment that were on average around 2 percent of GDP 
during 1976—79 fell to around 0.3 percent during the crisis years of 1981—85. 
Since central government investment expenditure is mainly on social over- 
head, the impact of its substantial reduction has important repercussions on 
income  distribution  and  on  growth.  The  fall  in  this  particular  type  of 
investment will have long-lasting effects, the magnitude of which has not yet 
been fully appreciated. 
4  Trade Policies, 1970—85 
It should be recalled from our overview in chapter 1 that the long-run growth 
of the Bolivian economy has been critically determined by the exports of 
primary  commodities,  mainly  tin  and  natural  gas.  Bolivia's  economy 
depends crucially on the performance of the export sector. In turn, shifts in 
indebtedness have coincided, procyclically, with the export cycle. Bolivia's 
dollar export earnings during 1970—88 are shown in table 4.1. 
Export  earnings  and,  by  extension,  the  domestic  economy have  been 
greatly affected by the  instability of Bolivia's export prices.  As  a result, 
policymakers have focused on measures to stabilize and improve Bolivia's 
I 
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laNe 4.1  Export Earnin  ga, 1970—88 (in millions o  (U.S. dollars) 
1970  l9().4  1980  942.2 
1971  181.6  1981  912.4 
1972  201.3  1982  827.7 
1973  260.8  1983  755.1 
1974  556.5  1984  724.5 
1975  444.7  1985  623.4 
1976  5610  1986  545.5 
1977  634.3  1987  518.7 
1978  627.3  1988  542.5 
1979  759,8 
&sorce  IME, I,rtemnn,krnal  Fina,wiuI S:w,slic. 
terms of trade,  particularly  with respect to tin. These measures have been 
pursued mainly by participation in international stabilization agreements on 
tin and  by lobbying to forestall sales of this commodity by the  industrial 
countries.  In regard to natural gas,  the trade policy has been much more 
passive. 
Many  domestic  economic  policies  have  affected  the  development  of 
Bolivia's  foreign trade performance in recent  years.  Some of the  policies 
were particularly harmful and played an important role in the severity of the 
crisis in  the  l980s.  In part  because of adverse trade policies  and  in part 
because of adverse terms-of-trade shocks that were out of Bolivia's  control, 
Bolivia  suffered  one  of  the  sharpest  declines  in  Latin  America  in  the 
purchasing power of exports  (PPX) between  1981 and  1988, as shown in 
table 4.2.1 In this chapter, we review the main trade policies and their effects 
on  trade performance.  Particular  attention is paid to  exchange rate  man- 
agement.  The structure of tariffs and  the taxation of natural resources are 
also examined.  The in3portant question that underlies the whole chapter is 
why, despite  a  high  dependency  on  exports,  Bolivia's  long-run  export 
performance has been so poor. 
4.1  Export  Policies 
Bolivia's  export  policies  during  1961—81  were  primarily  aimed  at 
strengthening or at  least stabilizing Bolivia's terms of trade in the major 
commodity markets.2 From 1982 to 1985, little attention was paid to trade 
policies given the overwhelming problems of internal stabilization. 
By far the most important scheme of price stabilization was provided by 
Bolivia's  participation  in  the  International  Tin  Agreements  (ITA).  Five 
agreements were  signed—l956,  1961,  1966,  1971,  and  1976—but Bolivia 
did not join in signing the last one  in  1976, in protest against price targets 
that it regarded as too low. In the  1970s, agreements of lesser scope were 
also signed for tungsten and antimony, other important mineral exports of 
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Table 4.2  The Purchastng  Power of  laporh  (PPX) to Bolivia and Selected Countries, 
1988 (1980 =  100 for aH liadkea) 
Countzy  PPX,  1988  Export Volume  Terms of Trade 
Bolivia  57  69  89 
ArgentIna 
Brazil 
102  131  79 
167  197  86 
Chile  156  158  lOt 
Colombia  152  174  90 
Ecuador  103  159  67 
Mexico  139  228  62 
Peru  75  71  lOg 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
148  130  116 
56  106  55 
Sc,io-r  Economic Commission  for  Latin  America and the Caribbean,  Untied Nations  (ECLAC),  "Pre- 
liminary Overview of the  Latin  American Economy,  1988" (3  January  I989>  table  8. export volumes; 
table  10, terms of trade; and table 12, purchasing  power of exports.  As explained in  endoote  I to this chapter, 
the PPX  should  equal the  product  of the  export volume  index  and the terms-of-trade index.  This  is only 
approximately  true for the data shown, apparently  because of the differing coverage  of goods in the three 
indices reported  by ECLAC. 
The ITAs were agreed  upon by the  main tin producing and consuming 
countries,  with the exception of the United  States. The governing body of 
the ITA is the International Tin Council (ITC). The main, but not the only, 
instrument for achieving the price stabilization objective was a buffer stock 
of tin metal financed by the producing members. In negotiations for the five 
agreements, Bolivia,  which  had  the  highest  production  costs  among  the 
producing countries,  lobbied  systematically  for  higher  floor  and  ceiling 
prices than those set by the ITC. Other producers did  not follow Bolivia, 
feeling that a long-run policy of high prices would backfire on them. Time 
proved them right. 
There is considerable controversy over the workings of the ITC and of 
the buffer stock. For example, there was a problem with the small size of the 
agreed-upon stock. in fact, the buffer stock became irrelevant in the booming 
market of the 1970s. Moreover, the buffer stock could hardly cope with the 
most  important destabilizing  factor  in  the  tin market,  namely,  the  huge 
strategic stockpile of tin held by the  U.S.  General Service Administration 
(GSA). In the 1980s, the ITC held prices that were much too high instead of 
allowing a smooth accommodation to the weaker market conditions.  High 
prices induced the entry of new producers in the market and hastened the 
process of technological substitution with other  metals and  materials.  In 
addition, the financing of the buffer stock became a problem. This conjuction 
of an excessively high price with financing problems led to the collapse of the 
tin agreement in October 1985 and the collapse of tin prices from $5.60 per 
pound on the eve of the collapse to $2.55 per pound in July 1986, nine months 
later.  The October collapse had a stunning effect: the buffer stock declared 
insolvency and the London Metal Exchange ceased trading in this metal. The 
I 
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evolution of the real price of tin (relative to the unit value  of imports of the 
developing countries) was shown in  figure 1.2 in chapter  1,  in  which the 
collapse in October 1985 is plainly evident. 
Besides  the  problem of price  stabilization,  the  production  and  export 
activities of the mining sector during the  l970s were adversely affected by 
onerous tax legislation, which was somewhat eased after  1979.  The mining 
sector was subjected  to  two  main  types of taxes: a  regalia,  which  was 
initiated in 1965, and an export tax imposed with the devaluation of 1972. 
The regalia is a tax on presumed income, given that the nominal base of the 
tax results from the difference between world mineral prices and a presumed 
cost set by the Bolivian Ministry of Mines. Since presumptive costs changed 
infrequently, the regalia  functioned  in fact as a tax on the gross value of 
output. The regalia overtaxed the mining sector, and particularly the weakest 
enterprises,  in  years of low  mineral prices,  whereas  it  failed  to  fiscally 
appropriate the rents that were  generated in years of rising mineral prices 
(Gillis 1978). Moreover, tax codes did not encourage investment in mineral 
exploration and development. 
Petroleum was a major export  in Bolivia. But after  1973,  with the rise in 
domestic consumption and the progressive depletion of reserves,  the amount 
left  for  exports  decreased  substantially,  and  Bolivia  ceased  to  be  a  net 
petroleum  exporter  in  1977.  The  systematic  domestic  underpricing  of 
petroleum products encouraged the demand for both domestic consumption 
and for contraband  exports,  which  hindered  a  sensible  development  of 
petroleum exports  and  appropriate  tax  revenues.  In  addition,  petroleum 
production and  exports  have been subjected to punitive taxation and this, 
too, has had long-run costs in discouraging supply. 
Bolivia has important deposits of natural gas. In fact, the export prospects 
for energy lie mainly in natural gas. Exports of gas to Argentina have been a 
very important source of foreign exchange. In the 1970s, gas exports  were 
already marred by  controversies about price,  and these controversies  have 
gained in intensity in the last years. Unfortunately, pricing principles were 
not  clearly established  when  the  gas  pipeline  to  Argentina was  put  into 
operation in  1972.  A  negotiation  during  the  1970s  between  Bolivia and 
Brazil to export natural gas to Brazil did not succeed because of domestic 
political opposition to sales of the  "national patrimony" to Brazil. These 
negotiations have been resumed under the New Economic Policy begun in 
1985. 
In  1977 the Bolivian government decided to subsidize nontraditional (or 
minor) exports,  including selected agricultural products and manufactures. 
The  Law  of  Fiscal  Incentives  of  1977,  and  its  reform  in  1982,  for 
nontraditional exports  included exemptions from all export taxes as well as 
from import duties for inputs into exports and a tax rebate certificate granted 
to the exporters.  The certificate,  which amounted  to between  10 and  25 
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sales, or imports. It could also be sold freely for use  by other  exporters. The 
tax certificate was a direct subsidy that partially  compensated an increasing 
overvaluation of the peso. 
An ex post evaluation of export policies demonstrates that these policies 
were not always clearly stated, nor were their effects fully appraised. It is 
clear that with respect to traditional exports,  fiscal measures were generally 
inimical to  a  long-tenn  increase in supply. The fiscal system focused on 
expropriating economic rents—a legitimate objective, of course—more than 
on encouraging the opening of new mines or the drilling of new wells. In 
regard to the promotion of nontraditional exports, it is possible to make two 
appraisals. First, the scheme of 1977 (and the reform of 1982) was subject to 
considerable abuse,  without really leading to increased incentives for more 
exports.  Second, the exportable  products  that  benefited from  this export 
promotion policy constituted less than 5  percent of the value of all exports. 
In  fact,  the emphasis  on fiscal measures obscured the  fact  that  domestic 
firms and industrialists first  had to learn how to improve their production 
and merchandising methods. Thus, it appears that more effective forms of 
encouraging nontraditonal exports could have been sought. 
4.2  Import Policies 
Major import tariff reforms took place in  1967,  1973,  1982,  1985,  and 
1986.  Before the changes of 1985  and  1986,  the most important was  the 
reform in 1973,  which had been distorted with piecemeal changes in the tax 
rates but which nonetheless affected the schedule in significant ways. A very 
important feature of the tariff structure in place until  1985 was the existence 
of preferential tariff provisions for (I) commodities, according to the final 
use to which they were put; (2) goods used in the northwestern regions of the 
country; and (3) goods coming from countries with which Bolivia had (and 
has) economic agreements for bilateral reductions in tariffs. 
Examples of preferential tariffs of the first type were the special provisions 
for  imports  for  the  mining  and  petroleum  sectors  and  the  exemptions 
accorded by the Investment Laws of 1972 and 1981.  Preferences of the third 
type  included  the  Bolivian  Lists of Tariff  Concessions  to  the member 
countries of the  Latin American Free Trade  Association and the Andean 
Group.  These  provisions  for  preferential  tariffs  affected  an  important 
proportion of Bolivian imports. Depending on the year, the value of imports 
subject to the preferential rates ranged between 25 and 35 percent of total 
imports. 
Considerations of government revenue and exigencies of the balance of 
payments (i.e., the need to constrain the fall of reserves in the context of a 
pegged exchange rate) prevailed over the view of using tariffs (and other 
import policies) as effective tools for guiding industrial policy. The piecemeal 
changes eroded the original intentions of coherent and limited protection in 
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the 1973 reform and  in  subsequent tariff changes.  While one  could  find 
economic reasons to justify the distinct tariff  rates in the reforms on protection 
and  revenue grounds,  the  piecemeal changes  introduced a high degree of 
dispersion of the tariffs, reflecting ad hoc considerations with little economic 
justification. 
Frequent changes  were often brought about  by the  pressures of special 
interest groups of industrialists and importers. Before 1986, tariff duties, as 
is to be expected,were high on luxuries and competitive consumer goods and 
exhibited significant variation.  On the other  hand,  tariff rates for capital 
goods were very low. Duties on raw materials and intermediate goods, which 
are necessary for domestic manufacturing and hence  could be treated  in a 
manner like that for capital goods,  were, however, quite variable. 
The effective rate of protection is better than the nominal tariff rate as an 
indicator of the extent to which a particular set of tariffs protects domestic 
producers. Table 4.3  shows the  effective rates  for  selected products  pre- 
vailing  in  the  second  half of  the  1970s.  lt is clear that  there  is con- 
siderable  variation  among  the effective  rates.  Note  that effective  rates 
have also been computed for imports subject to quantitative restrictions by 
finding  the implicit tariffs involved,  which were calculated as the relative 
difference between  international and  domestic prices.  This procedure was 
used as well in the case of prohibited imports. 
More specific conclusions can also be drawn from the data in table 4.3. 
First, the high protection provided by the import bans stands out. Apart from 
the  case  of  import  prohibitions,  the  most  important  characteristic  that 
appears in the structure of effective protection is the high effective rates for 
goods considered luxuries. The effective rates are considerably higher than 
the already high nominal tariff rates.  Second,  it is clear  that there is high 
effective protection for domestic production. In the cases of goods subject to 
import bans there is complete protection, but this is also true in many cases 
which are  only  subject  to tariffs.  Third,  most  intermediate products  for 
industrial usage  have low  (or  even  negative)  effective  rates,  which  are 
generally very close  to the  nominal rates.  Fourth,  the effective  rates for 
capital  goods are close  to  the nominal rates; however, in many cases  the 
effective rates are negative. 
Quantitative  restrictions,  including prohibitions,  were  used  along  with 
tariffs to limit imports during 1970—82, but their scope was reduced during 
the decade.  In 1978 less than 2 percent of the Brussels Trade Nomenclature 
was subject  to  prohibitions.  During  the  crisis years  of  1982—85,  many 
luxury  and  competitive  imports  were  banned  for  balance-of-payments 
purposes (around 10 percent of the items of the Brussels Trade Nomencla- 
ture). 
Smuggling has greatly limited the application of tariff and quota policies 
and has substantially hurt government revenues.  Once again, the expansion 
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the public sector. Although  there are no good data for this illegal activity, a 
fair guess for the late 1970s  was that contraband imports  constituted around 
20 percent of legal imports. The expansion in contraband imports after 1978 
is also related to the laundering of dollars earned in the drug trade.3 
4.3  Economic Integration 
Bolivia has adhered  to two main economic integration schemes,  the Latin 
American Free Trade  Association  (LAFTA), which later became the Latin 
American  Integration  Association,  and the  Andean Group, as welt as to 
a host of other organizations of economic  cooperation with less  ambitious 
aims. 
Bolivia joined LAFTA in 1966 and was given a relatively less developed 
country status with preferential  treatment that  consisted essentially  in post- 
poning  dates  for  the  implementation  of tariff reductions  and dismantling  nontariff barriers. The direct benefits of Bolivia's association with LAFTA 
were virtually  unnoticeable.  Bolivian exports  to  the  countries  consisted 
mainly  of petroleum,  natural  gas, and minerals.  These exports,  however 
important,  would have  taken place anyway, with or without LAFTA mem- 
bership. Bolivian imports of manufactures from LAFTA grew at a very fast 
pace, but  this expansion can hardly be attributed to its participation in the 
organization. 
The  apparent failure of LAFI'A, at  least  from  the  viewpoint of the 
relatively  more poor Andean member countries, led to the formation of the 
Andean Group with the signing of the Cartagena Agreement in May 1969. 
The  Andean  Group  integration  scheme had  two main  instruments:  (1)  a 
customs union, and (2) a joint mechanism of investment programming for a 
list of goods for the  Sectorial Industrial  Development Program (SIDP). In 
addition,  in order to Counteract the  adverse  effects  that  these  instruments 
might unintentionally  provoke,  the  Andean Group Countries agreed upon a 
set of measures  to harmonize other policies that affected trade and agreed to 
set common policies for the treatment of foreign private investment. 
Bolivia was again given a relatively less  developed country status in the 
group,  along with Ecuador, and both  were accorded preferential treatment 
for the two main instruments and subordinate policies. Economic integration  within the Andean Group created considerable hope among Bolivian policy- 
makers,  who  thought  that it would provide the big  push  necessary for 
Bolivian industrial  development with the  incentive  of a  large market  for 
manufactures.  Bolivia,  therefore,  enthusiastically  supported  the  Andean 
Group at the outset. 
By 1978 there was considerable disillusionment  with the workings of the 
Andean Group among government officials and industrialist  organizations in 
Bolivia.  From their  point of view, the benefits of integration  seemed  rather 
scant  and  the  costs were  presumed to be high. The  tact that the whole 
r 
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Table  4.3  Bolivia,. Nominal Tariff, and ldfrctive Rates of Protection  by Industry 
(31 December 1977) 
Standard 
Mean  Deviation 
A. S  notor'y stotistlrs for o list of  .337 groups of 'ow'nodates 
Nominal  tanff  38.9%  28.0% 
Effective  rate of protection  74.4%  97.5% 
Simple  correlation  between nominal and effective rates  0.88 
Rank order  correlation  between nominal and effective rates  = 0.88 
Effective 
Nominal  Rate of 
Tat-sit  Protection 
8. Indices for selected items within this list 
Livestock  products  .17  .14 
38  Chemical  &  fertilize, mineral  products 
.81  483  Butter 
233  Cheese  .67 
1.81  Canned  fruits & vegetables  .62 
.29  .77  How mill products 
.42  .58  Bakery  products 
.97  4.2  Processed tobacco 
5.83  Catpett  LIS 
.91  1.88  Lace  products 
.71  2,15  Jersey fabric 
2.33  Carpeting  products  1.13 
2.36  Premanofactured  wooden  stzuclures 
1.67  Papers for sanitary  use 
.17  .19  Pharmaceutical  preparations 
.3  .65  Paints, inks, & dyes 
1.72  Leather 
1.89  Soles and  other shoe components  .97 
.05  Mining machinery 
.49  Steel stmctwes 
.30  Hand tools 
.09  Farm  machinery, except  tractors  .11 
.01  Textile  indosuy machinery  .09 
.05  tndustiaI furnaces 
.53  Rosiness & of  lice machines  .38 
1.03  Domestic  kitchen  appliances  .48 
.79  2.54  Washers 
2.24  Fans & other domestic  appliances  .76 
.37  .61  Domestic  refrigerators 
.93  2.82  Trucks 
.91  Household  radio & TV  sets  .53 
Motorcycles. bicyctet. &  parts  .43 
.94  1.60  Wood  furniture  for homea 
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Andean Group  entered into  a  state  of crisis  contributed  to the  problem. 
Chile,  with  the  most  healthy  of the  Andean  Group  economies,  in  fact 
withdrew from the group in the mid-  1970s  under the policy of the Pinochet 
regime. The Andean Group has continued in prolonged crisis, a crisis which 
deepened markedly with the international economic turmoil of the  l980s. 
In the aftermath of the hyperinflation,  with public  policies dominated by 
the  need to consolidate  the  stabilization, Bolivia's  participation in the 
Andean  Group  and in  all  the  other  integration  schemes  is  almost  dead. 
Notwithstanding this, the collapse of the markets for traditional  exports may 
inspire Bolivian policymakers to seek  some fresh approaches to economic 
integration,  especialLy  with  Brazil and  Argentina, which represent large 
potential markets for light industrial exports from Bolivia. 
4.4  Exchange  Rate Policies 
Between 1957 and  1982, Bolivia followed a regime of unified  pegged 
official exchange rates. The  abundance  of credits from 1957 until the late 
1970s allowed the government to maintain a fixed exchange rate without the 
need to resort to explicit foreign  exchange rationing,  and thus prevented the 
development of a parallel market with significant premiums.  Between 1957 
and  1979,  the  exchange rate  showed  a  surprising  stability: only  once, in 
October 1972, was the peso devalued. After the drying up of  foreign inflows 
in the early  l980s  and with the resistance of the government to undertake 
timely devaluations, the economy operated with what was in effect a dual 
exchange rate:  an  overvalued  and  rationed  official  rate  and  a  floating. 
parallel  (sometimes illegal) rate.  After 1985 the exchange rate  was  again 
unified and operated as a managed float. 
On  some  occasions during  the  1960s  and  1970s,  foreign exchange 
reserves  fell  significantly,  prompting  policy measures  to avoid  an  outright 
devaluation  through  hidden  or  explicit  rationing  of  foreign exchange. 
Various temporary trade policy instruments were used for this purpose. On at 
least two occasions, a uniform increase  in import tariff rates was  used as a 
substitute for devaluation from the import side: in 1969, an almost unifonn 
surtax of 10 percent was levied on all imports; in 1975, another surtax of 3 
percent was created. Export  subsidies for minor exports were also used to 
compensate for overvaluation in 1977.  However, the percentage of trade that 
benefited from those subsidies was very small. 
As mentioned in section 4.2, quantitative restrictions  were also used  for 
balance-of-payments purposes.  For  instance,  in  1969 the  restoration of 
external  equilibrium was  obtained  with  temporary  prohibitions  on  the 
imports of automobiles and of Luxuries.  A new tool in the kit of import 
controls was introduced in  1976 in the form of prior import deposits.4 It is 
important  to note that these deposits were both a monetary  measure  and a 
tariff-like regulation  raising the cost of imports.  Because  of both  features, 
r 
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they  were initially  very  effective  in curtailing imports. However,  to the 
extent that importers could roll over their deposits, the monetary contraction 
aspect  was lost,  except when there were increases  in the level of imports.  Thus fiscal and, to a lesser extent, monetary measures were used to avoid 
open devaluations of the peso in the l960s and the  l970s.  In accordance 
with the spirit of the times,  devaluation  was  viewed  as  a declaration of 
failure in economic policymaking,  General Banzer, who had to go through a 
devaluation in 1972, paid the Costs, political and otherwise, of very painful 
adjustments in the  economy  distributed  over  more  than  a  year after the 
devaluation.  Although never publicly declared,  a  widely held  opinion in 
government circles at  the time  was  that the  boom in  export prices  in 
1973—74  saved Bolivia from a string of further devaluations. 
The devaluation of 1972 deserves  some additional  attention. Since the end 
of  1969  when  the  assets  of  the  Bolivian  Gulf  Oil  Corporation  were 
nationalized,  pressures  on  the  peso  had  been building up.  In  1970 the 
government decided to impose some mild administrative  regulations on the 
convertibility of the peso; for instance, requiring a full registration in the 
Central Bank of  demanders of foreign exchange.5  These regulations were not 
sufficient  to  avoid  the drain on  foreign exchange reserves of the  Central 
Bank.  By the  end  of 1972, it  became  clear  that a  devaluation  was  un- 
avoidable. The IMF was  called  for consultations,  and Bolivia applied for 
a standby  loan. The peso  was  devalued by 40 percent,  and some public  sector prices, as well as interest rates on savings deposits, were increased. 
Workers obtained a uniform compensation of Sb  135, equivalent to U.S. $7 
(1972 dollars),  at  the  new  rate of exchange. After the devaluation,  many 
prices were  subject to controls and fixed at their pre-devaluation  levels. 
Some of the prices were revised upward only in October 1973 and the rest in 
January  1974.  Strong  excess demand  conditions  made the  revisions  un- 
avoidable, 
In table 4.4 we show how the peso incurred a significant  real appreciation 
vis-à-vis  the  U.S.  dollar during  1973—84.  The relatively long  period  of 
overvaluation  had  important  implications  for  resource allocation.  In  the 
mining  sector,  the  combination  of overvaluation  plus  punitive taxation 
shifted resources  from there to the nontradable manufacturing sector and the 
service  sector.  Overvaluation  also  encouraged the  expansion  of the very 
capital-intensive  activities  of  tin  smelting  and  oil  refining. Traditional 
exports and nontraditional ones, such as commercial agriculture,  suffered.  If overvaluation  hurt exports,  one may wonder why the  issue was  not 
debated more fully at the time or why there was not a significant  lobby to 
push  for a devaluation.  The following reasons  may be hypothesized. First, 
oil and mineral exporters  can usually  live with overvalued exchange rates 
until  the rates are severely misaligned. Given their cost structure, exporters 
usually place more emphasis on lessening the weight of direct taxation than 
on the exchange rate to maintain their after-tax profitability. Second, the high 212  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs  I  213  BohvialChapter  4 
Table 4.4  The Real  Exchange  Ra te in  Bolivia, 1970—84 































Source: IMP data. Note; The index is constructed  as PIE?, where P is the Bolivian  consumer pnce index, 
Eis the exchange rate (pesos per dollar), and P is the U.S. CPI. For  each year, annual  averages  are used br 
the three indexes. Note that £ is the official exchange ratc in the  1980a there wan a large and  persistent gap 
between the official exchange rate and the parallel  market exchange rare. 
prices for the main exports, well above previous trend,  concealed the need to 
correct the exchange rates. Although profit margins in the exporting sector 
decreased with overvaluation,  they were still  very high in mineral, oil,  and 
gas exports. 
It  was not fully  realized that  overvaluation hindered the expansion of 
potential exports. Since no significant actual exports were greatly damaged 
by overvaluation, no political lobby was established to gain a better price for 
the  dollar  earned in  the  exporting  activities.  Also.  hopes  for expolts  of 
manufactures were riding on the Andean Group market, and little attention 
was paid to the development of other markets. Markets in the Andean Group 
were  protected by  a  relatively high  common external  tariff,  while  trade 
liberalization within  the  group  benefited  mainly  noncompetitive  imports 
from  the partner  countries.  In  those  circumstances, overvaluation,  if not 
severe, was not the major hindrance for export promotion of manufactures to 
the protected market. In the event, however, that market turned Out  to be 
much too limited to support much manufacturing export activity in Bolivia. 
The hypothesis that overvaluation constituted a liscal measure to extract 
resources from the hard-to-tax public enterprises also has to be taken into 
account, The weakness of the central government vis-â-vis the public enter- 
prises,  and  especially the  inability of the  central  government to  tax  the 
state enterprises directly, may explain one attraction to overvalued exchange 
rates.  Such rates  permitted  the  transfer of resources from  the  exporting 
sector,  formed  mainly by  public  enterprises,  to  the  nonexporting  public 
sector, formed mainly by the central government.6 
The abrupt reduction in net foreign reserve flows in 1982, combined with 
the  underlying  budgetary disequilibrium,  at  first  caused  a  rapid  loss of 
reserves and a collapse of the fixed exchange rate regime in March of that 
year.  The collapse was followed by a dual tnarket with a fixed  official rate 
for a handful of transactions and a floating rate  for all other transactions, 
either of current  account or capital account.  Unexpectedly for the  public 
authorities, the exchange rate depreciated very rapidly in the parallel market, 
causing an upsurge of inflation. The difficulties of managing the exchange 
rate during the high-inflation period and the unification of rates at a realistic 
level  with  the  stabilization program  of August  1985  are  discussed  more 
completely in chapter 5. 
4.5  Capital Flight 
The overvalued exchange rate and  lax management of the public sector 
contributed to widespread capital flight in the 1970s and  1980s. Ugarteche 
(1986) and the World Bank (1985) give some estimates of capital flight based 
on the "errors and omissions" account in  the balance of payments,7 The 
average annual capital flight is estimated to have been as follows (in millions 
of U.S. dollars):  1971—75,  $77.3 (4 percent of the  1975 GDP);  1976—81, 
$216.9,  (6 percent of the  1981 GDP); and  1982—83,  $106.2  (3 percent of 
the  1983 GDP). Bank deposits held  by Bolivians  in banks  in the United 
States were estimated to be on the order of $400 million in 1985, amounting 
to around 10 percent of GDP. This is an extremely conservative estimate of 
offshore bank accounts, especially in view o  the fact that it is easy to hide 
foreign ownership of bank accounts and  since many accounts are  held in 
non-U.S. banks. 
What were the forces  behind capital flight? We have already mentioned 
that  overvaluation coupled with expectations of devaluation is an important 
explanatory factor. In addition, three other factors deserve to be mentioned. 
First, illegal transfers to private individuals resulting from the mismanage. 
ment of public sector investments were likely to be exported to safe havens 
abroad. Similarly, subsidized loans, diverted from their intended uses, were 
placed in assets abroad where they could not be seized by the debt collectors. 
Second,  fears of expropriation or of controls  on  the  free movements of 
capital  have motivated a substantial portion of capital flight. In this regard, 
one of the most negative effects of the dedollarization measure of 1982 was 
its  impact  on  capital  flight,  since  individual  savers  were  left  with  an 
unsatisfied demand for deposits in the domestic banking system and had to 
look abroad for a safe vehicle for their savings.8 Third, earnings from the 
coca  trade  have surely  generated extensive capital  flight, largely for non- 
macroeconomic reasons. 
4.6  Conclusions on Poor Export Performance 
It is clear from our survey of trade policies in Bolivia that relatively little 
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potential.  Traditional  exports  were  seen  as offering rents  that  could  be 
distributed  to  other  parts  of  the  economy.  Nontraditional  exports  were 
hindered severely by an inadequate exchange rate policy and by a range of 
fiscal incentives which really did not have much effect on the margin in the 
incentives to produce nontraditional exportables.  Public investments in the 
tradable  sector, as discussed  in the previous  chapter,  generally were  un- 
profitable and socially costly. They were  motivated more by political con- 
siderations  and  easy foreign  credit,  rather  than  by  a careful cost-benefit 
analysis. Finally, unwarranted policy hopes were held for export promotion 
within the context of regional integration schemes, particularly the Andean 
Pact. These regional schemes proved to be superfluous for Bolivia, not only 
because the target market remained very small even  after integration, but 
also because the Andean countries almost all descended into deep crisis in 
the  1980s. 
5  Aspects of Foreign Debt 
Accumulation, 1952—85 
As was shown in table  1.8,  Bolivia has depended significantly on foreign 
savings to finance gross capital formation since the late  l950s.  The bulk of 
that  foreign financing has come  in  the  form  of medium-  and  long-term 
(MLT) loans to the public sector, which is the category of capital inflow that 
we will examine in this chapter. Unfortunately, it is difficult to study the 
foreign debt of the Bolivian private sector because of a lack of adequate 
data, though available information suggests that the debt of the public sector 
is indeed by far the dominant form of external indebtedness.'  It should be 
mentioned, however, that private nonguaranteed debt increased very rapidly 
in  the crucial  subperiod  1978—82,  just  preceding the extreme  macroeco- 
nomic crisis. The measured short-term debt remained fairly constant over 
time,  but the  quality of the data  on  this type of debt prevents  us from 
drawing any firm conclusions. The frequent shifts in the classification of the 
debt because of reschedulings, arrears, and the assumption of the debt of one 
sector by another during the past several years makes the analysis even more 
difficult. 
An historical view of Bolivia's borrowing can help to discriminate among 
the different factors responsible for the debt crisis.  Bolivia had  access to 
loans from official multilateral sources and from governments since the final 
years of the  l950s.  These credits had a concessional element,  the size of 
which decreased  significantly over time.  Already by  the  first  half of the 
1960s, Bolivia had a debt-GNP ratio in excess of 30 percent and by 1970, a 
debt-GNP ratio of over 40 percent, as we see in table 5.1. The innovation in 
the  l970s was Bolivia's renewed access to financial markets from which it 
had been cut off after defaulting on its public sector bond debt in 1931. This 
led to a marked shift in the structure of the debt, as is shown in table 5.2, 
from official sources to private sources, particularly to banks. The share of 
bank debt soared from 2.3 percent of the total to 38.9 percent in 1981. 
The  first  incursion of the commercial  banks into lending to Bolivia in 
recent history occurred in 1972 when the government received credits from 
Citibank,  Swiss Bank Corporation,  and  the  Bank of America  to compen- 
sate foreign owners  of those  firms  nationalized by  President Tones  (see 
Ugarteche  l986,  150,  and  the references therein). Other credits with very 
expensive borrowing terms followed.  There  was also a significant rise  in 
suppliers' credits. 
In 1977 Bolivia was still in good standing with the international banks, but 
the spillover effects of problems elsewhere  in  the  developing  world  had 
negative repercussions on borrowing terms,  resulting in shorter-term loans 
and higher-risk premiums. By 1980 Bolivia faced a severe debt problem that 
had not yet been resolved by the end of the  1980s. The problems with the 
commercial banks are the gravest, but are not the only critical aspect of the 
debt crisis. In the early l980s, the military regimes in Argentina and Brazil 
gave short-term financing to the generals in Bolivia. In 1983 this short-term 
debt  was refinanced into  a longer maturity, thereby sharply increasing the 
MLT public debt. This explains why, while net capital flows were negative 
in 1983, there was a sharp increase in measured MLT debt. 
If one  looks at  the conventional measures of overall indebtedness (see 
table 5.1), MLT public debt relative to GDP was already high in the l960s. 
Indeed, the ratio of MLT public debt to exports in the 1960s and early 1970s 
was actually above the average ratio between  1974 and  1977.  But, as we 
should like to  StreSS,  this observation neglects the fact that the nature of 
Yese  Debt-GNP  Ratio  DcbI.Export Ratio 
1970  48.2  231.9 
1975  48.6  166.6 
1980  77.0  214.5 
1981  88.0  272.1 
1982  93.8  313.4 
1983  111.8  367.0 
1984  111.9  401.8 
1985  107.7  478.7 
1986  105.1  596.1 
1987  110.8  743.4 
&nr.e.  World  Ban/s Debt Tub/es, (New Yofk Oxford University  Ptrss), 1988—89 edition. unre  World  Bunk  Debt Tables. 1988—89 edition. 
This category  is  'private financial muskets,"  and 
commercial  banks. 
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'bbte 5.2  Strueture of Medium- and Long-Term 
debt outstanding and disbursed) 
Debt,  1970—85 (proportion of total 
1970  1975  1980  1985 
Official creditors  567  60.0  51.5  59.9 
of which: 
Multilateral  5.4 
Bilateral  51.3 











Commercial  banks  17.3 
Suppliers  9.8 
Other  16.2 













Table 5.3  Debt-Service  Indicators, 1970—87 (public and publidy guaranteed  debt) 































Source.'  World Bmtk 13th, Tables, 1988—89 edition. 
Noi.' The data refer to Iota! debt servicing  on medium-  and long-term  public and publicly guacanteed debt. 
Table 5.4  Debt Outstanding and Dislrnrsed, Medium and Long Term, 1970-85 
(in miUlona  of U.S. dollars) 
1970  480 
1975  824 
1980  2.228 
1981  2,765 
1982  2,861 
1983  3,279 
1984  3,386 
1985  3,484 
includes a small  amount  of bond  debt not  held  by 
Bolivia's debt had  changed  decisively,  with a sharp increase in the share of 
debt owed to foreign commercial banks, a point that can be seen clearly in 
table 5.2. 
In part because of this change, the indicators of debt servicing (as opposed 
to indicators based on the stock of debt) suffered a persistent deterioration 
over time, as can be observed in table 5.3. It should be noted that the figures 
on interest service understate the contractual debt burden because they are 
based on actual  payments and not on payments due, and since the portion of 
interest in arrears is very important, especially in the 1982—85 subperiod. 
The  increasing  debt-service  ratios  reflect  the  change  in  the  nature  of 
indebtedness and,  more  precisely, the  shift  from debt with a  large  con- 
cessional element toward  debt  on  market terms,  in  a situation  in  which 
market interest rates were rising sharply.  The debt-service indicators relative 
to  export  of  goods  and  services  worsened  progressively  in  the  1970s, 
compared to the values at the very beginning of the decade. 
In sum, Bolivia's creditworthiness improved very significantly in the first 
half of the 1970s, if creditworthiness is defined as access to market lending. 
The extraordinary upsurge of exports  (and its effects on real  GDP) in the 
1970s created an illusion in regard to the long-run economic prospects of a 
country that had been, before this event, very dependent on foreign aid and 
loans with highly concessional terms. By  1980,  however, that  illusion had 
been  shattered.  Bolivia's  creditworthiness  disappeared  once  again,  and 
Bolivia found itself  in a debt-rescheduling exercise with the banks, two years 
before the outbreak of the global debt crisis, 
5.1  The Nature of Borrowing by the Public Sector in the 1970s 
The big  push for debt accumulation appeared between 1975 and  1980,  as 
can be seen in table 5.4. Who were the beneficiaries of the growing external 
ource,'  World  Bunk Del'S Tables,  1988—89 edition. 
debt?  Among the public enterprises,  the  state  oil company,  YPFB,  was 
probably the  major  recipient,  followed by  the  smelting  company,  CMK 
(Complejo Minero  Karachipampa). and the state mining company, COMI- 
BOL.  Loans contracted by the specialized state banks,  with public sector 
guarantees, were channelled to the private sector producers. The  stock of 
debt owed  by the central government also grew very rapidly between  1975 
and 1979.  The big increase between  1979 and  1983  was caused essentially 
by a transfer of a debt from COMIBOL (and other less important enterprises) 
to the TGN. 
The  important  question,  of course,  is  why  the  Bolivian  government 
increased its  indebtedness so  rapidly  at  the end  of  the  1970s.  As  was 
discussed in earlier chapters,  the data suggest that most of the  debt was 
related to the rapid growth of public investment projects, which in turn were 
linked  to a complex of political and economic factors. We  have identified 
several of those factors at length in earlier chapters, including (1) the very 
short time horizon of Bolivian governments; (2) the use of state enterprises 
as a vehicle for political control; (3) the use of state enterprises as a conduit 
for channelling public money to favored parts of the private sectors; (4) the 
soft budget constraint of the state enterprises, which reduced the incentive8 218  Juan Antonio  Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs  219  BolivialChapter 5 
to monitor investment projects; (5) the ovet-valuation  of the exchange rate, 
which led  to  a  misallocation of investment spending  into highly capital- 
intensive projects  and  which  increased the  budget  deficits of the  public 
enterprises; (6)  the use of state  enterprises as  buffers for macroeconomic 
shocks; and so forth. And as we have seen, the mega-investment projects of 
the public sector  in the end failed to pay the necessary returns. 
In addition, there was certainly  a misjudgment about  the country's true 
macroeconomic situation, as well as a failure to predict (along with the rest 
of the world!) the sharp swings that were to take place in the international 
economy at  the end of the  l970s  and  the  early  l980s.  One  part of the 
misjudgment came from the fact that Bolivia's strong economic performance 
in  the  l970s  reflected a  temporary  terms-of-trade  improvement  and  the 
effects  of  the  foreign  loans  themselves,  rather  than  a  true  underlying 
improvement in the economy. The annual average terms of trade of 1976—80 
was 22 percent higher than the average in 1971—75. This meant a positive 
real income effect of terms-of-trade change of 6.2  percent of GOP for  the 
second half relative to  the  first  one. This improvement  turned out  to be 
temporary, though the  borrowing behavior implicitly assumed  that  it was 
permanent. 
With respect to the international environment, the low real interest rates 
on international loans were perceived to be permanent, when of course they 
turned out to be temporary. As stressed by Morales and Sachs (1989), this 
change  in the interest rate  environment helps to  account for the fact that 
overborrowing (and overlending by the banks) was a common feature of the 
entire world at the end of the l970s. 
5.2  Private Nonguaranteed Debt 
In 1985 the private nonguaranteed debt was 8 percent of the total external 
debt ($314 million, or approximately 8 percent of GDP). While the amount 
is modest,  it grew very rapidly in the late  1970s and early 1980s. Several 
channels were used  by  the  private sector  to  contract nonguaranteed debt. 
Credits were given  directly by the  international commercial  banks to the 
debtors,  or  they were  intermediated by  their  local  subsidiaries or by  the 
domestic banks. A significant fraction of the nonguaranteed debt is actually 
suppliers'  credit  from  foreign manufacturers to their  authorized domestic 
agents in Bolivia. 
The participation of the domestic banks in the marketing of foreign credits 
increased, somewhat surprisingly, when a hardening in the borrowing terms 
occurred and  the international banks and  their  subsidiaries were reducing 
their direct exposure. The implicit assumption on the part of the Bolivian 
banks may have been that there were de facto public sector guarantees on the 
private sector debt. 
Unfortunately, there is no available information on the final  users of the 
loans granted by the banks. We can,  however, make a strong presumption 
that  a high percentage of the  loans were  used in the service sector and  in 
other nontradable sectors. The presumption is based on the fact that when 
depreciation of  the  peso  accelerated, the delinquency rates  in  the  banks 
increased considerably. In October 1982 it was reported  that 40 percent of 
the banks' portfolios were technically in default (World Bank 1985, 528). In 
fact,  the  debt  situation  is  at  least  partially  behind  the  measure  of 
"dedollarization,"  to be mentioned in chapter 6, which allowed the private 
sector to  repay  at a  highly favorable interest  rate  the dollar-denominated 
debts  incurred  by  the  domestic  banking  system.2  Dedollarization  and 
exchange controls also erased the effective distinction between private and 
public debt after 1982, since the foreign debts of the private banks were to 
be repaid in pesos to the Central Bank, with the Central Bank then required 
to  honor  the  international obligations.  The  foreign debt of the  domestic 
private  banks with the  international banks  continues to be a thorny  issue 
because of several  legal and  financial disputes between the banks and  the 
government. 
No  information is available on  the  service  burden  of the  private non- 
guaranteed debt. 
5.3  Short-Term Debt 
The  data  on  short-term  debt  are  particularly  poor.  With  the  scant 
information available,  we  can  obtain  only  a  rough  picture of what  has 
happened since 1978. In view of the increasing difficulties of the economy 
after  1978 and  the  hardening  of terms  on  long-term  bank  lending,  the 
governments have  increasingly  resorted  to  short-term  loans  from  other 
central  banks  in  the  region  and  from  commercial  banks.  Balance-of- 
payments problems (i.e., dwindling reserves as a result of fixed exchange 
rates, domestic inflation, and large budget deficits) prompted the appeal for 
swap credits from foreign central banks, while the state-owned Banco del 
Estado contracted commercial debts to channel them to the private sector. 
The worsening of the  situation in  1980 caused a delay in payments of 
short-term commercial credits. This led to a refinancing agreement in April 
1981, to which we refer below, that converted about one-third of the public 
sector's  short-term loans  into  medium-term loans.  Unfortunately, the  re- 
financing did not substantially reduce the outstanding short-term debt, since 
the government made appeals to other sources for more short-term loans: 
Central  Bank  swaps  and  reciprocal  trade  credits  in  the  context  of  the 
economic integration scheme of ALADI. In 1983 a large part of short-term 
loans owed to Argentina and Brazil were converted to medium-term credits. 
In spite of the conversions to MLT debts, the stock of short-term debt 
Continued increasing on account of arrearages. In 1980, short-term debt was 
11.1  percent of the total external debt;  in  1982, it reached a low of 5.8 
percent;  and in 1985, the percentage was 8.7 percent. Short-term debt was 
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5.4  The Hidden Costs of Easy Credit Availability 
Since the  early  1960s,  the prime  focus of official policy had  been to 
increase economic growth. The emphasis on this objective grew even more 
from  1973  to  1978, both  as a product of design and as a result of very 
favorable external circumstances. The greater availability of foreign credits 
coincided with,  and  was  in  addition spurred  by, a  substantial increase in 
export  earnings.  Any  source  of  financing  for  capital  expansion  was 
welcomed at that point. The government had long tried to cater to foreign 
direct investors with generous fiscal  incentives, but the response was weak 
outside of the  petroleum sector. Thus,  as a  substitute, it  started to court 
foreign lenders,  who obliged as part of the world credit expansion of the 
1970s. Banzer's government assured political and monetary stability, and the 
government offered,  after some hesitation, exchange rate guarantees. This, 
and an ample  supply of development projects, however poor  in design or 
implementation,  sufficed  to  induce  a  very  significant  flow  of  external 
resources. The  increase in  the contribution  of  foreign  loans to  financing 
domestic  investment,  had,  however,  the  cost  of  further  impairing  the 
administration of  the  public  sector.  The  easy  recourse  to  indebtedness 
weakened the budget constraints and  indeed allowed the government more 
leniency in fiscal policies and on the exchange rate than there would ha, 
been otherwise.  Moreover, the undemanding fiscal attitude was aggravated 
when access was gained to commercial bank credits that were not tied to 
specific projects, in contrast to the case of official loans which almost always 
were based on specific projects. 
The access to loans on relatively easy terms also  impeded the design of 
needed  reforms  in  the  financial  sector,  particularly  in  the  banks.  The 
intermediation of foreign loans, contracted by  the government or with its 
guarantee, was a more important source of profits to the private banks than 
the lending out of deposits made by domestic wealthholders. The neglect by 
the financial intermediaries of the local demand for deposits in the banking 
system likely had a negative longer-term effect on the mobilization of do- 
mestic savings. 
The foreign loans were channelled to public investment projects and to the 
private sector through "refinancing" mechanisms. We  have noted at length 
in  the  previous  chapter  that  poor  project  design  and,  especially.  poor 
implementation,  led  in  many  cases  to  results  incommensurate  with  the 
resources that had been put out. A significant share of the increase in public 
indebtedness was due to these factors. Loans  that were  channelled to the 
private sector did not fare better in regard to results, as they were diverted to 
speculative uses  and,  frequently, never  repaid.  In  many  notorious cases, 
private lenders simply defaulted to the state banks that had channelled the 
external credits, and the government made no attempt to collect on the bad 
debts. This increased the demand for loans and, ironically, there was a ready 
supply to match. 
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A  special mention  needs to be  made regarding exchange rate  policies. 
Overvaluation coupled with punitive taxation in the natural resources sector 
hampered investment in minerals, hence reducing the future supply of foreign 
exchange to honor the foreign debt obligations. In addition, overvaluation led 
to an expansion of imports of consumer durables that  was again financed 
directly and indirectly with foreign debt. Lastly, as the reserves of foreign 
exchange became precariously low, partly because of the currency overval- 
uation and the looming budget deficit, there was an increase in capital flight. 
Because of the absence of sound macroeconomic policies  and the poor 
administration of the loans  intended  for investment,  many  loans  simply 
became consumption loans in 1978—81. Their servicing would later require a 
drop in consumption, as indeed happened. In the transition, however, more 
indebtedness  was  accumulated  to  refinance  old  loans  and  their  interest 
charges. 
By 1980 Bolivia was already a highly indebted country, as indicated, for 
instance, by a debt-to-GDP ratio of 76 percent. It was then subjected to the 
sharp international interest  rate shock.  Arrears on  amortizations of loans 
granted  by  private  creditors  started to  build  up.  In  spite  of  a  debt 
rescheduling in 1981, the debt situation became aggravated. As seen in table 
5.5, from 1982 on, the net foreign resource transfers (net new lending minus 
interest  payments) turned  negative  and a  shift  from  external  sources  of 
finance to internal sources occurred,  throwing ihe Country  Onto the path of 
hyperinflation. 
5.5  Debt Management, 1970—85 
In this section,  some of the more important  institutional features of the 
debt management are presented. One interesting feature is Article 56 of the 
Net Resource Transfers  NRT as Percentage 
Year  (S million)  of GNP 
Source.  World  Bunk 0th, Tc,bks.  1988—89  edition. 
Note.  Net  ,soune transfers  are  debned  as  new  lending minus tolal deN  servicing  (amortization  puss 
antereal). All are  measured op a cash-tow basis. 
Tabk 5.5  Net Foreign  Trirnaters on  Medium. and Long-Term Public and Publicly 
Guaranteed Debt, 1970-B7 
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Constitution  of  the  Republic  of  Bolivia,  which  requires  congressional 
approval of all loans contracted by the government of Bolivia, the public 
enterprises, and all public  institutions,  or on their behalf. Strictly speaking, 
the  loans contracted by unconstitutional  governments are  also unconstitu- 
tional.  It should be recalled that during most of the period 1964—82,  Bolivia 
had only  de facto governments.3 
Until 1974, government agencies and public enterprises negotiated foreign 
credits, which were furnished principally by official lenders and by suppliers 
of capital equipment. Central government agencies, municipalities,  regional 
development  corporations,  and  committees  for  public  works  themselves 
engaged  in the search  for foreign credits.  The grant element in the official 
foreign loans  was  usually  so  important that  the  higher  levels  of  the 
government,  cognizant of this,  approved and included  them  in  the  fiscal 
budget.  In contrast,  suppliers'  credits  were systematically  seen  as too  ex- 
pensive and frowned  upon, but the purchasers of goods with suppliers' cred- 
its were usually in a position to overcome the objections of the Ministry of 
Finance and the Central Bank.  In fact, the growth of suppliers' credits led to 
increasing regulation in the mid-seventies. 
The haphazard way in which  the borrowing took place before  1974 was 
such that there are no good records on the state of the public debt and,  a 
fortiori,  there  was no policy on indebtedness, except the weak objections to 
suppliers'  credits,  mainly  under  the  advice  of foreign agencies  of inter- 
national cooperation. 
This situation,  and  the  large expansion  in  international  credit between 
1973 and  1978, led to two important  regulatory measures.  First, the National 
Institute  for  External  Financing (INDEF)  was  created  in  1974  as  a 
decentralized government agency to keep track of all indebtedness  incurred 
in the public sector  through its  financial  and nonfinancial  institutions,  to 
negotiate new loans, and in specific cases to refinance old loans. INDEF  was 
to  be  especially  active in  obtaining  general balance-of-payments  support 
loans. 
In 1974 a decree was passed  establishing the National System of Projects. 
The objective  was to create a set of agencies, in a hierarchical structure, to 
help in the generation of investment projects, to perform social cost-benefit 
analysis of them,  and  to  oversee  their implementation.  The  search  for 
sources of financing of  the projects was also included among the functions of 
the  system.  Large  investment  projects  and  their financing  required  final 
approval by the  National  Council  of Economic  Planning  (CONEPLAN), 
composed of several cabinet members and undersecretaries. Before projects 
arrived at CONEPLAN,  they were to be screened  by the National Committee 
of Projects and its technical secretariats4 
Very few investment projects followed the steps spelled out in the  1974 
decree.  The  process of approval  was  slow  and  cumbersome,  and  the 
technical secretariats lacked competent personnel. Managers of government 
agencies  frequently  ignored  the  guidelines  of the  National  System  of 
Projects. More importantly,  vested  interests were  able  to  circumvent  the 
procedures and get their projects to CONEPLAN directly.  Several reforms of 
the National System of Projects were proposed between 1976 and 1986, but 
to  no  important  effect. 
INDEF ceased to exist in 1979, and  its functions were transferred to the 
Central  Bank,  where a division on external  finance (FINEX)  was  created. 
The  general objectives  of FINEX  were  very  similar to those of INDEF. 
FINEX had  the advantage of being part of the Central Bank where it could 
enjoy better information  support. Unfortunately,  FINEX objectives were not 
met,  as  it  suffered  from  acute political  interference.  The  Ministries of 
Finance and  Planning  frequently  intervened in FINEX negotiations.  Very 
often,  debt  negotiating  committees  were  formed  by  making  appeals to 
private  Bolivian  bankers  with  international  connections  and  neglecting 
FINEX (a case  in point is the debt rescheduling of April 1981, discussed in 
sec.  5.6). 
The situation worsened during  Siles Suazo's administration,  when almost 
everybody in the Cabinet felt obliged to intervene in debt negotiations.  For 
instance, crucial  debt reschedulings with Argentina  and  Brazil were carried 
out by the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs. A very personalistic 
and  ad  hoc style of debt negotiations developed, with  a  significant loss  of 
institutional  memory of past  negotiations, which  was  important  since many 
agreements were verbal.  Bolivia, as well as its partners,  suffered consid- 
erably from the rapid turnover in negotiators. 
The need to redress the confusion in the external debt accounts of Bolivia, 
as well as the need to have updated information  on debt negotiations carried 
out by other countries in the same predicament, called for foreign expertise. 
Several debt  consulting  firms  and  personal consultants  were  hired.5  The 
consultants were, however,  less  helpful than expected, although it must be 
said in their behalf that they were contacted at a point when no solution  was 
really in sight. 
If the determination of the correct  size of the public external debt was  a 
formidable  task, keeping  track of the foreign debt of the Bolivian private 
sector  was  even  more  difficult.  It  is  worth underscoring  that a  good 
knowledge of the size and structure of the private debt was essential for the 
design  of policies aimed at the restoration of  external equilibrium.  Moreover, 
although  this  was  not  presumed at  that  time,  most of the  private  debt 
eventually  became  "nationalized"  with  the  dedollarization  measure  of 
November 1982. 
In 1979, ceilings on the stock of short-term debts, both private and public, 
were  set.  The obligation to register  the debts of the  private  sector in the 
Central Bank was also established, but unfortunately  this obligation was not 
tightly fulfilled. The lack of adequate  information  on the debt of the private 
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5.6  Debt Reschedulings,  1980—85 
The  debt crisis of the  I980s  commenced  with  a  small crisis  in  1980, 
during the government of Luis Garcia Meza. Arrears in amortizations to the 
commercial banks eventually led to a restructuring of the debt in April 1981, 
which was crucial for triggering further developments. The eventful years of 
1980—81 had  also led  to an abnormal growth of short-term credit to the 
generals  in  Bolivia from  the generals  in  Brazil and  especially Argentina. 
Arrears  on  those  debts  were  also  refinanced  in  1983  with  important 
implications. 
The chronology of events that led to the April 1981  agreement has been 
described by Baptista (1985) and Rivas (1986). Bolivia had ceased to make 
amortization payments after the Garcia Meza coup in July  1980.  Because of 
this, the creditor banks gathered in Caracas in August, formed a consortium, 
and elected the Bank of America as the leader of a Coordinating Committee 
formed by the Bank of America, Bankers Trust, Deutsche Südamerikanische 
Bank, American Express, Crocker National Bank, Libra Bank, Manufactur- 
ers Hanover Trust, Texas Commerce Bank, Bank of Nova Scotia, and Irving 
Trust. The Coordinating Committee represented 128  creditor banks. In the 
same Caracas meeting, an agreement was reached to reschedule debts with 
repayments due  between 28  August 1980 and 5 January 1981. In January 
1981,  the government of Bolivia was to meet again with the Coordinating 
Committee.  No agreement was reached in January except on  the need to 
meet again in April  1981.  Notwithstanding, Bolivia made some bona fide 
payments. 
After all these postponements, the April 1981 meeting took place in New 
York. Debts to the consortium amounted to U.S.$722 million (Or 19 percent 
of GDP),  of which  US$457.3 million were  to he rescheduled in  four 
tranches.  The  April  agreement consisted  essentially of a  conversion  of 
short-term loans in arrears to a medium-term loan  and a reprogramming of 
medium-term loans.6 The rescheduling called for a  10 percent down pay- 
ment of the refinanced loans according to the original schedule of maturities. 
The April 29th refinancing has been very much criticized within Bolivia. 
The thrust of the argument is that Bolivia  was overcharged, with its costs 
and conditions well above what other countries obtained at that moment or 
shortly after. A more telling point  is that it was extremely unrealistic that 
Bolivia would be able to come close to  achieving the terms of the agreement. 
It should also be noted that the agreement called for Bolivia to sign an IMF 
program which never occurred. The Coordinating Committee routinely asked 
for the fulfillment of this clause and, as routinely, waived it. 
Bolivia was unable to meet the terms of the April 1981 agreement and fell 
in arrears by September 1982.  Several meetings took place to normalize the 
situation, but  to  no avail.  A semblance of normality prevailed,  however, 
during the term of Minister of Finance Flavio Machicado in 1983, when debt 
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servicing  was  resumed.  Bolivia  finally  declared  a  moratorium  to  the 
commercial banks in mid-1984. 
Bolivia  was able to  get some  debt alleviation  more easily  with two 
bilateral creditors:  Brazil and  Argentina.  A  total  of U.S.$716  million of 
short-term debt  and  principal on  medium-term  debt  was refinanced with 
those countries  in  1983 on relatively easy terms: a fixed interest rate of 8 
percent, maturities between 8 and  10 years, and grace periods of 3 years. 
This scheme of refinancing was found acceptable by the Bolivian public and 
did  not  provoke  the  kind  of  criticism  that  the  rescheduling  with  the 
commercial banks  had  received.  The  international organizations,  on  the 
contrary,  objected  to  the  status  of "preferred creditor"  that  Argentina 
received because  it was able  to  use the  natural gas exports of Bolivia as 
collateral. 
5.7  Developments After 1985 
In chapter 8 we provide a detailed analysis of Bolivia's  debt renegotiations 
after 1985. The main point that can be mentioned here is that the government 
under President Paz took a very different approach to negotiations. Having 
inherited a unilateral suspension of payments on the bank debt from the Sites 
government, the  Paz administration maintained the suspension and  began 
negotiations with the banks addressed to a long-term solution to the crisis 
instead of another rescheduling. Some results were achieved in 1988 when 
Bolivia was able to retire approximately one-half of its commercial  bank 
debt at a price of II cents per dollar. In  1989,  more debt was retired and 
negotiations  continued  on  the  remaining  debt  that  had  not  yet  been 
repurchased. 
6  The Emergence of 
Hyperinflation, 1982—85 
The inflation in  Bolivia  in  1984 and  1985 was the most  rapid in  Latin 
American history up to that date and one of the highest in world histoiy.' 
During the first half of 1985,  the inflation surged to an annual rate of about 
26,000 percent (approximately 60 percent  per month),  and it reached an 
annual rate of 60,000 percent during May—August 1985. As shown in table 
6.1, the inflation was brought under control in the second half of 1985, and 
then after a sharp jump in prices jn January  1986, inflation was kept at Sow 
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Table  6.1  Monthly  Inflation  Rates,  89914—87 
1984  1985  1986  1987 
Jano.uy  9.6  68.9  33.0  2.5 
bmsry  23.0  182.8  8.0  1.2 
March  21.2  24.9  .1  .7 
Aped  63.0  11.8  3.6  1.6 
May  47.2  35.7  1.0 
lime  4.1  78,5  4.3  — .2 
July  5.2  60.3  1.8  .0 
August  15.0  16.5  .7  1.0 
Seplember  37.4  56.5'  2.3  .0 
October  59.3  —1.9  .6  2.1 
November  31.6  3.2  — .1  — .3 
ces  1/84—9/86. from national  statistics;  10/86—  12187, from IMF, I,ternauonal Fmancrn!  Sw,i.st,cs. 
'Note that prices actually  stop rising by September 9, though  because of ra1ad  inflatton  to August  and the first 
week of September, September's  average price  level is 56,5 percent hrghcr  than in August. 
double-digit  rates for the next three years.  Since the Bolivian inflation is one 
of the only cases since 1950 of a "true" hyperinflation  (by Cagan's classic 
definition of  monthly  inflation  exceeding  50  percent),  it  provides  an 
important  testing  ground  for alternative  views  of the dynamics  of hyper- 
inflation  and of the design of anti-inflation  programs.2 
6.1  Origins of the Hyperinflation 
The  proximate  cause  of the  hyperinflation  is  the government's  loss  of 
international creditworthiness in the early  1980s.  We  have noted that during 
the period 1975  —81, various Bolivian governments relied heavily on foreign 
borrowing to finance government expenditures. The  combination of a large 
buildup  of  international  debt  with  domestic  political  instability,  poor 
macroeconomic management, a weak tax system, and poor export prospects, 
precluded the Bolivian government from obtaining  new  international  loans 
after 1981. When foreign capital inflows  dried up in early  1982,  the govern- 
ment did not raise taxes or cut expenditures, but rather substituted domestic 
credit expansion  for  capital  inflows as  the  source  of  finance  for  the 
government.  The  rapid expansion  of the  money supply  then  set  off the 
inflationary  process.  Thus the balance of payments played a critical role in 
the origin of the  hyperinflation,  but only insofar as it affected the  rate of 
money creation. More evidence in support of this position  is that after the 
beginning of stabilization,  a massive deterioration  of the Bolivian interna- 
tional terms of trade in  1986 did not reignite  the hypennflation  since under 
the new policy rules, the terms-of-trade decline did not feed into the rate of 
domestic credit  expansion to the public sector. 
The  substitution of domestic credit expansion for capital  inflows and the 
jump in real seignorage  collection took place in the first half of 1982, almost 
nine  months  before  the  Siles  government  took  office.  But  there  is  no 
evidence that the intensification  of the inflation process involved a rise in 
seignorage  collection  after the beginning of 1982.  (The simple correlation of 
inflation  with the level of  seignorage  as a percentage  of  GDP is r2  =  — 0.001 
for the quarterly interval 1982:1 to 1985:3.) 
The time path of seignorage relative to GDP is shown in figure 6.1. The 
figure  records the  quarterly seignorage collection, measured relative  to 
annual GDP. Therefore, to obtain  the annual seignorage collection  relative 
to GDP it is necessary to add the quarterly  rates for  a  year. Seignorage is 
measured for each month as (M, 
—  M,_,). where M is base money, and  is 
then divided by an estimate of nominal GDP for the  month. This ratio is 
then  added for  the  months of the quarter,  with the  results  shown in  the 
figure. 
Surprisingly,  It is difficult even many years later to uncover precisely the 
causes for the jump in money creation in early  1982, though the main culprit 
is  almost  surely  a  shift in  the  environment  for  foreign borrowing. The 
problem with nailing down a culprit lies with the disarray of Bolivian fiscal 
data during this period, a problem we have already encountered in chapters 4 
and  5.  We  noted three kinds of problems inhibiting a clear assessment  of 
the fiscal  situation.  First, most of the available data cover only the central 
government  (the TGN)  and  not  the consolidated public sector, including 
state  enterprises, regional  corporations,  local  government,  state  develop- 
ment banks,  etc.  This limited coverage is especially  problematic  for  the 
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Fig. 6.)  Seignorage  (per quarter, as percentage of annual  GDP) 
Nose.  Annual seignorage  earnings  are  the sum of quarterly earnings. 
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hyperinflation  period,  since there were  large  ad  hoc  transfers  among the 
various parts of the government at that time. Second, there is great difficulty 
in  interpreting on  an  ex  post  basis  the  accounting  of  arrears  on  debt 
repayments during  this period.  Third,  there were  (and remain)  significant 
disagreements  among  the  various  parts  of  the  government  about  the 
responsibility for portions of the foreign debt. At some points, for example, 
the Central Bank repaid foreign debts on behalf  of the TGN, which the TGN 
refused to recognize. 
With these limitations in mind, it is still possible to piece together a rough 
interpretation of the rise in seignorage in 1982.  Key fiscal data for the central 
administration for 1981—84 are shown in table 6.2. Notice the important fact 
that the TGN deficit rises from an estimated 5.7  percent of GNP in  1981 to 
an estimated 22.3 percent of GNP in 1982.  This increase  just barely exceeds 
in magnitude the rise in expenditures on "internal  and external debt." Most 
or all  of the  "internal debt" category in this  period reflects Central  Bank 
repayments of foreign debt on behalf of the TGN, so that the jump in debt 
repayments is almost exclusively related to foreign debt. At the same time 
that debt servicing  jumps up, inflation starts to accelerate, with the result that 
real  tax collections fall sharply, from approximately 9.4 percent of GNP in 
1981  to 4.6 percent of GNP in  1982.  This  revenue shortfall is partially 
balanced by a simultaneous cut in the current and capital expenditures of the 
TGN. Notice that the combined expenditures on personnel, other services, 
materials, and  fixed assets fall by  3.0  percent of GNP between  1981 and 
1982. 
The importance of enlarged net debt-service payments for the burgeoning 
deficit in  1982 is also evident  from  the  balance-of-payments data,  which 
ThbIe .2  The Evolution of kevennea  nnd Expenditures, 1981-84  (n.s percentage 
1981  1982  1983  1984 
Revenues  9.4  4.6  2.6  2.6 
Inlental  taxes  3.0  1.8  1.4  .7 
Taxes  on  petrokum  2.1  .9  .4  .6 
Other  2.6  .8  .3  I.! 
Expenditures  15.1  26.9  20.1  33.2 
Personnel  7.2  3.6  5.2  8.0 
Other services  .7  .4  .3  .5 
Matenals  1.5  1.0  .7  .8 
Fixed assets  1.0  .4  .4  .5 
Internal debt  l.8  10.4  .3  .4 
Excental debt  1.3  7,7  10.8  2.2 
Others  1.6  1.4  2.4  20.8' 
Deficit  5.7  22.3  17.5  30.6 
Source:  Ministry of Planntng.  Bolivia. 
'Mainly  central  government  transfers Co state  enterpnses. 
unfortunately cannot be matched exactly with the budget data. We  saw in 
table  5.5  for  1980 and  1981  that  net  resource  transfers  to  Bolivia  were 
positive, meaning that net new borrowing by the public sector exceeded the 
level of interest  payments on  the  public debt.  In  l982,  net  new  lending 
plummeted, so that the resource transfer to Bolivia (new loans minus interest 
payments) turned negative. As a percentage of GNP, net resource transfers 
toward Bolivia shifted  from  6.2  percent  in  1980 to 2.9  percent in  1981, 
—2.0 percent in 1982, and  —4.6  percent in  1983.  Were we to include the 
data on short-term debt, which is not collected by the World Bank in the case 
of Bolivia, the shift in net transfers would be even more dramatic,  since an 
inflow of short-term credits in 1980 and  1981 dried up in 1982. 
As it turns Out, real seignorage collection from  1982 to mid-1985 remains 
roughly constant, averaging about 12 percent of GNP each year. This does not 
reflect a stable path of government spending, taxes, and monetary emission 
during this period. Instead, the roughly constant seignorage collections hide 
a process of adjustment in which tax revenue collections all but collapse, while 
government spending is cut back sharply Over time in the vain attempt to 
compensate for the falling tax collections. Once again, data problems at this 
point preclude a comprehensive account of this process.  As we have men- 
tioned, while there are reasonably acceptable accounts for the central gov- 
ernment, data on the consolidated public sector is sparse. 
Nonetheless, relying on the central administration accounts,  we can see 
much of the process at work. The government depended on three main forms 
of taxes during the period: internal taxes (mainly sales and income taxes), 
taxes on petroleum, and taxes on trade.  Each of these taxes fell sharply in 
real terms during the period.  Figure 6.2  records the collections from  taxes 
during  1981—84 as  a percentage of GNP (the category "other" includes 
trade taxes). Overall, revenues of the central administration fell from more 
than 9 percent of GNP in 1979 and  1980 to just  1.3 percent of GNP in the 
first  nine months of 1985, before the new stabilization program went into 
effect (the preprogram period in  1985 is indicated by  85.1  in the figure). 
Upon institution of the  stabilization program,  tax  revenues of the  central 
administration jumped almost immediately to more than lO percent of GNP 
(shown  as  period 85.2  in the  figure),  mainly through  an  increase in tax 
payments by the state oil company, YPFB. In view of the sharp decline in 
tax revenues, an increasing proportion of the central administration deficit 
was financed through fiscal credits from the Central Bank. The proportion of 
TON expenditures covered by TGN revenues fell from 65.6 percent in 1979 
to just 6.9 percent in the first nine months 011985: 
1979  66%  1983  13% 
1980  60%  1984  8% 
1981  62%  1985.1  7% 
1982  17%  1985.2  134% 
r 
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Fig. 6.2  Tax revenues as a percentage of  GNP (by category of tax) 
Note that the steep drop in revenues relative to expenditures in 1982 reflects 
the rise in expenditures on debt servicing in that year as well as the falling 
revenue collection. 
The reasons differ for the declines in the various kinds of taxes, and these 
reasons are worth  stressing,  since they help to explain  the  nature of the 
stabilization policies finally undertaken in August 1985. The drop in internal 
taxes (mostly income and  sales taxes) is most readily explained. lndexation 
of the income  tax system was not even attempted until  an  administrative 
change in March  1985,  so that lags in collection combined with high in- 
flation reduced the real  value of tax collections substantially, in the  way 
familiar from Tanzi (1977) and others. Many sales taxes were set at specific, 
rather than ad valorem rates, and the specific rates were adjusted with very 
long lags, if at all, and certainly not fast enough to keep up with accelerating 
prices under a hyperinflation. The decline in tariff  revenues introduces some 
less conventional effects.  Throughout the entire hyperinliation period,  the 
official exchange rate was pegged by the Central Bank and was adjusted in 
steps with long lags to the underlying inflation. As the government resorted 
increasingly to fiscal credit creation by the Central  Bau1 in order to fund 
expenditures, there was a constant pressure on foreign exchange reserves at 
the official exchange rate.  Rather than maintaining a steadily depreciating 
but unified price of foreign exchange, the government maintained the official 
parity for long intervals and rationed foreign exchange. The persistent eXCeSS 
demand for foreign exchange at the official exchange rate of course resulted 
in an enormous premium for foreign exchange in an unofficial, illegal,  but 
semi-tolerated black market. Table 6.3  shows the average premium on the 
T.b4g 6.3  PerceIage (.p  Setween  OfliiaI nd Bfk. 
1980—So. lii (q.arterIy verge) 
Mrkd Ecbange  Rate, 
1980: I  .0  1984: I  327.4 
II  .0  0  69.8 
LU  .0  1ff  309.7 
IV  .0  iv  302.7 
1981: I  .0  1985: I  330.9 
II  .0  Ii  321.0 
III  45.5 





1982:1  57.0  1986: t  5.8 
II  3.5  II  2,1 
III  4.8  Iii  .5 
LV  22.0 
1983:1  116.3 
II  105.1 
LII  241.8 
IV  225.4 
So,r.-e:  Mnit.y oF Piuming, Bolivia. 
black market relative  to the official rate on  a quarterly  basis  for  1980:1 
through 1986:3. In the month before the stabilization program, the premium 
was on the order  of I ,400 perceut Since the stabilization program began, the 
exchange rate has been unified, with a small and declining deviation (which 
remains because  of minor legal  and  administrative  factors)  between the 
official  rate and the now-legal parallel market rate. 
With foreign exchange rationing at the Central Bank, progressively fewer 
import transactions went through legal channels and more imports came into 
the country via smuggling, outside.  of tariff control altogether.  Under Bo- 
livian law, all exporters  are required to sell  the foreign exchange from ex- 
port earnings to the Central Bank at the official exchange rate. In sectors 
where smuggling was possible,  the sharp divergence between the official 
effective  rate  for  exporters  and  the  black-market  exchange  rate  made 
smuggling a highly  attractive  option  (the  smuggler converts  the  foreign 
exchange earnings from exports  in the black market,  where the number of 
pesos  per dollar  is much  greater  than  at  the  official  effective  rate).  A 
trenchant illustration is provided by the example of Peru, which, despite the 
absence of tin mines,  became  a tin exporter in  1983—85  on the basis of 
Bolivia's smuggled tin. As dollar export earnings sold to the Central Bank at 
the official rate shrank markedly, the Central Bank had a diminished supply  of dollars to sell to importers, who progressively turned to the black market 
in order to pay for their imports. The overall result was that a very high and 
apparently growing proportion of imports in the economy went unrecorded, 
and therefore largely untaxed, during the hyperinfiation period. 
The story of YPFB tax collections is related. Just as the official price of 
foreign exchange lagged the domestic price inflation, so too the government 
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Indeed, petroleum prices were typically changed  at the same  time that the 
official exchange  rate was  devalued.  As an example,  consider  the domestic 
price  of a liter of gasoline, converted to U.S. dollars using the black-market 
exchange rate (the rate earned, incidentally, by smugglers who carried cheap 
petroleum from Bolivia to Peru  across Lake Titicaca).  During this period, 
the  world  market price  was between  $0.25  and  $0.28  per liter,  but  the 
domestic price was as shown in table 6.4. 
Thus,  on the eve of the stabilization program (which raised the internal 
petroleum prices to world levels), the internal price of petroleum was about 
one-sixth to one-seventh of the world  market price.  YPFB was obligated 
throughout the hyperinflation period to pay taxes to the central government 
on a percentage of its revenues from internal sales and external sates. With 
internal prices so depressed, the taxes on internal sales were also severely 
depressed. Moreover, because its profits on internal sales were so limited by 
the  price  ceilings on  its  output,  YPFB also  refused  to  pay  taxes on  its 
external sales, arguing that the revenues were necessary to meet operating 
expenses. 
It is much more difficult to offer a comprehensive account of expenditure 
behavior during  the hyperinflation, for reasons to  which we have already 
alluded. As a rough estimate, however, it seems that as government revenu's 
diminished, real expenditures fell more or less in tandem to preserve a large 
but fairly constant deficit, since we know that the inflation tax, which was 
financing almost  100 percent of the cash-flow deficit, did not rise markedly 
above 12 percent of GDP from  1982 to mid-1985. It appears that the main 
casualties of the reduction in real spending were capital investment by the 
public sector and current central government expenditures on personnel and 
nonpersonnel services and materials. After mid-1984, interest payments on 
the foreign debt also diminished sharply as the government built up large 
interest arrears. Public investment spending felt, according to the IMF, in the 
manner shown in table 6.5. 
table 6.4  Domeallc  Price of CaotIne  (S/liter), March-December 1986 
March  $09 
April  .07 
May  .06 
Jtme  .05 
Joly  .03 
Angast  .04 
September  .28 
October  .27 
November  .23 
December  .23 
&vrr. IJDAPE.  Bol,vtan Mrnistry of Planning. 
Note.  The price  is calcolated by dividing the peso price  per liter by the black-mattel  evchange rate (peaov/$). 
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Table 6.5 
Central  administration 
State  enterprites 
Total 
Public Investm  mt (perceuta  ge of GNP), 1980—85 
1980 
2.9 
1981  1982  1983  1984  1985 
3.1  1.9 
4.6 
6.5 









Current spending  by  the  TGN evolved  in  a similar  way, 
spending on services and materials falling from 9.4 percent of 
to 6.8  percent in the first part of 1985. 
6.2  The Dynamics of the Hyperinflation 
This  section  is  devoted  to  a  closer  look  at  the  dynamics  of the 
hyperinflation. To organize the discussion,  we begin  with the simple and 
classic Cagan (1956) model. Real money balances (M1/P,) are written as an 
exponential  function of expected  inflation  ,lre,  and  inflation expectations 
adjust adaptively: 
(I)  = M,/P1  = A exp[b.ire(i)] 
The government's reliance on seignorage taxation is denoted by s  MIP, 
which may also be written asni + trm(1re), with m  = MIP, and IT  P/P. In 
the steady state, s  = 'irm(ir), which as  is well known can be satisfied by two 
inflation rates, a low inflation rate 1rm  = IT"°(S) and a high inflation rate 
,tflax  =  ITmax(S) for all s  s'', the maximal seignorage rate. The maximal 
rate is achieved at the inflation rate  IT  1/b, with stm' =  tn(l/b)/b. Given 
the relations  in (1) and thatM/P = s  s ",  an economy starting at t = 0 
will converge to Ir'm"(s) assuming that lrc(0)  1ran(s)  and that  1  > bX. 
In the  important  case  in  which  .c > srnal  and  in  which  the  stability 
condition  I  > bX is satisfied, then starting from a finite expected inflation 
rate, actual inflation will rise steadily without bound. At any given moment, 
the actual seignorage s can be financed through a surprise inflation, in which 
actual  inflation exceeds the expected inflation rate.  But this continuing gap 
between actual and  expected  inflation continues  to drive  up the  expected 
inflation rate,  which in turn increases the actual inflation rate necessary to 
achieve the  given level of seignorage.  Inflation  proceeds to  increase ex- 
plosively and without bound. 
One key property of the Cagan model should be stressed: starting from a 
steady state with IT0 = 
lrmut(S0), a permanent rise from S0 to s will lead to a 
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than .",  then a  new higher steady  state, r"(s,),  is reached. If instead s1 
is greater than  then inflation jumps up on impact and continues to rise 
without bound. In either case, a period in which inflation is rising need not 
signify a rising  financing need (i.e.,  a continuing rise  in s),  but rather a 
lagged adjustment of the inflation rate to an earlier once-and-for-all increase 
in s. 
This essential aspect of the model characterizes the Bolivian experience, 
as  we  have  already  seen  in  figure  6.1.  Aside  from  seasonal  spikes  in 
seignorage in the fourth quarter of most of the years (for budgetary reasons 
associated with a Christmas wage bonus), there is basically one permanent 
step increase in the seignorage collection in  1982, which persists until the 
third quarter of 1985. 
This model can easily be extended to the open economy by postulating a 
law-of-one-price (or  purchasing-power-parity)  relation  between  domestic 
prices,  foreign prices,  and  the exchange rate.  Specifically, we can assume 
P, = P  E,,  where P' is foreign (dollar) prices and E is the  exchange 
rate  in  units  of pesos  per dollar.  Given  the  path of foreign  prices  and 
seignorage demands,  we  can  solve  for domestic  prices and  the  nominal 
exchange rate. 
This simple extension model of monetary and price dynamics introduced 
earlier must be modified in one important respect in the case of Bolivia. We 
have seen that throughout the hyperinflation period,  foreign exchange was 
rationed at the official exchange rate,  so that a large black-market premium 
was present throughout the period.  In order to understand the dynamics of 
prices  with  a  black-market  exchange  rate,  it  is  necessary  to  alter  the 
purchasing-power-parity relation to  reflect the  fact  that  the black-market 
exchange rate, rather than the official  rate, best reflects the marginal cost of 
foreign exchanges for most imports during the period. For a limited subset of 
"necessary"  imports,  official  foreign  exchange  was  available  from  the 
Central Bank without rationing. The official exchange rate applied, for most 
of the period, to newsprint and pharmaceutical imports, for example. For all 
other  goods,  limited  amounts of  imports were  purchased  at  the  official 
exchange rate, but on the margin the cost of foreign exchange was dictated 
by the black-market price rather than by the official price. As a result, we 
should expect that the price level would be a weighted average of the official 
exchange rate (E) and the black market exchange rate (E) price of foreign 
exchange, so that 
(2)  P,  = E7E—P' 
As  before,  monetary  equilibrium  requires  MI?  m('tr').  Using  the 
convenient Cagan form for money demand used earlier, assuming adaptive 
expectations for inflation in a discrete-time setting, ir = ir  i  + (I) and 
—  'rr...1), and taking the logs of (2), we can write: 
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(3)  , 
—  ye,  — (I 
—  y)e, = Aa  — bA, 
+  (1 
—  X) (IL,_I 
— 
wherea  logA, .i.  10gM, e  = logE,p  = logP, and logP* = 0. By 
rearranging,  we get an estimable  equation  for the black-market premium 
(i  e) as an increasing function of (p.  —  e), as well as a rising function of 
inflation and a negative function of (log) real balances lagged one period: 
(4)  (, 
—  e,) =  —Xa/( I  —  y) + [1/(1  —  y)](p., 
—  e,) 
+ [bx/(l 
— 
y)Iir,  - [(1 - A)/(l - yfl(t,- -  ps_i) 
An  estimate of equation  (4)  using  monthly  data  for  January  1982  to 
September 1985 is strongly supportive of this monetary interpretation of the 
black-market premium. The estimated equation is:3 
(5)  (e, 
— 
e,) = 3.03 +  l.lO(p. 
—  e) 
(0.24)  (0.08) 
-t-  0.57  — 
O.58(I.L 
— p1) 
(0.17)  (0.10) 
R2 = 0.84; D.W. =  1.26; s.e.  =  0.27. 
The point estimate on (tj 
—  e) of 1.10 suggests  that the black-market  exchange 
rate gets a weight y of 0.9 in determining the price level. This high weight is 
broadiy consistent with direct estimates for prices, to which we now turn. 
The  microdynamics  of  wages,  prices,  and  exchange  rates  changed 
markedly over the course of the inflation. During the early l980s, nominal 
wages were changed only a few  times a year, and the presence of staggered 
nominal wage settlements gave  inertia to the wage-price process.  As  in- 
flation  accelerated,  wage  contracts were  renegotiated on  a  more frequent 
basis until, by the end of the hyperinflation, nominal wages were being reset 
on a weekly or biweekly schedule. As for prices, an increasing proportion of 
transactions became dollar linked in the sense that traders quoted prices in 
dollars, converting into pesos (at the parallel exchange rate) at the time of 
the  transactions.  It  was  illegal  during  this  period  to  use  dollars  for 
transactions or even to quote items in dollars, so that in most parts of the 
country (with the important exception of the Santa Cruz  region), dollariza- 
Lion  stopped short of actual transactions in U.S. dollars. 
A precise specification of price—exchange  rate linkages would open up a 
number of econometric and conceptual  issues better left to another study. 
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Here, the process of encroaching "dollarization"  is shown more simply  in 
an  equation linking monthly  inflation  to a  one-month  lag of inflation, the 
change in the  black-market  exchange rate,  and the  change in the official 
exchange rate. The equation to be estimated is: 
(6)  (p, 
— p,.) =  a0  +  a1(p,_1 — p,.2) +  a2(è, 
— 
+  a3(e, 
— e,_1) 
All variables are expressed  as monthly  averages,  where the monthly  average 
exchange rates for month : are proxied by the geometric weighted averages 
of end-of-month  rates for months 1— I  and:. 
There  are  two maintained  hypotheses: (1) as inflation accelerates, the 
weight of the exchange rates in the price equations increases  relative to the 
weight of the previous month's inflation; and (2) as inflation accelerates  and 
as  the  black-market  premium  increases  (see  table 6.3),  the  black-market 
exchange rate increases  in importance relative to the official exchange rate. 
Thus,  we expect that a  1/(a1 +  a2 +  a3) and a2/(a2  + a3) will both fall as the 
hyperinflation  intensifies. 
Estimates of (6)  are  shown  in  table  6.6,  first  under  an  unrestricted 
estimation of the parameters, and then under the restriction a1 + 02 +  Oj  =  I. 
The hypotheses are supported in each case.  The average  monthly inflation 
rates for the three intervals are:  1983,  13.2; 1984,  31.4; 1985, 66.9. We see 
clearly  that  as we  move from  1983 to 1985 the weight of lagged inflation 
(even at a one-month lag!) disappears, while the weight of the black-market 
exchange rate  grows  in  importance.  In  the  final  eight  months  of the 
hyperinflation,  price  change is basically  equiproportional  to change of the 
black-market exchange rate. 
The combination  of equations (5) and  (6) illustrates  the utter futility of 
the  government's  policy  of maintaining  an  overvalued  official  exchange 
rate  under conditions of rapid money creation. The government's resistance 
to  devaluation was ostensibly  owing to the fear of provoking  even higher 
inflation,  but it  is  clear  that  money creation  fed  into  prices even in the 
absence  of devaluation,  through  the  mechanism of depreciation  of the 
black-market  exchange rate.  The  maintenance of an  overvalued  official 
exchange rate did  nothing to  stop  inflation. On  the contrary,  it  not only 
created  large distortions  in the economy (particularly by acting as a tax  on 
legal  exports),  but  almost  surely  raised  inflation  by  increasing  the 
government  deficit  via  its  negative effects  on  tariff collections  and  other 
revenues. 
6.3  Failed Attempts to End the Hyperinfiation 
As with many other hyperinflations,  the end did not come on the first try, 
but  only  after several  attempts  at  stabilization  had  failed.  Stabilization 
programs were launched in November  1982,  November  1983,  April 1984, 
Table 6.6  Price  lnfiatio  n EqaIiom 
(P 
—  p,- ) =  'o + a,(p,_ 
—  p,_)  +  — ,_ ,)  -4-  o,(i,  ê,  ) 
',  2  Q  a,/(a +0,  + a,)  a,I(a,  + 0) 
I. UncomE.'jned  entimlion  (monthly) 
1983:1—191(3:12 
, 
33  .18 
(.27)  (II) 
V =  .42  OW. 




1984:1—1984:12  .13  .32 
(.52)  (.11) 
V  =  .58  D.W. 





— .18  .17 
(.17)  (.13) 
V  =  .87  OW. 




2. consuaid  Esunution 
1983:1-1983:12  .57  .16 
(II) 
V =  .42  D.W. 




1984:1—1984:12  .16  .31 
(.10) 
V  .71  OW. 




1985:1—1985:8  — .20  .17 
(II) 
V  =  .94  [3W. 




August  1984,  November  1984,  and  February  1985.  The  most  ambitious 
programs were those of November  1982  and  April  1984.  Notably, the April 
1984  package  represented  a  fairly orthodox approach to  stabilization  that 
included some of the measures  that later proved  successful in August  1985. 
The package  included a very large devaluation of  the official exchange rate, 
an announcement of tax reform, and a major increase  in public sector debt. 
In the event, the trade unions exploded in furious opposition  to the program, 
and  a month later,  the government  acceded to demands for a large wage 
increase to compensate for the devaluation. At the same  time, the govern- 
ment  reversed  its  debt policy under the  pressure  of the  trade  unions and 
entered into a  unilateral  moratorium  on  further servicing  of the external 
commercial banks debt.  The Sues government gave up further attempts to 
negotiate a  package  of debt rescheduling. 
The  complete  breakdown  of the  April  1984  package eliminated  any 
remaining hopes of the public that the Sues government would prove able to 
stabihze  the  economy.  It  should  be  recalled  that  in  November  1984, 23  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs  J 
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Presidenl Sues was compelled to announce elections for July 1985, one year  J 
Table  7.1  Outline of Mor  Policy lflhliaiiv  Fi  Year of New Eeonomk Palky 
ahead of schedule. A final  attempt at stabilization came in February 1985, 
Policy  Area  Key Policy Initiatives  linplenientation 
with a program that prompted a domestic march to La Paz and a month-long 
P 
sil-in  by  10,000 miners. Again the government  capitulated  to  popular  Eschange rate  Unification  of exchange rate on  Completed  1911.5 
demands, after which it gave up even the pretense of attempting to stabilize  current and capital account; free 
convertibility of foreign exchange 
before the arrival of a new government in August.  Public sector pricing  Public sector prices (most  Completed  1985 
importantly, energy and food) 
raised to world levels 
Consoltdated  public  sector  Target deficit of 6.3 percent ONP,  Budget approved  by Congress, 
budget  of which 5.3 percent  to be  May 1986 
externally  financed 
7  Ending the 1—lyperinflation 
Import regulations  Unitization of tariffs to tlat 20  Quotas  ,  percent rate; elimination of  tariff  refonn, August 1986 
trade quotas and nontariff barriers 
1 985  — 88  Private  sector salaries  and  Elimination  of government  Completed 1985 
employment  restrictions covering private 
wages, except for national 
The end of the hyperinflation came swiftly, just  three weeks after the new  minimum wage; removal of 
government of Victor Paz  Estenssoro  took office.  A comprehensive sta-  restrictions on hiring and firing 
bilization program,  labelled the  New Economic Policy, was  unveiled  on  Private sector pflctng  Elimination of all price controls,  Completed 1985 
except for public transportation 
29 August 1985, and within days, the hyperinflation ended.  Later in  1985,  and public utilities; elimination 
after several weeks of low inflation, there was another sharp run-up in prices  of previous monopolies  in 
associated with a large emission of money at the end of the year, but this blip  intercity transport 
in inflation was  quickly brought  under  control in mid-January  1986.  Public sector salaries and  Successive wage freezes twith  linplemented 
employment  one-step increases between 
freeze periods during 
August—December  1985, 
7.1  The New Economic Policy 
December-June 1986, 
June—December  1986 
The main features of the New Economic Policy are shown in table 7. I.  Employment reductions in state  P5rtial  implementation 
Note the program embraced widespread liberalization of trade and finance, as  enterprises and central 
administration 
well as fiscal  austerity. In principle, the stabilization measures are "short-  Public enterprises  Decentralization of major state  Most actions not taken 
term"  measures,  while the liberalization measures  are oriented toward  enterprises 
'long-run" growth. In fact,  as we discuss later,  the Bolivian government  Taxation  Increases in taxes paid by YPEB  In effect 
believes, with considerable reason, that the liberalization measures played a  Major consolidation and reform of  Approved by Congress, 
key role in permitting the stabilization policies to take hold. 
internal taxes; establishment of  May  1986 
VAT, patrimony  taxes,  and 
The  key  stabilization  measures  (putting  aside,  for  the  moment,  the  uniform income taxes 
question of liberalization policies) had  four basic elements, two of which  International financial  Negotiation of IMF standby  Approved by IMF. June  1986 
were to be implemented  immediately and  two  of which  were  slated  for  orgarnzation  agreement 
implementation in the months following the beginning of the program. First,  Reestablishment of  Current on all obligations 
creditworthiness with world 
the government committed itself to  a  policy of  a  unified exchange  rate,  Bank and 1DB 
without  capital  controls  or  exchange  controls.  The  exchange  rate  was  Foreign credilora  Negotiation of  Paris  Club  Terms of agreement approved, 
initially floated, though with a maximum value of the peso  beyond which  rescheduling  Jtrne 19116 
peso appreciation would not be permitted, and then was managed in a dirty  Commercial bank deN  Negotiations extended beyond 
1986 
float during the following year. Second, the fiscal deficit was immediately  Interest rates  Elimination of restrictions on  Completed 1985 
reduced through  a  combination  of  (a)  public  sector  price  increases,  es-  cotmnercjal bank interest rates 
pecially for petroleum products; (b) a public sector wage freeze; (c) further 240  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey B. Sachs 
reduction  in spending on  public  investment; and (d) budget  austerities in 
other  areas,  such as  subsidized credits  to  the  private  sector.  Third,  the 
program called for a tax reform to reestablish and broaden the tax base. The 
reform was enacted  by Congress nine months after the start of the program, 
and implementation began one year after.  Fourth, the government announced 
its iiitentlons  of reestablishing the country's creditworthiness  with interna- 
tional financial  institutions  (official and  private),  especially  the IMF,  the 
World Bank, and the Jnter-American Development Bank, while maintaining 
a suspension of payments to the commercial banks. Renewed creditworthi- 
ness  required  the  government  to  eliminate  arrears  on  its  debt-servicing 
obligations to  the international institutions  and to negotiate an IMF standby 
agreement, which  it did by  June  1986. In June  1986,  a Paris Club re- 
scheduling was  obtained. As described in chapter 8, Bolivia entered into a 
novel debt repurchase  agreement with its commercial bank creditors in 1988. 
To appreciate the  drama of the  end  of the  hyperinflation,  consider the 
situation  on the eve of the new program.  During August  1985, the official 
exchange rate  stood at  67,000  pesos  per  dollar,  while the  black-market 
exchange  rate  was  approximately  1.1  million  pesos  per dollar,  for  a 
percentage  gap  of some I  ,600 percent (in fact, after averaging I . I million 
for most of the month, the black-market rate shot up to 1.5 million pesos on 
the eve of the program announcement). The internal price of petroleum was 
about 3 cents per liter, compared with a world price of 28 Cents  per liter. 
inflation in the weeks  leading up to the program was  (at weekly rates): 
August 5—Il:  18.4 
August 12—18:  8.6 
August 19—25:  6.l 
August 26—September  I:  19.9 
As the program began, the exchange rate was allowed to depreciate freely, 
before a new de facto peg was set. The market set the new unified  rate at an 
opening level of about 1.1  million,  giving a one-day depreciation of 1,600 
percent  relative  to  the  previous  official  rate.  Internal  oil  prices  were 
immediately raised to  28  cents  per liter, or by 833 percent. All other price 
controls in the economy were lifted by the decree of 29 August  1985. 
These enormous changes  took only ten days to work through  the  price 
system. Prices jumped immediately  following the devaluation and increase 






These data are reproduced in figure  7. I, where the remarkable break in the 
inflation  from the second  week of the program  onward is clearly  evident. 
Fig. 7.1  Weekly  inflation rates (week 0 = 8126—9/1) 
The inflation  rate remained at relatively low levels during the following year, 
with the exception of a jump in prices during  December 1985 and January 
1986, following policy mistakes in monetary management at the end of 1985 
(which  resulted  in  a  cabinet  reshuffling  and  the  reinforcement  of fiscal 
austerity measures). 
The leading trade union organization,  the COB, which  had  opposed and 
mobilized  against  similar—indeed  less  dramatic—policy packages in  the 
past,  called for a general strike in opposition to the program. But after three 
years  of accelerating inflation  and  the  near chaos of early  1985, the new 
government clearly had the upper hand. A state of siege was declared (as a 
temporary  and  constitutional  emergency  procedure),  and  the  strike  was 
quickly disbanded, after which the state of siege was cancelled. 
The stabilization of the exchange rate at the new depreciated level of I  . 1 
million pesos  per dollar caused a gradual  rebuilding of the public's real 
money  balances.  One  of  the  central  policy  issues  at  the  end  of a 
hyperinflatjon  is  how  that  increase  in  real  money  demand  should  be 
accommodated_through  domestic credit  expansion to the public sector or to 
the  private  sector (e.g.,  via  rediscounting  of private  paper),  or  through 
foreign reserve inflows through  the balance of payments (i.e., Central Bank 
purchases  of foreign exchange at  a pegged rate or in a dirty float).  The 
Bolivian government chose the third, and clearly most conservative, strategy 
of relying on the  balance of payments. It was felt that with large Bolivian 
hoards  of U.S.  dollars,  both  in Bolivia and abroad,  there  was  sufficient 
availability of foreign exchange holdings in the private sector to provide the 
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basis  for the  needed  expansion of the domestic money supply.  Moreover, 
with confidence  in the peso  likely  to be  a rising function of the extent of 
foreign  reserve  backing  of the  domestic  money  base.  the  conservative 
approach was felt to be the most consistent with a restoration of confidence 
in the new exchange rate and  monetary regime. Net reserves climbed  from 
approximately $63 million at the end of August  1985 to about $150  million 
by the end of December, exceeding the  rise in the  money base  from $64 
million in August to $11. million at the end of the year. 
We have already noted the sharp rise in government revenue collection as 
soon as the program  started (see  fig. 6.1). The rise in domestic oil prices 
plus the renewed YPFB  tax payments on export  earnings alone raised the 
rate of  central government tax collection by about 7 percent of GNP. Adding 
in  a small recovery  of internal  taxes  and  tariff collections,  government 
revenues rose from about  I .3  percent of GNP  during  January—September 
1985 to 10.3  percent of GNP during the remainder of the year. Overall, the 
central  administration  moved  into  a  cash-flow  surplus  during  October— 
December 1985.  With a virtual elimination  of domestic credit expansion to 
the fiscal sector,  seignorage dropped off sharply after the program began (as 
was evident in fig. 6.1). Expressed as a percentage of GNP, the evolution of 
seignorage  on a quarterly basis is: 
1985:1  2.9%  1985:4  1.9% 
1985:2  3.6%  1986:1  .1% 
1985:3  3.4%  1986:2  .8% 
Shortly  after the stabilization  program was  announced, Bolivia faced the 
strong  challenge of shocks to  the  external  sector.  Bolivian exports  had 
depended heavily  on  three  items  in  recent  years.  Tin  and  natural  gas 
constituted about 90 percent of Bolivia's measured and legal exports,  while 
processed  coca leaf, to become  cocaine,  represented the third (illegal and 
unrecorded) export.  The rough estimates for Bolivian exports in 1985  are: 
Once the stabilization program got started, there were profound disruptions 
in all three of the major markets. The price of tin collapsed by 60 percent at 
the end of October 1985, as the worldwide tin cartel crumbled in financial 
distress. Three months later, hydrocarbon prices collapsed, forcing a renego- 
tiation of Bolivia's natural gas contracts with Argentina and resulting in a loss 
of  dollar  earnings on the order of $75— 100 million (the exact value is difficult 
to compute  because  of a complicated barter  arrangement between  the two 
countries as part of the  gas  agreement). Finally, the Bolivian government 
began an  interdiction  effort against narcotics trafficking in the summer of 
1986, disrupting the  smuggling  of coca-based products from the country; 
and, at the same  time, the world price for coca paste fell sharply. A con- 
servative estimate  would put  the  terms-of-trade  loss  on  the order of 10 
percent of GDP. 
The shortfall in export earnings threatened the stabilization  program in 
several ways.  Most  importantly, the export shortfall resulted in  a  sharp 
contraction  in living standards, which  is attributed  to a significant extent 
within Bolivia to the effects of the stabilization  program itself. With great 
weakness in the domestic demand for nontradable goods as a result of the 
decline in national income,  there was enormous political pressure  to revive 
government  spending,  increase  public  wages,  and  "reactivate" the  econ- 
omy. Second, each episode of export shortfall provoked public expectations 
of a  devaluation  and  helped  to  maintain  high  short-term  nominal peso 
interest rates as a result of continued speculation against the exchange rate. 
After  the tin price collapse in October  1985, the exchange rate was, in fact, 
allowed to depreciate by almost  50 percent over a period  of two months. 
After the collapse of world petroleum prices, the authorities pegged the peso 
exchange rate, despite skepticism of the public, who speculated heavily on a 
depreciation. Similarly, after the start of the drug interdiction effort in the 
summer of  1986,  the  public again  speculated heavily  against  the  peso, 
pushing up short-term peso interest rates once more and converting  domestic 
currency holdings into dollars  at the rate pegged by the Central Bank. Once 
again,  the  authorities  resisted  a  currency  devaluation,  but  at  the  cost of 
further months of high ex post real interest rates. 
7.2  Interpreting  the Rapid Success at Price Stabilization 
In  his  rightly  celebrated and  influential  analysis of the  ends of four 
hyperinflations,  Sargent  (1982)  stressed  that  hyperinflations  end  when 
governmenLs-'change the rules of the game" regarding budget deficits and 
money creation.  Sargent argues: 
in each case that we have  studied, once it became  widely understood that 
the government would not  rely  on the central bank for its finances, the 
inflation  terminated and  the exchanges stabilized.  .  .  .  [t]he changes that 
ended the  hyperinflations  were  not  isolated  restrictive  actions within a 
given  set  of rules  of the  game or general  policy.  Earlier attempts to 
stabilize  the exchanges in Hungary under }legedus,  and also in Germany, 
failed  precisely because  they did not change the rules of the game under 
which fiscal policy had to be conducted. (89—90) 
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At a trivial level,  Sargent  is certainly  correct that without a change in 
budget practices, no noninflationary exchange rate management would have 
been successful for long in Bolivia. Sargent's real assertion is much deeper, 
however, in suggesting that the end of the hyperinflation occurs suddenly not 
just  because the inflationary budget or monetary practices change, but also 
because the public expects and understands that these changes will persist. In 
other words, the rapid end of the hyperinflation is a signal of a restoration of 
confidence. At  this  level,  we believe that  the  Bolivian experience  is  not 
strongly supportive of Sargent's  view, in  that  the  evidence suggests that 
stabilization  proceeded  well  ahead  of a  complete  restoration  of  public 
confidence. 
In our interpretation,  fixing the  exchange  rate  was nearly  a  sufficient 
condition for a short-run stabilization because so much of pricing was lied to 
the nominal exchange rate.  Moreover, it  was possible to fix the exchange 
rate in the short run despite the fact that the public lacked confidence in the 
ability  of the  government to fir the rate in  the long run. A temporary 
stabilization of the exchange rate was feasible because the Central Bank was 
willing to commit at least some international reserves (e.g., Bolivia's  gold 
reserves) to pegging the exchange rate  in  the short term and  because the 
emergency measures allowed the government  to temporarily not  have 
resort to money Creation. 
Almost at the moment of stabilization, Central Bank credits to the public 
sector stopped rising, as revenues jumped in response to the higher domestic 
prices of petroleum products. During October and November 1985, increases 
in  the  money supply were  due  to  increases  in  Central  Bank holdings of 
foreign exchange reserves. The exchange rate stabilized at 1. 1 million pesos 
per dollar, leading almost immediately to price stabilization. (Actually, the 
government did not peg the exchange rate,  but rather intervened to prevent 
the rate from appreciating above the 1 .  1  million level. Given the pressures 
toward appreciation as households started to rebuild real money balances, 
the one-sided peg of the exchange rate worked as if the government were 
actually pegging the rate.) 
Before showing the evidence that inflationary expectations were slow to 
decline,  let us consider some reasons why we should not be surprised that 
expectations  did  not  shift  dramatically  upon  the  announcement of  the 
program. First, the  stabilization program was the seventh attempt in  four 
years  and  was  being  carried  out  by  a  president  without a  majority in 
Congress and with a direct electoral mandate of less than 30 percent of the 
voters.  Second,  the  program promised  many  reforms that  would  take a 
considerable amount of time to negotiate and implement. Third, the program 
reflected a radical change from the past policies of the president's own party 
(which, as the vanguard of the Revolution of 1952, did not have a tradition 
of  laissez-faire economics), and  so  could  not  be  counted on  to  win the 
support of the governing party itself. 
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Fourth,  there were profound unknowns at the time of stabilization. The 
overhang of foreign debt remained  crushing,  and the stabilization in  the 
intermediate run would remain possible only with new foreign funds from 
the official creditors. But would the IMF consent to a program without the 
immediate resumption of interest payments to the commercial banks? Would 
the Paris Club respond with generous debt rescheduling terms? Internally, the 
Situation was as murky. Under Siles, the central administration had reneged 
on  many  financial  commitments  to  regional  governments.  Would  those 
claims  by  the regional  entities  now  be honored,  thereby  threatening  the 
solvency  of  the  central  government?  Would  tax  reform  measures  be 
implemented9 Would the unions be able to crush this stabilization program 
as they had, in part, the early ones? As of 9 September 1985, there were no 
budget  accounts,  reliable  tax  forecasts,  or even statistics  on  Bolivia's 
international reserve holdings (the data were in a mass of confusion because 
of several complications with bilateral payments arrangements with Argen- 
tina).  There  was  simply  no  basis  for  an  informed  opinion  about  the 
longer-term prospects of stabilization. 
7.2.1  Inflation Expectations in the Wake of the Stabilization 
We have suggested that the hyperinflation ended immediately because of 
the stability and unification of the exchange rate,  even though inflationary 
expectations,  at  least  regarding  the  intermediate  run,  did  not  drop 
instantaneously. In other words, the program was successful even though the 
measures  were  not  immediately  credible.  The  key  to  this  seemingly 
paradoxical view, we have suggested, is the fact that it is possible to peg an 
exchange rate in the short run, even if there are widespread expectations that 
the exchange rate will collapse in the future. There is one excellent source of 
evidence on  exchange rate expectations,  and that is from  nominal interest 
rates on peso- and dollar-denominated assets  in La Paz in the aftermath of 
the stabilization. Nominal peso interest rates remained extraordinarily high 
during much of the year after the beginning of stabilization. Nominal interest 
rates fell after the stabilization program began, but only gradually and with a 
long  lag  in response  to the end of currency  depreciation.  Some data on 
nominal lending rates are shown in table 7.2. 
Under the  deregulated financial system  in  place  since the stabilization 
program began,  loans  could  be contracted  in  either  dollars  or pesos,  at 
unregulated interest rates. The spread between peso- and dollar-denominated 
borrowing reflects  mainly  the  expected rate  of depreciation  of the peso 
vis-à-vis the U.S.  dollar. Note  that despite  the  sudden cessation of price 
increases in September 1985, nominal interest rates in pesos remained on the 
order of 20 percent per month from October 1985 to March 1986, compared 
with dollar-denominated interest rates of 1½  to 2 percent  per month. The 
expectations of continued  currency depreciation  proved to  be  appropriate 
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Table 7.2  Peso- and  D Har4kmrntinated  Thirty-day Loan kalan. April 
1986 (bgin.lng  01 month) 
Es Post  Etcess 
Dollar Rate  Cost 01 
Peso  Dollar  on Peso  Loan  Peso Loan 
1985 
April  34 
May  35 
June  44 
July  50 
August  45 
September (stabilization  begins)  45 
October  31 
November  22  1.4  10.2  8.8 
December  21  1.6  —6.7 
1986 
January 
19  1.6  —8.1  —9.7 
February  20  1.7  34.5  32.8 
March  20  1.7  16.8  15.1 
April  19  1.7  17.5  15.8 
May  13  1.8  13.0  11.2 
June  8  1.9  8.4  6.5 
July  8  1.9  8.0  6.1 
August  S  1.9  7.5  5.6 
September 
7  1.9  6.8  4.9 
October  7  1.8  6.8  5.0 
November  3  1.8 
Note.  The cc post dollar race  oct a peso Ions is calculated  at (I +  i,)E,IE,  • where E, is the bcginmng-o1-month 
eachange rate (pesos per dollar) and i, is the beginning-ol-omoth  I interest  rule. 
'last  week ol  October. 
sharp depreciation of the peso. However, from February to September 1986, 
the interest rates remained extraordinanty  high (see table 7.2), despite the 
absence of any further currency depreciation. Thus,  it is clear from the data 
that there  was  not  a decisive  restoration of confidence in the peso at  the 
beginning  of the program,  despite the  fact  that  ex  post,  the  stabilization 
succeeded. 
Similar evidence  against  an  instantaneous recoveiy of confidence  is 
offered  by  the time  path  of real  money  balances  in  the  wake  of the 
stabilization  program.  Holdings  of real  balances  increased only gradually 
during 1986 and remained significantly below historical  levels throughout 
the year. 
7.3  Was the  Stabilization  Recessionary? 
The  evidence on  the  recessionary effect of the  program  is  ambiguous, 
since  during  the  year of the stabilization program  the  economy was hit 
remarkably  hard  by a series of external shocks, whose overall effect was  a 
toss of export  earnings on  the order  of 10 percent of  GNP. Such an enormous 
loss of export earnings would normally  be enough to create a deep recession, 
even in an economy starting from a position  of macroeconomic stability. 
Moreover, during 1981—85,  measured real GDP had declined every  year. by 
2.9  percent on  average, so  that  the continuing economic  stagnation  and 
falling  GNP  in  1986 could not  in  any  event be  attributed  easily  to  the 
stabilization program. 
In the event,  GDP fell by 2.9 percent in 1986, but  then began rising in 
1987  and  1988  (by  an estimated 2.3 and 3.0 percent, respectively),  despite 
the  sharp  fall  in the  terms  of trade.  There  is  absolutely  no  evidence, 
therefore, that the effects of  stabilization were in any way contractionary—if 
at all—for more than a very brief period. 
It  should  be  stressed  in  any  event  that  the  "austerity" fiscal actions 
undertaken in ending a hypennflation  are not  necessarily contractionary  on 
balance,  since  the  contractionary  effects  of a  rise  in  tax  revenues are 
balanced by the expansionary effects of the elimination of the inflation tax. 
Basically, the stabilization program does not involve a rise in overall taxes, 
but rather  a shift from one  tax (the inflation tax) to other,  more efficient 
taxes. In addition, the reduction in uncertainty and the elimination of price 
distortions brought about by the stabilization program should have important 
supply-side effects. 
Moreover,  the  stabilization  program  made possible  a  restoration of net 
inflows of  financial  assistance  from  the  rest  of the  world.  Thus,  the 
stabilization  measures  significantly  eased  the national  budget constraint, if 
account is taken of the hundreds of millions of dollars of financial assistance 
that  were made  available by the IMF, the World Bank,  the inter-American 
Development Bank,  and  the bilateral  creditors as a result of the success of 
the  stabilization  program.  We  have  noted in chapter  1  that  as a result of 
stabilization,  the  net  resource transfer shifted from a significant negative 
amount (approximately  6 percent of GNP net outflow in  1983) to a large 
positive amount in 1987 (approximately 5 percent of GNP net inflow). 
One  possible  source of contractionary  impulses  from  the  stabilization 
program has been the high real interest rates in Bolivia since the beginning 
of the stabilization.  As noted by Dornbusch and Fischer (1986), high ex post 
real rates have been present in the aftermath of most hyperinflations because 
of a scarcity of money as the demand for money rises  sharply following 
stabilization.  We have suggested that the high interest rates reflect Lingering 
inflationary  expectations, and so do not necessarily signal high ex ante real 
interest rates. 
7.3  Further Lessons from the Hyperinilation 
We conclude  our  discussion  of the hyperinilation by discussing some of 
the  central  issues  that have  been  debated in  the  design of stabilization 
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topics in particular: the case for an "orthodox" versus  "heterodox" shock 
program, and the linkages of short-run macroeconomic policy and long-run 
structural policies. 
7.3.1  Orthodox versus Heterodox Anti-Inflation Programs 
Much of the debate in Latin America in recent years has centered on the 
question of the  appropriateness of "orthodox" policies  in ending  a high 
inflation. Advocates of the  "heterodox" shock approach have argued  that 
tight  monetary  and  fiscal  policies  alone  are  insufficient to  end  a  high 
inflation. They suggest that incomes policies, wage and price controls, and 
even monetary reform should play a central role in a stabilization program.' 
Extreme advocates of heterodoxy go even further: they suggest that orthodox 
policies have no role to play in inflation stabilization. in this view, inflation 
is  an "inertial"  process,  in which prices and  wages rise because of self- 
fulfilling expectations.  The goal of policy,  in that view, is  to break those 
expectations through wage and price controls. 
The Bolivian experience sheds some  light on this  debate,  although the 
lessons from Bolivia must be read with care. The most obvious point is that 
Bolivia  was  successful  in  stabilizing  inflation  without  recourse  to  any 
elements of heterodox wage or price policies, There were no wage or pri"e 
controls, and no monetary reform. Indeed, at the beginning of the program, 
virtually  all  existing  price  controls  were  removed,  with  the  goal  of 
liberalizing the price system. 
In this sense, it is clear that orthodox policies were sufficient to end the 
hyperinflation.  And  as  already  indicated,  the  end  of  the  inflation  was 
virtually instantaneous,  with the  runaway  inflation being eliminated  in a 
matter of  a  couple of weeks  and  remaining low  for  several years.  This 
success  stands  in  sharp  contrast  to  the  failed  "heterodox"  plans  in 
Argentina, Brazil, and Peru. In those countries, inflation was held down by 
the stabilization programs for a few  months, only to explode at very high 
rates after a short period of time. 
The long-term success of the Bolivian program compared with the failures 
elsewhere is  clearly  related to  the  greater fiscal stabilization achieved  in 
Bolivia, and  thereby in the  lesser recourse to  money financing of budget 
deficits. The links  between the  budget deficits and  inflation in  all  ot the 
countries mentioned is clear enough. Large deficits are financed by money 
printing, which in turn causes a downward pressure on the foreign exchange 
rate. If the exchange rate is allowed to depreciate, then the domestic prices 
of  tradable  goods  (importables  and  exportables)  rise  in  line  with  the 
exchange rate depreciation. If the exchange rate  is pegged in order to avoid 
the inflationary consequences of depreciation, the central government loses 
reserves over time, which eventually forces it to devalue the exchange rate, 
but at a later date.2 
y 
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Typically, as  happened  in Argentina,  Brazil,  Peru,  and  Bolivia during 
1982—85, the government tries  to avoid outright depreciation or devaluation 
of the exchange rate, even as it runs out of reserves. Rather than devalue the 
official rate,  the  government rations  foreign exchange,  thereby creating a 
spread  between  the  official exchange  rate  and  the  "market"  (black  or 
parallel) rate. In the end, the inflationary consequences are the same as if an 
official devaluation had occurred. On the Fnargin.  imports are  purchased  at 
the  highly  depreciated  black-market  rate,  so  that  the  internal prices  of 
importables rise in step with the depreciated black-market rate,  rather than 
the official exchange rate.  Eventually, the gap  between the official and the 
depreciated  black-market  rate  becomes  so  large  and  produces  so  much 
cheating  and  corruption  (in  the  form  of  overinvoicing of  imports  and 
underinvoicing of exports,  bribes to get Central Bank allocations of foreign 
exchange, etc.) that the official exchange rate is grudgingly devalued.3 
Of all of the high-inflation countries in Latin America in the 1980s, only 
Bolivia after  1985  was able to break this circle of budget deficits, depre- 
ciating cunency, and high inflation. The orthodox tight monetary policies in 
Bolivia, made possible by a major reduction in the budget deficit, was the 
key  that  allowed Bolivia  to  maintain  a  stable  and  unified  exchange rate 
vis-à-vis  the  dollar.  In  other  countries,  the  large  budget  deficits  that 
continued after the stabilization programs were  put in place prevented the 
establishment of a stable and  unified exchange rate for any  period longer 
than a few  months. 
While  the  Bolivian  case  illustrates powerfully  the  need  for  significant 
budgetary adjustment, it does not really settle the case for or against wage 
and price policies in addition to the more orthodox budgetary policies. In 
Bolivia, inflation stopped immediately without any additional "heterodox" 
pricing policies, but we should not make overly strong inferences from this. 
Part  of  the  Bolivian  experience  reflects  the  special  characteristics  of a 
hypennflation rather than a mere high inflation. 
In Bolivia, the inflation ended as soon as the exchange rate was stabilized 
because the  preceding  hyperinflation had  eliminated  all  long-term  price 
Contracts  from  the  Bolivian  economy.  By  August  1985,  most  prices  in 
Bolivia were set on a spot-market basis.  Often,  the prices were quoted in 
dollars, with the Bolivian peso price being determined by the dollar price 
multiplied by  the  black-market exchange  rate  at  the  moment,  in  these 
circumstances, inflation is basically equal to the rate of depreciation of the 
black-market exchange rate, If the exchange rate can be stabilized, inflation 
will immediately revert  to the rate of increase of dollar prices. Indeed, in 
early  September  1985,  the exchange  rate stopped  depreciating  and  the 
Bolivian inflation was over. 
In  other countries,  however,  it  may  happen that  the exchange rate  is 
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Chile during  l979—8l. The  difference  between Bolivia  and  these other 
cases  seems  to lie in the nature of hyperinflation,  in which  all vestiges of 
long-term  pricing  in  the  domestic  currency  disappear.  For  less  rapid 
inflations,  staggered price contracts denominated in the domestic currency, 
or backward-looking indexation to the domestic CPI, can  break the tight link 
between inflation and the exchange rate. Thus,  countries with high inflations 
but not hyperinflations might be wise to combine exchange rate stabilization 
with other  pricing measures  in order to achieve  a  rapid  return  to  price 
stability. 
The  1985 Israeli  stabilization  is a  clear  example of the  combination of 
orthodox stabilization  policies combined with elements of "heterodoxy" in 
order  to  achieve a  rapid  disinflation.  As in  Bolivia,  the key to  Israel's 
stabilization  program was a dramatic  and  sudden Cut fl the budget deficit. 
And  as  in  Bolivia,  the  stabilization  of the  exchange rate  provided  the 
"nominal anchor" in the stabilization,  that is, the key price whose fixity was 
central to price stability  throughout the economy. But in Israel, as opposed  to 
Bolivia, the government also negotiated an agreement  with the Histadrut, the 
national  trade  union  movement,  which called  for  a short-term  freeze of 
wages  and prices. Notably, the union agreed to this freeze conditional  on the 
continued stability of the nominal exchange rate. Thus, as in Bolivia, ti" 
Israeli  stabilization  was,  at  the  core,  built  upon  nominal exchange rate 
stability. 
7.3.2  Stabilization  and Structural Adjustment Policies 
One of the continuing debates  among economists and policymakers is the 
appropriate mix of "stabilization"  policies (budget cutting, tight monetary 
policy, etc.) with  "structural"  policies  (trade liberalization, privatization, 
etc.).  Some  argue that  stabilization  should  precede structural  adjustment 
policies, while others say  that  the  stabilization  and  structural  adjustment 
policies should be pursued in parallel.  Once again, the Bolivian case sheds 
some light on these arguments. 
The Bolivian stabilization program began with the remarkable presidential 
Supreme  Decree  21060,  which  instituted  a  wide-ranging  liberalization 
program  in  conjunction  with  the  short-run  stabilization  measures.  It is 
important to understand the motivations for this joint action. To a significant 
extent, to be sure, the designers of the stabilization program were aware  that 
Bolivia  needed  to  undergo  major  structural  adjustments,  especially  to 
develop  new  export  markets,  in  order to  compensate for  the  long-term 
secular decline of Bolivia's major export, tin.  But  the motivations  for the 
liberalization  went  beyond  the  textbook  arguments  for  outward  trade 
orientation and an efficient allocation of resources. 
The  designers of the stabilization  program  were aware  of the  enormous 
administrative overload that Bolivia's model of state capitalism had created. 
The  state  sector  was  not  only financially bankrupt  but  administratively 
bankrupt as well. There  was  little administrative  capacity to carry out  the 
most  basic  functions  of government,  much  less  to  implement  a  refined 
program  of  industrial  policy  based  on  an  elaborate  scheme of price 
controls,  transfers,  and  subsidies. Price  controls  that  were in place  were 
haphazardly  enforced,  subject  to  enormous  corruption,  and  often  had 
bizarre  and  unintended  consequences.  Grain  subsidies,  for  example, 
resulted in enormous smuggling  of flour to neighboring  countries  and  the 
enrichment of millers, rather  than  any  significant  benefit  to  the  poor.5 
Significant  amounts  of cheap  gasoline  were  being  smuggled  in  tanker 
trucks  across  the  border  with  Peru.  Cheap  credits  to  agriculture  were 
simply  fueling  the  black  market,  rather  than  creating  any  additional 
agricultural  output.  Under  these  circumstances, much of the economy  was 
already de  facto  liberalized,  with many  prices—even  those under formal 
controls—effectively  being  determined by world market  conditions.  Price 
controls often had bizarre  and  regressive effects,  with powerful or clever 
middlemen  able  to  arbitrage  the  gaps  between official  prices and  world 
prices. 
For these reasons, the liberalization  of prices was viewed  as a basic part 
of the short-term  stabilization  strategy, as well as a part of the long-term 
development  strategy.  By  freeing  up  prices  and  withdrawing from  the 
business  of setting  a  wide  range of quotas and  prices,  the  government 
therefore  hoped  to  accomplish  many  things:  to  free  top  government 
officials  to  focus  on  the  crucial  fiscal  measures  in  need of immediate 
implementation;  to  eliminate  many  of  the  costly  and  disiributionally 
perverse  income  transfers  implicit  in  the  existing  system  of  price 
regulation; to reduce the need to monitor government policies, so that the 
scarce  administrative  machinery  could  focus  on tax  collection  and budget 
cutting rather  than on the administration  of a complicated system of wage 
and  price  controls;  and  finally, to  send  the right price  signals needed  to 
encourage  the movement of resources  into new tradables sectors. 
As  discussed  below,  the  long-term  structural  adjustment  to  the 
liberalization  policies  is  still  in  the  early  phases, despite  several  years 
of  stabilization.  While  there  has  been  some  rise  in  nontraditional 
exports,  there  have  still  not  developed  major  new  export  sectors  that 
can  compensate for  the  collapse  of  tin  exports.  Bolivia  has  still  not 
generated  the  needed  internal  savings to  finance  the  development  of a 
major  new  export  sector, and  external  savings are  unlikely to  make  up 
the difference in view of Bolivia's enormously  high country risk. At the 
same  time, Bolivia remains stuck  without its  most  obvious  new  market: 
Brazil.  It  is only very recently  that  Brazil has shown an interest in easing 
its  heavily  protectionist  policies  to  allow  an  increase  in  imports from 
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8  Bolivian Debt Management, 
1985  —88 
We saw in the previous chapter that the cutoff in loreign lending to Bolivia in 
the  early  1980s,  combined  with  heavy  debt-service  payments  during 
1982—84,  was  a key factor in provoking the Bolivian hyperinflation.  The 
commercial bank debt payments were unilaterally  suspended in May 1984 by 
the  Sues  government  at  the  insistence  of the  COB,  the  trade  union 
organization.  When  President Paz  came to office, the key intention  with 
respect to the foreign debt was  to avoid a resurgence of inflation that could 
be caused by a return to heavy debt-service payments. 
The Paz  government began negotiations with its  various creditors  on  a 
differentiated package of debt relief. With respect to the IMF and the World 
Bank,  there was  no prospect of debt relief via  reschedulings. since those 
institutions do not reschedule their debts.  Thus, the government attempted to 
arrange  new credits that would offset the debt servicing, thereby leading to a 
net resource  inflow from these institutions.  With respect to the bilateral cred- 
itors,  the intention was to get  a fully negotiated postponement of interest 
and principal  payments through a settlement in the Paris Club and to arrange 
for net new credits from friendly governments. 
Finally, with respect to the commercial creditors, the goal was essentially 
to get a new kind of settlement on the debt that would eliminate  Bolivia's 
debt overhang and obviate the need to make economically  and politically 
destabilizing  net transfers to the bank  creditors.  In the event,  Bolivia has 
maintained a suspension of interest servicing to the bank creditors since 1985 
and  negotiated a  novel  "debt buyback," which eliminated  approximately 
one-half  of Bolivia's commercial bank debt by the end of 1988. 
in this chapter we  analyze both  the  conceptual underpinnings  and  the 
nature of negotiations that led to the Bolivian buyback, as well  as discuss 
briefly the nature of Bolivia's settlement with the other creditors. 
The chapter continues in three sections. In the  next section, we explain 
why a comprehensive debt reduction mechanism, such as a debt  buyback, 
can be highly desirable for the  creditors  as well as the debtor. Then,  we 
describe the negotiations and  implementation of the Bolivian buyback and 
argue that, indeed, the arrangement has been of benefit to the creditor  banks 
as well as to Bolivia. Finally, we briefly describe the favorable debt relief 
that has been  achieved by Bolivia in negotiations with its other creditors. 
8.1  The General Theory of Debt Reduction Operations 
if a country  owes $1  billion on which it can only pay an expected $50 
million, the country may suffer enormous costs from being unable to pay the 
full amount due, it will face a great difficulty  in new borrowing, even for 
highly productive investments.'  It will face high bargaining costs in handling 
the $1  billion of bad  debt.2 And,  it  will  face  sanctions from disgruntled 
creditors (e.g.,  a  withdrawal  of trade credits)  that  will hinder  its  future 
economic  performance.3 In addition, there will  be  a  major  internal  dis- 
incentive to economic  reforms  which  increase  the debt-service capacity of 
the country, since the Costs of reform are borne by the country, while many 
of the benefits of reform  will be appropriated by the creditors (who receive 
higher repayments in the event of reform).4 
For these reasons, it  may  well be beneficial  for the  country  to pay  an 
amount even more than the $50 million (in present value terms), in order  to 
cancel the overhang of $1  billion of  mostly bad debt. It will  also be generally 
advantageous  for the creditors to accept a  partial payment on the debt, as 
long  as it is in excess  of the $50 million  expected payments.  The partial 
payments  could come in the form of a direct cash buyback (especially if  the 
country can borrow the funds for the buyback from friendly governments) or 
some other arrangement where future debt payments of over $50 million are 
guaranteed  by the debtor country.  A cash-starved country would obviously 
prefer to find ways to make the present value of payments in  the future, 
rather than with  current cash.5  By eliminating the overhang,  the  country 
would avoid the costs of  default and regain the incentives for internal reform. 
in practice, even mutually  advantageous  debt reduction schemes (in which 
the debtor clears the debt overhang and the creditors raise the total value of 
payments that  they  receive)  are  hard to  negotiate under the  current  debt 
management  strategy of the IMF and the creditor  governments. There  are 
several  decisive reasons  why even mutually beneficial deals have not taken 
place.  First, the few very heavily exposed banks have an  inherent incentive 
to reject buyback deals, even when they are efficient from the point of view 
of the banks  as a whole (i.e., when they raise the market  value of overall 
debt repayments).6 Second, the U.S.  government is the main arbiter of the 
kind of  deals that take place, and it has vetoed almost all comprehensive debt 
reduction schemes,  on  behalf of the  most-heavily  exposed money  center 
banks.  Third, for the smaller countries, the debt negotiations are guided by 
the creditors'  concerns over precedent for the large debtors, rather than for 
the efficiency  of the outcome for the  small debtor,  It is generally  best to 
"strangle"  a  little  country,  even  at  the  expense  of the  country's  debt 
servicing,  if it  sends  a convincing signal to Brazil and  Mexico to keep 
paying  their debt. 
8.2  The Bolivian Buyback 
The  Bolivian  buyback  must  be  understood  against  the  following 
background. Bolivia  was  the only  case  up  to  1988  in  which  the U.S. 
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position  only  after  long  and  difficult  negotiations  with  the  Bolivian 
government.7  The  strategy  has  been  highly  beneficial  for  all  parties, 
according  to the theory of the  'debt overhang" outlined earlier. Bolivia, 
alone of the high-inflation countries in the Southern Cone, has been able to 
stabilize and to resume growth because it has not been trapped by excessive 
debt repayments. There has also been a restoration of political stability in the 
country  after  the  chaos  and  virtual  anarchy  of  hyperinflation  during 
1984—85. 
After the  Paz government came to power in  mid-1985 and  undertook 
remarkable stabilization efforts to halt the hyperinflation, it remained official 
U.S. and  1MF  policy in  the  spring  of  1986 that Bolivia  should resume 
interest payments on its foreign bank debt. indeed, in March 1986, only two 
months after price stability had been restored to the country, the 1MF was 
urging a large devaluation in Bolivia in order to facilitate increased interest 
payments to the commercial banks. The Bolivian government was convinced 
that such a move, in addition to destroying the economic and political basis 
of  the  stabilization  program  itself,  would  cause  a  collapse  of  the 
government. 
instead,  the  Bolivian  government  urged  a  different  approach  in  dis- 
cussions  with  the  U.S.  government and  the IMF.8 Ultimately,  the  1MF 
agreed to treat the Bolivian case on its own merits and  acknowledged that 
Bolivia's  foreign  bank  debt  could  not  be  paid  (at  least,  not  without 
undermining economic  and  political  stability  in  the  country).9  The  IMF 
also agreed to grant Bolivia a program based on its successful stabilization 
efforts, despite the fact that the Bolivian government had not reached any 
understanding with the commercial bank creditors.  This was the  first  time 
that the IMF loaned money to a debtor country that did nor plan to make 
interest payments to the commercial banks (or even to clear the arrears on 
back payments). 
In  late  1986,  the  banks  began  to  discuss  with  Bolivia  a  longer-term 
solution to Bolivia's debt overhang, once they saw that the U.S. government 
and the 1MF were not going to defend the banks'  position vis-à-vis Bolivia. 
Moreover,  for  several  years,  the  U.S.  regulators  had  been  forcing 
writedowns of Bolivian debt in the banks'  books, thereby eliminating any 
important incentives that the banks might have had to hold on to the debt. 
After two years of complicated discussions and legal work, the buyback was 
arranged.  Note  that during the entire period of discussions. Bolivia did  not 
pay any interest to the commercial banks. At the same time, Bolivia received 
large net resource transfers (on the order of about 5 percent of GNP per year) 
from the official creditors. 
As mentioned earlier, Bolivia repurchased with the buyback about one-half 
of its debt at  11  cents per dollar of face value. The money  used for this 
purpose was donated from foreign governments. While some of the money 
might otherwise have come to Bolivia as foreign aid in other forms, much of 
it would not  (of the $34 million spent on the buyback,  Bolivia might have 
been able to get $15—20 million of the money in other forms of aid). 
It  might  appear  that  the  buyback  could  not  have  had  much  of a 
beneficial efficiency effect on Bolivia,  since the country only repurchased 
one-half of the  debt and  the  remainder still  sells for  II  cents (indicating 
that  most of the remaining debt also will not be paid, thus leaving Bolivia 
in a situation of default).  But this abstract analysis misses the real  point of 
Bolivia's  situation  post-buyback.  Under  current  U.S.  and  IMF  policy, 
Bolivia is not being pressed on the remaining part of the debt, except to 
settle that  remainder on  a similar  basis  to  the  buyback. o  In  effect,  the 
official  community is recommending a  gradual  process  in  which  Bolivia 
will clear all of its commercial bank debts at a price of about II  percent of 
face  value,  and the process  seems  to  be  occurring:  after  the  buyback, 
Bolivia  has  continued  to  repurchase  debt  at  the  buyback  price,  through 
individual deals  with  creditor  banks.  Meanwhile,  as  this  process  goes 
forward,  the  official  community has  agreed  not  to  impose  sanctions  on 
Bolivia for nonpayment on the remaining bank debt. 
Was the debt strategy of the IMF and U.S. government successful in the 
case of  Bolivia? The  answer  is  a  resounding  yes,  for all of the parties 
concerned. In effect, in 1986 the official community recognized the futility of 
trying to press  Bolivia to  pay  unpayable debt.  As a  result, the Bolivian 
government got the time and international support to put in place a remarkably 
strong and effective stabilization program that has ended a hyperinflation and 
restored growth to the country for the first time in almost a decade. Bolivia's 
political stability has been enhanced, as have its democratic institutions. The 
creditors as a whole benefited as well, as shown by the fact that Bolivia's debt 
rose in value from 5 to II cents per dollar. This increase in the price of debt 
was not a giveaway by Bolivia.''It  reflects, instead, the creditors' share of the 
remarkable turnaround of the Bolivian economy, from the worst in the world 
during the early 1980s (with the world's highest inflation in forty years) to one 
of stability and incipient recovery in 1988. 
Bolivia's success story depended strongly on the supportive actions of the 
U.S. government and the IMF in providing a framework in which Bolivia 
could successfully negotiate with its bank creditors.  Effective progress for 
other debtor  countries  will  require  similar  official  forbearance.  As  the 
Bolivian case has demonstrated, the debtor as well  as the creditors (at least 
taken  as a group) can benefit strongly from  a  realistic approach to com- 
prehensive debt reduction. 
8.3  Bolivia's Relations with the Ofilcial Creditors 
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The key to 
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reduction with 
Bolivia's  debt strategy has  been to maintain good  financial 
official  creditors  while  at  the  same  time  pursuing  debt 
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to the IMF. World  Bank,  and  Inter-American Development Bank;  negoti- 
ated two standby programs with the IMF for 1986—87 and 1987—88,  and a 
three-year Structural Adjustment Facility with the IMF for 1988—90;  negoti- 
ated  several  loans with the  World  Bank  on concessional terms (from the 
International Development Association fund); and renegotiated the debt with 
the Paris Club on highly favorable terms in 1986 and 1988. 
The  result  has  been  a  positive net  resource  transfer  from the official 
creditor community  at the same time that Bolivia has had essentially a zero 
net resource  transfer to the banks.  The relevant data are shown in table 8.1, 
where we see  that after the stabilization  program went into  effect in  1985, 
Bolivia  succeeded  in  reversing  the  overall  net  resource transfer  by  an 
elimination  of net outflows  to the banks and a reversal from outflows  to 
inflows from the official community. 
Tnble  8.1  Net Reaource Transfera  on Medmm- nd  Long-Term  Debt,  1982-87 
(S uniHion) 
Type of Creditor  1982  1983  1984  1985  1986  1917 
016cm!  7!  14  —53  —16  195  8! 
Molttlateral  56  45  I  —41  142  " 
Bilateral  IS  —3!  —54  —45  54  .33 
Private  —132  —149  —49  —30  —II  —9 
Soppliera  —7  — 17  —2  —4  —3  — 
Financial  maokets  —125  —132  —47  —26  —8  —8 
Total  —61  —135  —102  —116  184  72 
Nd  trankras % of GNP  —2.0  —4.6  —3.4  —3.6  4.8  1.7 
World Bnnk Debt Thbles,  1988—89 edition. 
9  Beyond  Stabilization 
to Economic Growth 
and Development 
The Bolivian stabilization  has eliminated much of the panic conditions that 
surrounded the hyperinflation  in  1984 and  1985.  Also, significant  progress 
has  been  made  in easing the  external  debt overhang.  Virtually  complete 
price stability  has been reestablished in Bolivia during  1987 and 1988.  It is 
evident, however, that many of the deeper  problems in the Bolivian economy 
and  society that helped to cause  the hyperinflation  remain in place,  and  in 
I 
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some cases  have deepened.  We  now  mention  some of the challenges that 
remain  in converting  the current  stabilization period  into  the first  phase of 
sustained economic development. 
The end  of the hyperintlation  did not bring a  sudden rejuvenation of the 
economy. Real growth during 1987 and  1988,  while positive,  was not even 
enough to  maintain real living standards. Indeed, it is fair to say that once 
the  hyperinflation was  lifted,  Bolivia's  desperate  underlying  situation 
became  even more apparent. 
We  noted in the introduction that Bolivia  has survived for hundreds of 
years on  the  exports  of a  few commodities:  silver until  the  nineteenth 
century, tin during  the twentieth  century, and  natural gas and  (illicit) coca 
paste  in the  l980s.  None of these commodities  can continue  to act as the 
engine of growth  of the Bolivian economy. Silver and  tin deposits  have 
been  heavily mined, and remaining exploitation  of these  minerals will have 
to be  on  a  smaller  and  much  more  technologically  advanced basis.  Tin 
mining in  Bolivia had already  become  unprofitable  at  $5.60  per pound, 
the  price  that  prevailed  before  the  collapse  of the  world  tin  market  in 
October  1985.  At the post-collapse price  of about  $3.00  per pound,  the 
Bolivian government  was  forced  to  lay  off most of the tin miners,  and 
Bolivia now  stands  little chance of maintaining  significant  amounts of tin 
exports. 
Natural gas is  almost as problematical. The price on Bolivia's natural gas 
exports to Argentina was slashed  sharply after the collapse of  world petroleum 
prices in early  1986.  What is more, Bolivia's export contract with Argentina 
expires in 1992. In view of Argentina's  recent large discoveries of  natural gas 
deposits,  it is  quite  possible  that  the  gas  contract  with  Bolivia will be 
suspended  after 1992 or at least renegotiated on a much smaller scale. 
Coca paste  is the most  problematical  and ironical case of all.  As men- 
tioned in chapter  1,  starting in  the early  l980s, when  U.S.  demand for 
cocaine  soared, Bolivia was pulled  into  the extensive cultivation of coca 
leaf, the raw material input of cocaine. The coca leaf is processed  into coca 
paste,  a precursor of pure cocaine, and is then smuggled to Colombia. In the 
mid-1980s,  it  was  estimated  by  the  U.S.  Drug  Enforcement  Authority 
(DEA) that Bolivian foreign  earnings on coca paste exports roughly matched 
the sum total of all legal Bolivian exports. 
Bolivia  has  demonstrated  a  natural  comparative  advantage  in  coca 
cultivation.  The climate of the  Yungas and  Chapare regions of the country 
are  well  suited to coca cultivation, and coca leaf has played an important 
role in the  Andean culture  for centuries. Illegal narcotics traffickers  have 
demonstrated an enormous entrepreneurial activity in  mobilizing resources 
into the sector, developing transportation and communications lines. etc. 
And yet, of course, the industry  has been  a disaster for the country from 
almost  all points of view. It has encouraged the development of an internal 
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poses  life-and-death  risks  for  Bolivia's  democratic  institutions  and  civil 
society. Coca cultivation  has jeopardized Bolivia's foreign relations with the 
United  States  and  other  industrialized  countries.'  It  has  thereby  created 
enormous uncertainties, as the U.S.  government has repeatedly threatened to 
suspend  foreign aid and international support to Bolivia. 
Coca production has also drained economic vitality from other economic 
sectors  a Ia the "Dutch disease."2 It has debilitated  the tax system, since a 
"leading  sector"  is  outside  of  normal  tax  collection.3  Hundreds  of 
thousands  of well-organized  (and  in many cases  well-armed) peasants  now 
derive their meager livelihood from the cultivation of coca leaf, meaning 
that  any  plan  for  limiting  coca cultivation must confront an  enormous 
political  and  economic  challenge  from  a  large  part  of the  population. 
Despite all of this, the Bolivian government  has  devoted a large share  of 
its scarce  resources  and  political capital  to reducing  coca cultivation and 
trafficking.4 
For these reasons,  Bolivia must now develop a new export base,  indeed a 
completely new economic orientation, one that is a radical departure from its 
entire past history. As the planning minister, Gonzalo Sanchez de Losada, has 
said many  times,  "Bolivia must reinvent  itself." The  basic strategy is to 
follow  the  lead of the  outward-oriented  developing  countries:  make the 
environment fertile for new exports,  and  then wait to see  which industries 
respond to the  incentives.  Few observers could  foresee that Chile's brisk 
growth in recent years would be based on kiwi exports or that Korea's export 
surge in the  1960s would be  initiated with the export  of wigs to the U.S. 
market! The key policies for promoting  the new export base in Bolivia are a 
realistic exchange rate, an open trading  system, and—budget  permitting— 
fiscal incentives for nontraditional exports. Bolivian export  potential seems to 
be greatest  in three broad areas. First, there is obvious potential in agricultural 
exports. The Bolivian lowlands in the East offer a vast and fertile area  for 
grains (e.g., soybeans), tropical fruits, cut flowers,  timber, etc. Bolivia has 
already begun to make soybean exports to world markets since the mid-l980s. 
Second,  there is  the potential for light  manufacturing (e.g., yarns, textiles, 
furniture), especially for export to the Brazilian  market. In July 1988, Brazil 
and Bolivia signed  a new trade accord to open up some of  the Brazilian market 
to new Bolivian goods. Third, there is the remaining potential in the mining 
and petroleum sectors.  With new technologies for secondary recovery, some 
old silver and tin mines might once  again become profitable.  There also 
remains the potential,  long under discussion, for a natural gas pipeline to 
Brazil. 
All of these  new  industries will require time, learning,  and, above all, 
heavy investment expenditure. In turn, the investments must be  predicated 
on a long period of social peace and political stability.  Whether that stability 
can be achieved is certainly  Bolivia's most important question. There remain 
259  BolivialChapter  9 
three sociopolitical  cleavages that are serious obstacles to economic stability 
and long-term growth: income distribution,  ideology, and region. 
The income distributional  cleavage  remains profound and  is the source of 
considerable political conflict. The  key political problem  is to moderate the 
nearly  continuous  confrontation  between powerful social  groups,  such as 
organized labor and  private  capital, and the  various  regional  forces. The 
state-capitalism model attempted to finesse the income distribution  problem 
through  a combination  of the inflation tax,  heavy foreign  borrowing, or 
internal  repression  of  the  lower classes.  None of these  alternatives  is 
workable for a long-term development strategy. 
A  key  to a  more  equitable  distribution of income  in  Bolivia  is  an 
increased  tax  burden  on  the  higher  income  individuals. Rather  than 
balancing the budget by eliminating the basic services of the state, such as 
health  and education,  considerations of equity  and  stability require that the 
government make increased efforts to secure  an adequate  tax base on the 
higher incomes. This might include a tax on land holdings and higher taxes 
on  luxury  consumption  goods. A second key to a  more  equitable distri- 
bution  of income  would be  greater  public  spending  on  education in  the 
rural  sector, where most of Bolivia's  poorest citizens  live.  Investment  in 
the  human  capital  of the rural peasantry is  essential for  long-term  eco- 
nomic development. 
The  second division to  overcome  is  ideological,  involving competing 
conceptions of the role of government.  With the evident  failures  of state 
capitalism in the past  two decades,  there is a temptation on one side for a 
strict laissez-faire economic approach and, on the other side, for a fortified 
socialism. A more modulated approach is more likely to succeed.  Such an 
approach would  recognize the government's  responsibilities  for infrastruc- 
ture and social investments in health and education,  but also recognize the 
limitations  to the role of the state in the productive  sector.  Part of the push 
toward laissez faire in Bolivia is a frank acknowledgement of the limited 
capacity for honest, capable public administration  in the country.  But this 
limitation  could be lessened  by a concerted effort to raise the standards  and 
capacity of the state bureaucracy. A determined effort at improved training 
of civil servants is vital in this regard. 
The third division is  sectoral and  regional.  As we  have  noted,  export 
diversification  will require  a change in emphasis to  agriculture  and light 
manufacturing,  which  in turn will surely entail  some geographical shift in 
the locus of  economic activity from the highlands to the lowlands. This kind 
of shift  can  be  politically bruising and  destructive  if not  handled  with 
foresight and planning. The government will have to tread carefully  between 
goals of allocating  investment expenditures heavily  toward the new sectors 
and regions,  and  the need to distribute  the burdens and  benefits of public 




I. The hypennflations in Peru (beginning in 1988) and in Argentina (1989) are the 
only other  hyperinflations  that did not occur following a war or revolution. 
2.  The inflation rate for the hyperinflation is measured as the twelve-month change 
for August  1985  over August  1984. The  1986 measure is December  1986 over 
December 1985. 
3.  See Malloy 1970 for an  authoritative account of twentieth century Bolivian 
history before the Revolution, with  an  emphasis on the secular decline of the tin 
sector starting in the late 1920s. 
4.  There are several questions about the quality of  the Bolivian National Accounts. 
Reported figures by  the Central Bank of Bolivia differ, substantially in some cases, 
from those published by the IMF and the World Bank. Even more surprising, there 
are  significant differences between the  IMF  and  World  Bank data.  In the  book, 
National Accounts data up to 1979 are sourced in Central Bank data because they are 
more complete. The discrepancies with other sources are relatively minor. We have 
preferred,  in general,  World Bank data  for  the period  after  1980.  It  should be 
mentioned that the Central Bank substantially changed its methodology of national 
accounting after 1980. The new data seem to invite a thorough reviswn. 
5.  Coca production and consumption by Indian peasants in the Bolivian highlands 
have  a secular tradition. Coca is used to fight  hunger and the effects of  physical stress 
in  populations with very  low  standards of nutrition.  Curative properties of coca 
leaves have also been known in the urban centers of Bolivia for centuries: brewed 
coca leaves are used regularly to cope with minor ailments as diverse as high-altitude 
sickness  and  toothaches.  Many  Bolivians.  even  in  the  cities,  consider  coca  a 
miraculous plant.  it must  also be added that coca plants have  a natural habitat in 
altitudes ranging between 1,000 and 2,000 meters. Bolivia has great extensions of 
land on those altitudes. Productivity there is very  high, and little capital investment 
and labor are needed to grow the coca shrubs. Cropping and marketing are, however, 
very labor intensive, and most of the costs are incurred in those phases. High prices 
for the end-product coca  usually mean high revenues for everybody in the chain, 
from  middlemen  to hitherto  impoverished peasants.  This partially  explains  why 
eradication is so unpopular, especially with poor peasants. 
6.  Bolivia  briefly  exported oil in the  1970s,  but rising internal demand and falling 
reserves eventually led to an elimination of oil exports. Bolivia  has continued to be  a 
natural gas exporter to Argentina, but  financial  relations  with  Argentina have  been 
unsettled  since the mid- 1980s, with continuing  disputes between the countries  over prices, 
volumes, and repayments  schedules.  In  1987 and  1988,  Argentina went into arrears on 
payments to Bolivia,  resulting in a serious loss of  public sector revenues for Bolivia. 
Chapter 2 
I.  The Bolivian Revolution is a complex event that defies easy summary. It has 
been the Object  of excellent studies both  in the United States (e.g., Malloy  1970; 
Malloy and Borzutsky 1982) and Bolivia. 
2.  In  addition,  the key political  development  of  universal suffrage  was also established. 
3.  From the very beginning there was technical and managerial trouble,  adding a 
heavy  burden to the fiscal  budget  and  penalizing the  mining  sector,  which  was 
obliged to sell all of its ores to ENAF,  the state enterprise that controlled  the tin 
smelters.  It  should be  noted that  the  Construction of the  tin  smelters had  been 
envisaged  for decades,  but  private  cost-benefit  analysis  had  suggested  the  Un- 
profitability of the operation.  In  the long run, it is possible that  improvements in 
technology and  especially  in  management  could lower  the  costs  of operation 
sufficiently to justify the project, but this has yet to happen. 
4.  In  1967, guerrilla units commanded by Ernesto "Che" Guevara were defeated 
by the Bolivian Armed Forces, supported by U.S. intelligence and combat units, in 
the following years, there were several attempts, most of them by university students, 
to reorganize the guerrillas. 
At the time of the coup d'etat of August  1971,  there were rumors of a strong 
Brazilian influence and even intervention among the military. This in itself  would not 
be surprising in view of the place of Brazil in the geopolitics of the region. What is 
more important is the fact that the Brazilian model of  development was regarded as 
the paradigm in economic matters by the new authorities. 
5.  Paz Estenssoro broke away from the government in  1973  because of the small 
(and diminishing)  role  given  to  him  and  his  party  in  the  bureaucracy  and  in 
policymaking. FSB was a junior party in the coalition and it was dropped noiselessly 
alter  one of its leaders tried to stage a coup d'etat in the eastern city of Santa Cruz. In 
spite of the rupture with the MNR and the FSB, Banzer retained in his bureaucracy 
some of the technocrats of both parties. Many of them would later join Banzer's  new 
party, the AcciOn  Democratica Nacionalista (ADN). 
Chapter 3 
1.  A good rationalization of this point can be found in the Estrategia Nacional de 
Desarrollo y Plan Cuatrienal (Ministry of Planning, Bolivia,  1984), 45—52. 
2.  Planning and a high degree of government intervention in the economy have  a 
relatively long history in Bolivia. The extreme dependency on tin and the vagaries of 
that market in the  1930s  led  already  in  1942 (in the so-called  Bohan Plan) to a 
recommendation  Tor government-induced production diversification and the opening 
of the eastern lowlands to modern agriculture and oil exploration. A United Nations 
mission  in  1950  similarly  recommended  more  planning  and  a  more  active 
governmental role in the economy and in the provision of social services. The MNR 
tried to implement  this and Bohan's advice after  the Revolution of 1952.  When 
President Kennedy created the Alliance for Progress program, one of the conditions 
to  have  access to the development  funds provided therein was to have a national 
development plan. In 1962 the  Paz  Estenssoro administration announced a ten-year 
plan of  economic development. At the core of this plan, there was a set of  policies to 
promote an orderly recovery of tin exports to their pre-1952 levels. Some lip service 
was also  paid to  import substitution.  One of the most  important  features of the 
ten-year plan resides in its investment program. investment was to be oriented to the 
provision of social overhead to support production. With the exception of the needed 
funds for  COMIBOL,  little  else  was  allocated  for  the  direct  involvement  of 
government in production. The plan was also innovative in its basic needs approach 
1° alleviate  extreme  poverty.  In  regard  to  the  sources  of  financing,  the  plan 
emphasized the  need to increase domestic savings. However, no specific measures 262  juan  Antonio Morales and Jeffrey B. Sacks 
were included.  Also in the plan  there is  an  underlying  two-gap  model with a clear 
recognition of foreign exchange bottlenecks. 
3.  In  contrast,  the  1962  ten-year  plan  insisted  more  on  social  overhead 
investments for the peasantry holding individual  plots of land. 
4.  In  some  other cases, such as the one with gasoline and other fuels,  the public 
enterprises directly provided  the subsidies to the consumer public. Those subsidies 
were not, however, deducted from the tax liabilities to the Treasury. 
5.  This  discussion is based on F. Machicado (1987). 
6.  This  discussion is also based on F.  Machicado (1987). 
Chapter 4 
I.  PPX  measures the  real  volume  of imports  that  can  be  purchased using  the 
proceeds of  export sales. The index is constructed as follows: 
PPX,  =  [Ps, *  x,/P,,,,j I [P * X / Pj)  *  100, 
where year zero is the baseline year (1980)  in table 4.1, P is the price of exports. P,,, 
is the price of  imports, and X is the volume of  exports.  Note that movements in PPX 
can  be  decomposed into movements  in  the  tenns  of trade and movements  in the 
volume of exports: 
PPX,  =  [IPtiP)/(Po/P,,o)I * 
Bolivia in fact  suffered  large declines in the volume  of exports (which fell by 31 
percent between 1980 and  1988)  and in the tenns of trade (which fell by II percent 
between 1980 and 1988), according to the  1988 data of ECLAC, tables 8 and  10. 
2.  The  foreign trade policies  between 1964 and  1978 are discussed in detail  in 
Morales (1982). 
3.  Contraband  color  television  sets,  personal  computers,  stereos,  and  even 
automobiles have been sold in the open market in the most important  Bolivian  cities 
at below international prices since the mid-l970s. Allegedly,  this is possible because 
those contraband imports serve to launder drug money (or  coca-dollars"). 
4.  The system of prior import deposits consisted of a 120-day deposit in Bolivian 
pesos in the domestic banking system to which the private importers were liable. The 
deposit had to be equal to a given percentage, with a ceiling of  25 percent, of  the CIF 
value of the imported  goods. These deposits did not earn interest and were subject to 
a  100 percent reserve requirement. 
5.  The government tried, in doing so, to avoid a confrontation  with the IMF, since 
most forms of  administrative allocation of foreign exchange could have  been judged a 
violation of Article VII! of the Articles of Agreement of the IMF. Registration of  the 
demands for foreign exchange had a mild deterrent effect on capital  flight. 
6.  The  use  of the  foreign exchange  system  for several  functions  other  than 
equilibrium in the foreign exchange market has  been  very clearly stated by Cooper 
(197!, 10—13). 
7.  Errors  and omissions  picks  up capital  flight that  corresponds to  measured 
exports and imports (i.e.,  when  measured exports  do not contribute  to a rise in 
foreign  exchange reserves or other measured foreign assets,  the discrepancy appears 
in  errors  and  omissions).  However,  underinvoiced  exports  or wholly  uncounted 
exports (e.g., cocaine) will contribute  to capital flight that is unmeasured by errors 
r 
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and omissions. It is true that understatement of imports  may lead to an overstatement 
of  capital  flight,  but  in  the  Bolivian  context,  the  understatement  of  exports 
(particularly  drug-related Ones)  is likely to exceed the understatement of imports. 
8.  When  the UDP government  took office in the  fall of  1982, one of the first 
measures  taken  was  to  eliminate  the  use  of dollar-denominated  contracts  in the 
tinancial system. All deposits and liabilities that had been dollar-denominated  were 
obliged to be converted into peso-denominated assets at a stated  exchange rate. This 
led to a  massive disinterrnediation  of the  banking  system and to a flight for safer 
assets,  particularly foreign exchange and other foreign  assets. 
Chapter 5 
I. In  1982.  according  to  the  World  Bank  Debt  Tables,  the  MLT  public  debt 
constituted 87  percent of the total  external debt of Bolivia. The same  ratio in  1985 
was 82  percent.  These data suggest that the MIJF public debt  is by far  the  most 
important component of total external debt. 
2.  To some extent, the effective subsidy to debtors was paid for  by an effective  tax 
on depositors. Specifically,  depositors  with dollar-denominated  claims on the banks 
had their claims converted into pesos at a disadvantageously low exchange rate. This 
helped the  banks  to absorb  the  costs of converting  their claims  on private  sector 
debtors from dollars to pesos  at the same  disadvantageous exchange rate. 
3.  This legal  argument  has  frequently  been employed  in the  internal  political 
discussions on the debt, particularly by advocates of unilateral debt suspension. 
4.  A complete evaluation  of the  National System of Projects appears  in JUNAC 
(1985). 
5.  Among them was the investment banking firm of Salomon Brothers. 
6.  The  four tranches and the terms of the refinancing  were as follows: 
Tranche IA:  Short-term  debts  past  due  between  August  1980  and  April  1981. 
Maturity of 3½ years and a grace period of I year. Interest charges at 
LIBOR + 2 percent. 
Tranche IB:  Medium-  and long-term  debts having  reached  maturity  between April 
1980 and April 1981. Maturity of  6 years and a grace period of 2 years. 
Interest charges at  LIBOR + 2¼ percent. 
Tranche II:  Medium-  and long-term debts reaching  maturity  between April 1981 
and April 1982. Maturity of 5  years and  a grace  period of 4 years. 
Interest charges at LIBOR  +  2¼ percent. 
Tranche III:  Medium-  and long-run debts reaching maturity between April 1982 and 
May  1983.  No agreement  was  reached on  maturity or grace period. 
Interest charges at LIBOR  +  2¼ percent. 
In addition  to these  terms, Bolivia was charged a myriad of fees  and organization 
costs:  a  once-and-for-all  flat  fee  of  1  percent  of  the  rescheduled  debt  for  the 
coordinator  bank; an  annual fee of U.S.$49,000  for the coordinator  bank; a fee of 
0.375  percent  on  tranche IA and  1.125  percent  on tranches lB  and  II;  and all 
organizational and legal expenses. 
Chapter 6 
I. If hyperinflations  are  ranked by their maximal  inflation rates over  half-year 
calendar intervals  (January—June,  July—December), the Bolivian hyperinflalion  ranks 264  Juan Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs 
IT, 
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seventh  in the  twentieth century. following: Hungary  (1946:1),  Greece (1944:2), 
Germany (1923:2). China (1949:1), the Soviet Union (1922:1), and Poland (1923:1). 
2.  Cagan defined the beginning of hyperinliation as  the month in which inflation 
exceeds 50 percent, and the end of hyperinflation as the month in which inflation last 
exceeds 50 percent and is then followed by twelve months of less than 50 percent 
inflation. 
3.  In this case,  in. e, ë are measured at the end of the month; 'n', is the change 
in the  monthly price level.  Ideally, p should  be  an end-of-month  price,  with 
= P, 
—  P,_,.  Since prices  are  available only  on a monthly  average basis, 
end-of-month prices for month :  — I are proxied by a geometric average of average- 
period: and:—  I  prices. 
Chapter 7 
I.  Monetary reform refers to the switch from one currency to another as part of 
the stabilization program. Argentina switched from the peso to the austral in June 
1985 under the Austral Plan; Brazil switched from the cruzeiro to the cruzado in 
March 1986; and Peru adopted the inti in place of the peso in September 1985.  The 
precise economic content of such a shift in currency depends on several  factors. 
including: (I) whether there is a tax on old money balances as part of  the conversion 
process, and (2) the terms under which long-term contracts in the old currency are to 
be settled in the new currency. 
2.  This paragraph, of course, describes a highly schematic view of the linkages 
between the  budget and inflation.  The point  is not  to be comprehensive,  but  to 
emphasize the crucial link in the Latin American context between budget deficits and 
the exchange rate,  and between the exchange rate and the domestic price level. 
3.  As a formal matter, an overvalued exchange rate combined with a black-market 
exchange  rate  acts  as a  tariff.  Marginal  imports  are  priced  according  to  the 
depreciated  black  market  rate,  while exports (to  the  extent that  they  are  not 
smuggled) receive the lower official exchange rate. Thus, the gap between the official 
and the black-market rate acts as a tax on exportables by reducing their price relative 
to  importables.  As  the  gap widens,  the  resource  misallocations caused  by  the 
overvaluation of the official rate eventually  become so enormous as to force  an 
official devaluation. 
4.  In  a famous policy debacle, Chile  fixed  the peso-dollar exchange rate in  the 
midst of a 35 percent annual inflation during 1979. Whde tradable goods prices soon 
stopped rising in Chile, nontradables prices continued to rise  for two more years, in 
part because of a formal system of  backward-looking wage. indexation. The exchange 
rate fixing, combined with a huge inflow of  short-term capital upon a liberalization of 
the financial system, led to an enormous squeeze of the tradable goods sectors in the 
country.  Eventually the exchange rate had to  be sharply devalued. The inadvisable 
fixing of the exchange rate  is probably one  factor that contributed to the  severe 
recession in Chile in  1982 (the other  factors include a reversal of the short-term 
capital inflow, a terms-of-trade decline, and the rise in world interest rates). 
5.  At the time of the stabilization program, official bread prices were set at a tiny 
fraction of world market prices. There was, however, very little bread available at the 
ridiculously low  official prices.  Rather, flour and bread  were smuggled to  Peru, 
effectively setting the internal bread  price in Bolivia at the level of the border price, 
Paz  was sold at many  times  the otticial  price.  The middlemen,  rather than  the 
consumers of bread,  were apparently the largest beneficiary of the subsidized grain 
prices. 
Chapter 8 
I.  No bank will lend to the Argentine government, for example, even for a highly 
profitable public  investment, for  fear that  the loan  will  simply  become  part  of 
Argentina's overall bad debt, ft is dangerous to lend even if  the individual project has 
a good return. 
2.  Negotiations may break down repeatedly, at high cost (e.g., with disruptions of 
normal trade financing), because the various parties  have  a continuing incentive to 
posture, to act tough, etc.  For theoretical analyses, see Fernandez and Kaaret (1988) 
and Rotemberg (1988). 
3.  Even if the banks know that  the debt cannot  be  paid,  they may  still impose 
sanctions for nonpayment,  in order to impress other debtors  with whom  they are 
negotiating. 
4.  Consider a case  in which a wonderful economic reform  is identified, which 
•  would cost $100 million of current consumption in order to raise the debtor's  future 
income and its debt-servicing capacity by $200 million in present value. Suppose also 
that all of this incremental debt-servicing capacity  would be squeezed Out of the 
country by the  foreign creditors in the course of future negotiations. The debtor has 
no incentive to undertake the reform, even though it has a very high return, because 
the benefits accrue to the foreign creditors. However, if the country first entered into 
a buyback in which it paid $60 million for the $1 billion in debt, thereby cancelling 
the debt overhang,  the debtor would then be free to undertake the investment and to 
reap the large returns. 
Note that this incentive efl'ect could work by incentives on a given government (by 
leading the government officials to a rejection of specific public investments or public  sector reforms) or through the electoral process (by contributing to the election of 
governments that oppose the reform efforts). 
5.  As an example, the country could negotiate with creditors to use the receipts of 
future export earnings as collateral for  future debt-service payments, in cases where it 
would be administratively possible  to arrange for future export  earnings to accu- 
mulate in an escrow account out of reach of  the country. 
6.  There are probably only four or five such banks in the United States.  They are, 
however, among the biggest banks. Examples include Citicorp,  Bank of America, 
Chemical Bank, Chase Manhattan, and Manufacturers Hanover. 
7.  I have  been closely involved in  the  Bolivian debt negotiations as the govern- 
ment's main outside economic advisor. 
8.  There were no working meetings with the banks during this crucial period, as it 
was the official negotiations with the IMF and discussions with the U.S. government 
that were of most importance. 
9.  There are several complex reasons for this change of position. Most important 
was the ferocity of the crisis in Bolivia (with real per capita GNP having  declined by 
almost 30 percent,  with the terms of trade having collapsed,  and with a virulent 
hyperinflation  during  1984—85), combined with the strength of Bolivia's adjustment 
program (which eliminated tens of thousands of jobs in state enterprises and closed 
net of the costs of  transport and smuggling. Most bread available on the streets of l.a  the budget deficit by more than  10  percent 01' GNP almost overnight).  Also,  the Antonio Morales and Jeffrey D. Sachs  266  Juan  267  Bolivia/References 
United States had important foreign policy interests in stabilizing democracy in the 
country, since Bolivia borders most of the large countries of South America  and has 
often been feared as  a focal point of unrest (Che Guevara  died in the Bolivian  jungles 
in  1967).  Moreover,  the United States  was interested  in pursuing an  anti-cocaine 
policy  in  the region, which could only be accomplished  with a friendly,  stable 
government. 
10.  In  1988. Bolivia signed a three-year Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility 
with the IMF.  base.d  on a program  of balance of payments  that  presumes that 
Bolivia's remaining  debt will be settled on termS  similar to the buyback. 
II. The financial "costs" to Bolivia of the debt strategy have been minimal. If  we 
judge the net cash costs of  the buyback to Bolivia at $20 million, the country has  paid 
in  total  over three  years  less  than  I  percent of one  year's  (INP ($20  millionl 
$3 billion) to its commercial  bank creditors. At the same time, Bolivia has  received 
large net resource inflows from the official creditor community.  Thus, in contrast to 
Bolivia's net resource inflow, all of  the other countries in the  region  have  been making 
large net resource transfers to the foreign creditors (as Bolivia did during 1982—84). 
Chapter 9 
I.  Bolivia  has  already experienced the disaster of governance in conjunction  with 
the coca mafia under the dictatorship of General Luis Garcia Meza.  Garcia Meza's 
brutal  role  led  to  the  worldwide diplomatic isolation  of Bolivia,  which in turn 
contributed importantly  to Bolivia's financial rupture with the rest of the world. 
2.  In other words, the  export of  coca paste has caused a secular appreciation of the 
Bolivian  real exchange rate, thereby squeezing  the profitability of legal export sectors. 
3.  Taxation of coca  production  and  exports  is  virtually  impossible  from an 
administrative  point of view  and  is  strenuously  opposed  by  the  international 
community.  It is judged that normal taxation of the sector would  effectively lead to 
its legalization. 
4.  In  1986,  for example,  the  Bolivian  government  undertook  joint  military 
operations with the U.S. government  to  interdict coca paste exports and to drive 
down the internal price of coca leaf.  The President faced impeachment proceedings 
for his actions  at  the  hands  of nationalist  elements in the Bolivian Congress. The 
action provoked  a run on the peso ansi a nationwide banking  crisis, as individuals 
sought to remove local deposits in anticipation of  a culTency devaluation.  In the end. 
the peso  was successfully defended. 
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